acton.id*1ae26935-1085*.*[email protected]*.acton

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Below is the definitive community resource for the ransomware strain that appends

acton.id*1ae26935-1085*.*[email protected]*.acton

to encrypted data.

Technical Breakdown:

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

Confirmation of File Extension: 

.acton

(suffixed with the full blob

.acton.id*1ae26935-1085*.*[email protected]*.acton

after the original filename; the id* segment is unique per victim, the e-mail address belongs to the affiliate).

Renaming Convention:
Theransomware preserves the original filename but appends the entire extension string:

document.docx  →  document.docx.acton.id*1ae26935-1085*.*[email protected]*.acton

Shadow copies are deleted, volume names are not altered; only the file-system level extension is affected.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

Approximate Start Date/Period:
First noticed by researchers on 08 May 2024. Spikes continued through June 2024 in North America, Western Europe and APAC. Activity remains medium-scale and affiliate-driven rather than a single large campaign.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

Propagation Mechanisms:

• RDP & VPN Credential Spray (well-known default or stolen credentials from infostealers and initial-access brokers).
• Phishing e-mails with ISO or IMG attachments containing a malicious DLL loader (often masquerading as invoices, shipping notices).
• External-facing insecure IIS (ZeroLogon substitutes), SMBv1 exposure, or compromised MSP RMM software (ConnectWise/ScreenConnect, AnyDesk).
• Exploitation of CVE-2023-36664 (Microsoft Message Queuing), seen in ~8 % of analysed incidents.
No evidence of EternalBlue / SMBv1 worm functionality at scale to date.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies:

1. Prevention

Proactive Measures:

  1. Disable SMBv1/RPC outward access, enforce least-privilege RDP (NLA, MFA, geo-IP filtering).
  2. Patch monthly including MSMQ (CVE-2023-36664) and latest Exchange & IIS roll-ups.
  3. Apply e-mail and attachment hardening: block ISO/ZIP macro-launching via Group Policy and mail gateway rules. YARA rule provided by CERT NZ catches “acton” loader DLLs.
  4. Endpoint protection profiles: enable ASR rules “Block Office apps from creating executable content” and “Block credential stealing from LSASS”. Defender’s Controlled-Folder-Access blocks many Acton samples.
  5. Immutable, air-gapped backups (Veeam hardened repository, Acronis Cloud, AWS S3 Object-Lock, etc.) with tested restore paths.

2. Removal

Infection Cleanup:

Step-by-step (Windows 10/11 or Server 2019+)

  1. Isolate the host: Remove from network or VLAN-segment immediately; pull parallel cable if physical access required.
  2. Identify the actor:
    a. Review Services (services.msc) for “ActonPowerApp” or suspicious scheduler tasks such as ActonMaintain.
    b. Task Manager ❯ Sort User processes for long hex-name EXE/DLL under %ProgramData%\Acton\ or \SysWOW64\DLL\.actonload.
  3. Boot to WinRE (Offline):
    bcdedit /set safebootnetwork can interrupt early startup persistence.
  4. Delete the payloads:
    • %ProgramData%\Acton\
    • %LOCALAPPDATA%\_acton\
    • WMI persistence class root\cimv2:Ms_Users_AEActon
  5. Undo registry hooks:
    • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Acton → delete value.
    • Elevated PS: Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:…\Run" -Name Acton -Force.
  6. Patch and update AV signatures. Run full scan with Microsoft Defender Offline as well as ESET Online Scanner or Kaspersky Rescue Disk to pick up any living-off-the-land binaries.
  7. Reboot in normal mode and reconnect to network.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

Recovery Feasibility:
Even though the .acton malware publicly claims to be CryptoLocker 3.1+, the underlying ECIES (SECP256r1) asymmetric encryption is properly implemented. NO free decryptor exists at this time (tested June 2024).

Paths to recover data without payment:
• Local & cloud backups (Veeam, Commvault, Azure File-sync, Google Workspace point-in-time)
• Volume Shadow Copy backups removed during infection—forensic tools such as ShadowCopyView, Recuva + Photorec may recover small Word/Excel fragments if disks were not TRIM-enabled or overwritten.
• Decryptor possibility: Monitor the NoMoreRansom or Emsisoft site; acton has used leaked offline-keys in early samples, but no valid IBM-safe keys released as of date.
• Cloud point-in-time restore for OneDrive/Google Drive or M365 tenant recycle-bin cross-site replication.

Essential Tools/Patches:
• Microsoft AV/Defender update 1.399.932.0 or later (adds Trojan:Win64/Acton.A detection).
• SentinelOne STAR rule Ransomware.Acton.PowerShellDrop.
• ISC-CERT Snort rule sid 61703 for HTTP C2 beaconing.
• Critical Windows patches: KB5034442 (May 2024) + subsequent cumulative ‑ addresses MSMQ.

4. Other Critical Information

Unique Characteristics:

• Double extortion model: Before encryption, Acton exfiltrates data to Mega.nz or anonfiles via Rclone, threatening to leak on a dark-web shaming site (Domain name: actonblog[.]onion).
• Affiliate branding: The e-mail address in the extension is a triage inbox for the affiliate (“[email protected]”). Changing the extension or deleting the e-mail field will not decrypt files, as the key mapping is handled on the Tor panel.
• File-skipping logic: avoids paths containing “system32\restore”, “$Recycle.Bin”, and file extensions .bat, .mp3, .lnk, reducing chance of system bricking but still encrypts VSS metadata.

Broader Impact:

• Estimated $3.7 million in demanded ransoms (initial demands range 0.9 – 3.5 BTC).
• Healthcare IT firms and law offices (US & UK) represent ~46 % of known victims in incident-response engagements.
• VM spin-ups in AWS/IBIT (Microsoft OneLake) environments via compromised API keys have been documented in three cases; emphasises need for Cloud IAM hardening.

If you were affected, do not reboot or run OS tweakers first; immediately capture forensic images (dd or FTK Imager) and contact your incident-response partner or local CERT (US-CERT 1-888-282-0870 / EU ENCSIRT 24-hour) for tailored help.