aurora

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Below is a community-centric dossier on the Aurora ransomware that has been operationally observed with the extension “.AURORA”.

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TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN

  1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
    • Confirmation of File Extension: All successfully encrypted files are appended with “.AURORA” as the final extension.
    • Renaming Convention: The malware typically pre-pends a random 6-digit identifier (e.g., “[127921]”) to the original file name and then adds “.AURORA”, producing results such as:
    CompanyBudget.xlsx → [127921]CompanyBudget.xlsx.AURORA

  2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
    • First sightings: late June 2018 (v1.0) on Russian-speaking crack forums.
    • Craft kits for sale in underground markets exploded in early 2019, pivoting to mass-email spraying attacks by mid-2019. Definitive global spikes were noted in Q3 2021 as affiliates adopted Aurora in RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service) bundles.

  3. Primary Attack Vectors
    • Phishing with weaponised Office or PDF attachments (Emotet-style macros that fetch the Aurora loader).
    • RDP brute-force / credential stuffing—once inside, Aurora copies itself to the %PROGRAMDATA% path and registers persistence via “Task Scheduler” or “Run” registry keys.
    • Exploitation of unpatched public-facing applications:
    – Confluence (CVE-2022-26134)
    – Log4j2 “Log4Shell” (CVE-2021-44228)
    • Living-off-the-land: Uses legitimate tools like WMIC to harvest & destroy Volume Shadow Copies (vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet).

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REMEDIATION & RECOVERY STRATEGIES

  1. Prevention
    • Patch aggressively: Force monthly OS & application updates; focus on Log4j, Confluence, JetBrains, and IIS bugs.
    • Disable legacy protocols: SMBv1, RDP exposure on TCP/UDP 3389, Telnet/FTP.
    • Enforce least privilege & multi-factor authentication (MFA) for RDP, VPN, corporate SSO.
    • Network segmentation & traffic inspection with SEG (secure email gateway) rules blocking macro-laden Office files.
    • Endpoint hardening: Application whitelisting via Windows Applocker / WDAC and enable Windows Defender Credential Guard.

  2. Removal (Post-Infection Cleanup)
    Step 1 – Immediate Isolation
    – Physically disconnect/shut down active NICs to prevent reinfection & lateral prop.
    – Disable file shares and cloud sync folders until declared clean.

    Step 2 – Malware Eradication
    – Boot into Safe Mode with Networking.
    – Run up-to-date EDR/AV (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Microsoft Defender) in offline mode or use a clean PE boot disk. Target files:
    %PROGRAMDATA%\Aurora.exe, %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Desktop\bin.exe, %TEMP%\encrypter*.dll
    – Remove persistence artefacts:
    • Scheduled task “UpdateTaskAurora” or “SystemIndexerAurora”
    • Registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run (“AuroraSync” / “CASDFds”)

    Step 3 – Credential Reset
    – Assume compromise: Change every domain and local admin password; invalidate Kerberos golden-ticket material (klist purge & krbtgt double-password reset).

  3. File Decryption & Recovery
    • Decryption Feasibility: At the time of writing, no known working free decryptor exists for Aurora. AES-256 + RSA-2048 hybrid encryption used for each file; private keys are stored on the threat-actor side.
    • Alternative Recovery Paths (validated):
    – Restore from verified, offline, air-gapped backups that are not concurrently mapped to infected hosts.
    – Attempt Shadow-Explorer (Windows prior to Win 11) to recover non-damaged shadow copies—successful in <5 % of cases due to Aurora’s early deletion.
    – Leverage file-recovery tools (PhotoRec, R-Studio, Recuva) only after malware has been fully eradicated to extract residual artefacts if ShadowCopies were partially intact.

  4. Other Critical Information
    • Unique Differentiators:
    – Small payload (≈ 470 KB) that compiles itself on-the-fly with PyInstaller to avoid static signatures.
    – “Dashboard view” pushed to affiliates, allowing them to monitor infected count and toggle encryption speed to evade heuristics.
    • Broader Impact / Notable Events: June 2022 Brazilian health-care outage (Hospital Santa Casa de São Paulo) traced to an Aurora affiliate phishing campaign, halting non-urgent surgeries for 4 days.