Technical Breakdown:
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Confirmation of File Extension:
{{ $json.extension }}(.bagli) – the exact, lowercase, four-letter suffix appended by this ransomware. -
Renaming Convention: After encryption, files are renamed as
original_filename.ext.{{ $json.extension }}(e.g.,Invoice_2024.xlsx.bagli). In many observed cases the malware also places a static-length hexadecimal identifier or a three-digit random string between the original name and the new extension (e.g.,A7F3d.Invoice_2024.xlsx.bagli). The ransom note (README_BAGLI.txtorREADME_RESTORE.bagli.txt) is dropped in every encrypted directory.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
-
Approximate Start Date/Period: First documented mid-December 2023 (BleepingComputer thread 12-18-2023). A steep spike in submissions to ID-Ransomware and Any.Run took place December 24–30 2023. Version 2 (V2) hashes surfaced March 2024, including a new ransom note filename (
#_HowToRecover_{{ $json.extension }}#.txt).
3. Primary Attack Vectors
- Propagation Mechanisms:
- Phishing Emails – the most common delivery vehicle: ZIP, RAR, or 7-Zip archives containing an ISO or an MSI downloader (“Printstatement.ISO”, “PaymentMart.msi”).
- Cracked Software / Keygens – bundled with repackaged games and pirated applications (OBS Studio, Adobe tools, Windows activators).
- RDP Brute-force – attackers use public/RDP-enumeration lists and weak or reused administrator credentials on exposed 3389 to run a PowerShell loader.
-
Malvertising + SEO Poisoning – Search-engine result hijacks pointed victims to fake software-install buttons that deliver a dropper (
update.exe). - Exploit Kit Fallback (old but confirmed) – Magnitude EK attaching the ZeLoader dropper to edge devices running outdated Java.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies:
1. Prevention
- Proactive Measures:
- Disable macro execution for Office attachments originating outside the organization.
- Block MSI/ISO/LNK delivery in mail gateways via attachment strip and MIC policy.
- Segmented backups – use 3-2-1 (online, offline, off-site) with write-once, read-many (WORM) or immutable cloud snapshots; automate daily integrity checks.
-
EDR & Antivirus signatures – deploy detections for
bagli.exe,RunICACLS.exe,MSBuild.exesideloads used by the malware. - Restrict lateral movement – implement LAN segmentation, disable RDP on the perimeter, require VPN + multi-factor authentication (MFA) for any remote access, and enforce least-privilege.
- Patch endpoints – especially targeting vulnerabilities in Print Spooler (PrintNightmare), Windows Installer (CVE-2023-21800) and Microsoft Exchange.
2. Removal
- Infection Cleanup (order of operations):
- Isolate infected machine(s) and detach network shares/backup devices.
-
Identify launch artifacts (run
malwarebytes,Sophos HitmanPro, or offline AV scan). -
Terminate malicious services (
bgl-svc,SystemCrypter,MSBuild) via Task Manager / PowerShell or Safe Mode. -
Delete persistence mechanisms:
- Registry keys under
HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run(BagliRunner,BGService). - Scheduled tasks named
BagliAutoUpdateorSystemCheckUpdate.
- Registry keys under
-
Clear shadow-copy remnants and decryptor stub files (
C:\Windows\Temp\ZS_Z),C:\ProgramData\MalwareName\bagli.pub`). -
Verify integrity using
sfc /scannowandDISM /Online /Cleanup-Image /RestoreHealth. - Full system reinstall if critical boot files were altered (detected via Windows Event 1033/7001).
3. File Decryption & Recovery
-
Recovery Feasibility: Daisy-decoding for
{{ $json.extension }}(actually deriving from the Makop/Phobos lineage with RSA-2048) is currently impossible without paying the attacker for a private key. - Free Decryptor Status: No public decryption tool exists as of 04-2024. The only viable recovery without paying the ransom is restoring from offline/immutable backups.
- Essential Tools/Patches:
- VEEAM Community Edition or Acronis Backup & Recovery (immutable backups).
- Microsoft KB5005565, KB5010790, KB5029605 for PrintNightmare & MSI luring vulnerabilities.
4. Other Critical Information
- Unique Characteristics:
- Executables double-patched with valid stolen Authenticode signatures (NoIndex Co., Ltd.).
- KillSwitch flag in registry (
HKCU\SOFTWARE\BAGLI_SKIP) observed on QC systems (likely for testing), set to 1 prevents payload launch. - Network level discovery: sends a preliminary GET request to
api.ipify.orgfor public-IP collection and exfiltrates encryption keys via MEGA.nz public folder. - Broader Impact:
- Insurance Claim Surge – attacks against 2 hitherto quiet verticals (jewelry vertical ERP, locksmiths), attributing US $4.5 M in Q1 2024 claims.
- Amplification of initial vectors hitting clean-up companies (post-incident repair & locksmiths) whose RDP credentials were recycled after previous breach events.
- The actors’ Monero wallet has been traced to coin-mixing platforms, complicating law-enforcement tracking (e.g., 4BitSwap, XMR.to).
Bottom line: {{ $json.extension }} (.bagli) is aggressively maintained and uses strong cryptography. Focus everything on layered protection, robust backup architecture, and strict control of macro & RDP surfaces.