@opensourcemail.org

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

TROLDESH (a.k.a. Shade) Ransomware Technical & Recovery Playbook

File-extension covered: .xtbl (the variant that renames files to originalname.ext.id-[unique-ID][email protected])

1. Technical Breakdown

1.1 File Extension & Renaming Pattern

  • Extension appended: .xtbl (followed, in some editions, by .ytbl, .da_vinci_code, .no_more_ransom, etc.).
  • Renaming convention: [original_filename].[orig_ext].id-[8–12_hex_id][email protected]

Example:
Report_Q1.xlsx becomes
[email protected]

The e-mail segment varies ([email protected], @firemail.cc, @opensomemail.org, etc.) but .xtbl remains static in this branch.

1.2 Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First seen: ~Late 2014 (Russia/Ukraine focus).
  • Worldwide spike: 2015-2017; campaigns were still active, albeit declining, until March-2020 when decryption keys were released.
  • Key takedown: 27 Jan 2020 – Federal partners in Russia & Interforce announced seizure of C2s; 750 000 decryption keys publicized 2 Mar 2020 via No More Ransom.

1.3 Primary Attack Vectors

| Mechanism | Details |
|———–|———|
| Spear-phishing | .zip/.rar attachments containing .js, .vbs, or malicious .docm → macro dropper |
| Exploit kits | Rig, Nuclear, and GrandSoft delivering Shade payload as post-exploit payload |
| Compromised websites | Water-hole attacks pushing fake codec/installers |
| Remote Desktop (RDP) | Brute-force → manual execution of TrOLODESH.exe via PowerShell |
| SMB lateral spread | Not wormable by itself; uses legitimate sysinternals-style tools (e.g., PsExec) once inside to hop targets |

2. Remediation & Recovery Strategies

2.1 Prevention

  • Patch aggressively: MS08-067 (if still using XP), MS17-010, Adobe Flash vulnerabilities Shade leveraged.
  • Disable Office macros via GPO – “Disable all with notification” → whitelist by certificate only.
  • Filter mail – Strip .js, .vbs, .wsh, .hta, .scr in email gateways.
  • Harden RDP – Restrict to VPN, NLA enabled, 15-char, rotated passwords, lockout policy.
  • Application whitelisting (AppLocker, Windows Defender Application Control).
  • Least-privilege – No admin rights for daily users; remove local admin (“LAPS” managed accounts).
  • Backups & offline images – 3-2-1 rule plus immutable/Tape backups. Confirm restoration testing schedule.

2.2 Infection Cleanup (>.xtbl Variant)

A. Initial scoping & isolation

  1. Physical or VLAN segment infected machines.
  2. Immediately collect volatile memory dump for forensics (winpmem, FTK Imager).

B. Eradication checklist

  1. Malware killing:
  • Boot to WinRE/WinPE → run updated Malwarebytes, HitmanPro, ESET NOD32.
  • Install & update Windows Defender Offline (MSERT.exe) in Safe Mode w/ Networking.
  1. Persistence removal:
  • Registry run keys
  • Scheduled tasks (schtasks.exe /delete /tn UPNPAgent*)
  • %APPDATA%\Roaming\System32\WindosNT\ <– common drop location
  • Reverse any WMI event subscriptions.
  1. Network clean-up:
  • Restore from clean snapshot/VM in server environment.
  • Revoke/re-issue Kerberos tickets (klist purge).

2.3 File Decryption & Recovery

✅ Decryption IS POSSIBLE – FREE

  • Tool: Kaspersky “Shade Decryptor” (get from https://noransom.kaspersky.com/shade-decryptor).
  • Compatibility: Works on .xtbl, .ytbl, .ytbl2, .da_vinci_code, and .no_more_ransom.

Step-by-step:

  1. From a clean Windows OS , download & run the decryptor as Administrator.
  2. Ensure encrypted files are online (decryptor will fetch individual keys from your ID via locally generated pairs).
  3. Provide an empty --au-dessus-de-tout output folder (so original files remain untouched).
  4. Expect >8–24 h run time on large datasets; logs saved under C:\ProgramData\Kaspersky Lab\KDRL\*.log.
  5. Verify integrity – Open random decrypted files; hash compare with last known-good backup.

If decryption fails because of a new sub-branch not released with keys, restore from backups (still the most reliable fallback).

2.4 Post-incident Hardening & Broader Impact

  • Unusual characteristics:

  • Shade was dual-purpose – in parallel it distributed Click-fraud Trojans (Pony) and crypto-miners. Removal tools must scan for secondary payloads.

  • It avoids CIS countries via keyboard-layout check (LANG: 0419 etc.). Non-CIS users see full encryption.

  • Wider implications:

  • >450 k victims globally, 6000+ monetary addresses traced.

  • Highlighted how threat actors repurposed PCs for both ransomware revenue AND ad-fraud concurrently – a blueprint later seen with Dridex/Conti.

    ––––––– End of playbook –––––––