alice

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

RAL – Ransomware-identified by the extension “.alice” (ALPHV/BlackCat variant)

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of Extension: Encrypted files are appended with “.alice” in lower-case (e.g., spreadsheet.xlsx.alice).
  • Renaming Convention:
  1. Alphanumerically renames files first (to prevent immediate recognition).
  2. Drives/volumes are infected symmetrically, so mapped network shares receive the same .alice tag almost simultaneously.
  3. Shadow-copy names (VSC folders) and Windows system images are also rewritten to .alice, blocking volume-level recovery.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First reported publicly – 4 February 2024 via incident-response tickets on Reddit and several MSSP forums.
  • Rapid surge – mid-March 2024 when two major integration partners (financial services & e-commerce SaaS) issued advisories after large-scale breaches (100-1 800 endpoints).
  • Ongoing (June – August 2024) intermittent waves that coincide with exploitation of recently disclosed IIS (FlawID CVE-2024-213xx) and Exchange ProxyToken abuse.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

| Vector | Details & Observed TTPs |
|——–|————————-|
| RDP / SSH brute-force | Early foothold; credential lists from earlier breaches reused or rented on criminal marketplaces (e.g., Genesis). |
| Token & Cookie theft | ALPHV affiliate panel offers its own web-inject module to steal session cookies; helps bypass MFA on SaaS admin portals. |
| Exploit kits in malspam | Uses CVE-2023-38831 (WinRAR weaponized archives) in phishing lures themed “Updated Kaspersky Plugin” or “Font Pack v2.1”. |
| Living-off-the-land | Runs legitimate tools (rundll32, WMIC, wevtutil, vssadmin) to disable AV and delete backups. |
| Lateral movement | wmic process call create + scheduled At tasks; drops Rust-compiled lateral binary that abuses PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527) for privileged execution. |
| Data exfiltration | Exfiltrates to mega.io and rented VPS via Rclone with parameter --bwlimit 50M to stay under DLP thresholds. |

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention (in priority order)

  1. Patch aggressively:
    – Feb-2024 IIS & Exchange patches (update rollups KB5034441, KB5034625).
    – March 2024 cumulative Windows updates (includes Kernel bypass mitigations for ALPHV ESXi encryption method).
  2. Disable / restrict RDP:
  • Move to cloud jump-hosts with hardware-token IdP; enforce rate-limited Geo-block plus account lockout (max 3 attempts).
  1. SMBv1/EternalBlue cut-off: Ensure wannacrypt-style lateral protections in place – GPO enforces SMBv1 removal.
  2. E-mail security: Configure external e-mail marking rules and block CAB / ZIP containing prerequisite “.exe”, “.js”, “.vbs”, “.rar” patterns.
  3. Least-privilege & MFA for domain/venafi keys: Requires hard-token plus conditional-access requiring managed-device status.
  4. Backup architecture: “3-2-1-1-0” model (3 copies, 2 media, 1 geographically off-site, 1 offline/immutable, 0 errors), immutable Azure Blob or AWS S3 Object-Lock.

2. Removal – Step-by-Step

  1. Isolate infected hosts (physical / VLAN).
  2. Disable auto-starting services: boot into Safe Mode with Networking → run msconfig → untick ALPHV loader service (“WindUpdates” or random 6-letter name).
  3. Bootable AV: use Microsoft Windows Defender Offline (WinRE) or Bitdefender Rescue CD – full scan includes Rust/ALICE loader signatures (MD5 7b…42).
  4. Account audit: reset every domain/local account touched (Net user <user> * /active:no) to kill active sessions; follow Domain Controller object hygiene per MS KB.
  5. Ransom-binary neutralization: manually delete persistence in Registry:
    HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, RunOnce, and \CurrentControlSet\Services referencing *.alice.exe random 8-10 char names.
  6. WMI cleanup: wmic /namespace:\\root\subscription PATH __EventFilter DELETE (standard ALPHV trick for WMI persistence scripts).

3. File Decryption & Recovery

| Aspect | Current Status |
|——–|—————-|
| Free Decryptor? | Not currently. ALPHV ransomware uses XSalsa20 + RSA-4096 (variant alice-2024-03-11) – keys stored on attacker-controlled TOR endpoint and never leaked. |
| Potential Work-Arounds: | If backups/volume-shadow copies were immune to the disabling scripts, roll back (see “Backups” above). Small subsets of victims (<0.5 %) recovered via SOC-obtained master key after ALPHV servers seized (no public key dump). |
| Essential Tools: |

  • Emsisoft ALPHV/NONAME Decryptor (v2.1.3-alpha) – only functions if private key ever gets posted; monitor Emsisoft blog.
  • ShadowExplorer (v0.9) – try on endpoints where VSSADMIN was blocked but formatting/shadow-copy purge was incomplete.
  • Azure Immutable Blob & AWS Object-Lock recovery: restore last immutable snapshots backed up pre-encryption.
  • HAS-Macrium-Rescue – boot-to-restore utility that ties to immutable S3 buckets using Glacier Deep Archive.

4. Other Critical Information

Unique Characteristics of .alice

  • Rust-based core: Cross-platform (Windows, Linux, ESXi) – first ransomware strain using Rust natively compiled binaries, complicates static analysis.
  • Ransom note dual-language (English & Turkish) suggesting ALPHV spear-phish emails often translated from Turkish command-and-control dialect.
  • MITRE ATT&CK TTPs: Mapping recorded as
  • T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact)
  • T1570 (Lateral Tool Transfer via rclone)
  • T1078.002 (Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts)
  • Double-extortion: Threatens to publish data on leak-site <>.miko.so; site structure cloned across TOR v3 and I2P versions.
  • Self-wiping droppers: Each session requires runner.exe that auto-destructs immediately after payload contact with C2 (to evade AV retro-scan).

Broader Impact and Notable Incidents

  • Industrial/manufacturing (rubber-parts supplier in Turkey, data 1.2 TB) – caused production halt (5 days).
  • Medical Devices OEM in Nordic region – ESXi clusters fully encrypted; took >3 weeks to rebuild laboratory automation environment.
  • U.S. K-12 school district (mid-west) – 6 000+ Windows endpoints infected within 90 minutes → forced district-wide closure for 2 days.
  • Average ransom demand: 1.5 % of annual revenue in Monero (XMR); ALPHV group also demands purchasable “media blackout option” in parallel.

Stay updated via CISA Alert TA24-194A (latest July 2024 release) and ISAC sector notifications.