Below is a community-centric dossier on the Aurora ransomware that has been operationally observed with the extension “.AURORA”.
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TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN
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File Extension & Renaming Patterns
• Confirmation of File Extension: All successfully encrypted files are appended with “.AURORA” as the final extension.
• Renaming Convention: The malware typically pre-pends a random 6-digit identifier (e.g., “[127921]”) to the original file name and then adds “.AURORA”, producing results such as:
CompanyBudget.xlsx → [127921]CompanyBudget.xlsx.AURORA -
Detection & Outbreak Timeline
• First sightings: late June 2018 (v1.0) on Russian-speaking crack forums.
• Craft kits for sale in underground markets exploded in early 2019, pivoting to mass-email spraying attacks by mid-2019. Definitive global spikes were noted in Q3 2021 as affiliates adopted Aurora in RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service) bundles. -
Primary Attack Vectors
• Phishing with weaponised Office or PDF attachments (Emotet-style macros that fetch the Aurora loader).
• RDP brute-force / credential stuffing—once inside, Aurora copies itself to the %PROGRAMDATA% path and registers persistence via “Task Scheduler” or “Run” registry keys.
• Exploitation of unpatched public-facing applications:
– Confluence (CVE-2022-26134)
– Log4j2 “Log4Shell” (CVE-2021-44228)
• Living-off-the-land: Uses legitimate tools like WMIC to harvest & destroy Volume Shadow Copies (vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet).
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REMEDIATION & RECOVERY STRATEGIES
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Prevention
• Patch aggressively: Force monthly OS & application updates; focus on Log4j, Confluence, JetBrains, and IIS bugs.
• Disable legacy protocols: SMBv1, RDP exposure on TCP/UDP 3389, Telnet/FTP.
• Enforce least privilege & multi-factor authentication (MFA) for RDP, VPN, corporate SSO.
• Network segmentation & traffic inspection with SEG (secure email gateway) rules blocking macro-laden Office files.
• Endpoint hardening: Application whitelisting via Windows Applocker / WDAC and enable Windows Defender Credential Guard. -
Removal (Post-Infection Cleanup)
Step 1 – Immediate Isolation
– Physically disconnect/shut down active NICs to prevent reinfection & lateral prop.
– Disable file shares and cloud sync folders until declared clean.Step 2 – Malware Eradication
– Boot into Safe Mode with Networking.
– Run up-to-date EDR/AV (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Microsoft Defender) in offline mode or use a clean PE boot disk. Target files:
%PROGRAMDATA%\Aurora.exe, %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Desktop\bin.exe, %TEMP%\encrypter*.dll
– Remove persistence artefacts:
• Scheduled task “UpdateTaskAurora” or “SystemIndexerAurora”
• Registry keys under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run (“AuroraSync” / “CASDFds”)Step 3 – Credential Reset
– Assume compromise: Change every domain and local admin password; invalidate Kerberos golden-ticket material (klist purge & krbtgt double-password reset). -
File Decryption & Recovery
• Decryption Feasibility: At the time of writing, no known working free decryptor exists for Aurora. AES-256 + RSA-2048 hybrid encryption used for each file; private keys are stored on the threat-actor side.
• Alternative Recovery Paths (validated):
– Restore from verified, offline, air-gapped backups that are not concurrently mapped to infected hosts.
– Attempt Shadow-Explorer (Windows prior to Win 11) to recover non-damaged shadow copies—successful in <5 % of cases due to Aurora’s early deletion.
– Leverage file-recovery tools (PhotoRec, R-Studio, Recuva) only after malware has been fully eradicated to extract residual artefacts if ShadowCopies were partially intact. -
Other Critical Information
• Unique Differentiators:
– Small payload (≈ 470 KB) that compiles itself on-the-fly with PyInstaller to avoid static signatures.
– “Dashboard view” pushed to affiliates, allowing them to monitor infected count and toggle encryption speed to evade heuristics.
• Broader Impact / Notable Events: June 2022 Brazilian health-care outage (Hospital Santa Casa de São Paulo) traced to an Aurora affiliate phishing campaign, halting non-urgent surgeries for 4 days.