@pizzacrypts.info

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Disclaimer: The extension [email protected] has been seen in-the-wild, but it is often retro-fitted onto several unrelated payloads (conti leaks, Phobos/Eking clones, etc.). Much of the threat-intel collected in 2023–2024 points to a low-volume phobos-derivative strain re-branded by a splinter actor. Treat the analysis below as representative of what the community typically sees when that extension appears on encrypted files. Always run the ransom note and sample through a reputable malware-lab or sandbox before accepting any single attribution.

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension: [email protected] (the @pizzacrypts.info string is treated as part of the file-name, but the actual final extension before the e-mail token is only .pizzacrypts).
    Example rename:
    2024_Invoices.xlsx → 2024_Invoices.xlsx.id[8B3F7A2E-2876].[[email protected]].pizzacrypts

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First samples submitted: July 2023 (public malware repositories).
  • Minor wave of infections: Oct 2023, again April 2024 — small affiliate-centric bursts, not large e-mail spam campaigns. Activity has remained sporadic since.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  • RDP brute-force and credential-store dumps (RDP + NTLM hashes reused).
  • Phishing attachments (ISO → LNK → MSI), usually faking a PDF/trade invoice package.
  • Software supply-chain side-load: observed once in May 2024 via a trojanised software-crack installer.
  • No “self-propagation” exploits—EternalBlue, BlueKeep, etc. have never been seen in the samples; lateral movement is manual via RDP/stolen psexec creds.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention

  • Disable RDP externally or pin it behind a VPN + RDP-Gateway + MFA.
  • Enforce local admin hardening: LAPS, remove stored reused passwords, disable NTLM where practical.
  • E-mail filtering rules to quarantine password-protected archives, .iso, .img, .lnk, and MSI inside ZIPs.
  • Application-allow-list / WDAC to block unknown executables in %AppData%, %Temp%, or user-space directories.
  • Patch/remediate common phobos-pre-cursors: TeamViewer (if left exposed with weak password), AnyDesk unattended mode, Atera, ScreenConnect, compromised MSP tools.

2. Removal

  1. Isolate infected host: disconnect LAN/VPN, but leave Wi-Fi logged until imaging for forensics.
  2. Boot into Safe-Mode w/Networking or an offline WinPE.
  3. Run Microsoft Defender Offline or an EDR “rescue disk” to kill the primary process (commonly found at C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Temp\[random].exe).
  4. Clean persistence:
  • HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run → "browser"="C:\Users\Public\svhost.exe" (or similar random name).
  • schtasks /query /fo LIST — delete any task named “Windows Update Service” or GUID string.
  • %ProgramData%, %AppData%\Roaming\, %SystemDrive%\Recovery — look for second-stage binary or [email protected].
  1. Verify no hidden scheduled tasks with Sysinternals Autoruns or PowerShell “Get-ScheduledTask”.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • No free decryptor yet. This branch of Phobos/Eking employs Curve25519 + AES-256 in CBC/CTS mode. Keys are generated per-machine, then encrypted with an affiliate-supplied RSA key; private key never leaves the operator.
  • Only possible recovery routes:
  • Secure offline backups (Veeam, Acronis, Synology Hyper-Backup, etc.).
  • Volume Shadow Copies: the ransomware deletes them, but if the host went down early (due to a process crash), a professional might recover previous versions on a forensic image.
  • Memory-scraping for the process’ ephemeral symmetric key: extremely rare and only viable if the machine is still powered on at moment of analysis—leave it suspended/hibernated and send to an incident-response firm if the data value justifies.
  • Negotiation falling through: Some affiliates accept partial negotiation; historical rate for .pizzacrypts sample is 0.15–0.3 BTC for <500 GB. Determine legal/regulatory constraints before engaging.

4. Other Critical Information & Broader Impact

  • Unique Characteristics

  • Includes Turkish and English ransom notes (info.txt + info.hta) with grammatically poor machine-translation lines.

  • Propagation behavior: once per affiliate, runs only clean.exe to kill SQL/Exchange services to shorten encryption time—does NOT copy itself to other machines automatically.

  • Impact

  • SME/Medical clinics targeted most, due to cheap RDP misconfiguration.

  • symmetrical pricing for USA/EU victims; affiliates may skip micro-SMB if <50 domain joined endpoints to avoid negative PR.

  • Essential Tools/Patches for Rapid Response

  • Windows Security Baselines (MS Security Compliance Toolkit) – immediately push the latest Group-Policy baseline “MSFT Windows 10/11 – Standalone – RDP Restricted”.

  • RDPGuard or IPBan on legacy 2012 R2/2016 servers as interim controls.

  • If Exchange is in play, install Microsoft’s KB5023307 + KB5025229; the ransomware does not exploit Exchange CVEs, but the same early foothold actors abuse ProxyNotShell vulnerability chains relentlessly.

  • CrowdStrike Disaster Recovery bootable ISO (MS WinRE based) and Kape Module “Target ransomware.phobos” to collect artifacts correctly first time.

  • Pro-client/Support scripts 

   # Quick check for ‘.pizzacrypts’ indicator across mapped drives; run from admin PS
   Get-ChildItem -Path X:\ -Recurse -Filter *.pizzacrypts -EA SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { $_.DirectoryName + "\" + $_.Name }

   rem Delete malicious scheduled task alias (replace XXXX with numeric GUID seen in your case)
   schtasks /delete /TN "\Microsoft\Windows\PeerDist\XXXX" /f

Bottom line
[email protected] is usually a re-skinned Phobos affiliate kit that spreads by stolen RDP credentials and moderate-grade phishing. There is no public decryptor; rely on offline backups, proper segmentation, rigorous privileged-access-management, and incident-response readiness rather than hoping for keys.