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[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Technical error: the placeholder {{ $json.extension }} evaluated to the literal string “blank”.
“Blank” is not a known ransomware extension, so there is no credible forensic data about a family that stores *.blank encrypted files.

Below you will find (1) concise instructions for confirming the real extension in case the placeholder simply collapsed, and (2) a template that you can instantly populate once the actual extension is known.

  1. Quick Reality-Check – what is the file’s NEW extension?
    • Open any directory that contains the seized documents.
    • The files are usually renamed twice:
    original name → [randomorid_string].[extension]
    e.g.
    Invoice.xlsx → Invoice.xlsx.0P4L0CK3R
    Report.doc → Report.doc.Locked
    • Write down the substring after the last dot. That string is what replaces “blank” in all following sections.
  1. Template – ready to be filled-in once you have the real extension

Once the correct extension is identified, copy the framework below and paste it into a new document or ticket.
Replace every instance of «EXT» with the extension you just found (e.g. .ma1x, .0P4L0CK3R, .locked, etc.).

«EXT» – Technical Breakdown

  1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
    • Confirmation of Extension – The ransomware appends the suffix «.EXT» to every encrypted file.
    • Renaming Convention – Typical pattern observed: <original_filename> → <original_filename>.<random-16-chars>.EXT (some variants strictly use unique_id.EXT). Files in network shares may get an additional __locked prefix.

  2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
    • First samples surfaced around ≈ «yyyy-mm».
    • Peak activity week seen in «month-year» following a spam-wave or «specific exploit-name» mass-scanning window.

  3. Primary Attack Vectors
    • Exploit vectors –
    – CVE-«YYYY-XXXX» (if known) exploitation of remote services.
    – SMBv1 / EternalBlue-style propagation (ms17-010).
    – RDP exposed to the Internet with weak / reused passwords or lacking Network Level Authentication.
    • Delivery mechanisms –
    – Malicious Microsoft Office macros inside .xlsm or .docm attachments.
    – Fake software-update pages serving NullSoft or MSI dropper.
    – Drive-by download via compromised advertising networks (malvertising).

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

  1. Prevention (first 24 h after detection)
    • Isolate suspected hosts (pull patch cable / disable Wi-Fi NIC).
    • Disable SMBv1 on all Windows endpoints and servers (Group Policy → disable “Microsoft network client” → uncheck “Microsoft Networks: SMB 1.0”).
    • Segregate VLANs; block inbound TCP/445 and TCP/3389 unless needed.
    • Enforce MFA and complex passwords for any external-facing RDP.
    • Apply vendor patch for CVE-«YYYY-XXXX».
    • Deploy EDR or AV with behavioral-blocking rules for “mass file rename followed by ransom-note drop”.

  2. Removal
    • Step-by-step:
    a. Boot the infected host into safe mode with networking OFF.
    b. Run a reputable offline rescue disk (Kaspersky Rescue, Bitdefender Rescue, Sophos Bootable).
    c. Delete the lateral-movement scheduled tasks often named: %TEMP%\svchost.exe, rundll32 scheduled.dll,Start.
    d. Remove persistence keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\...\Run pointing to %windir%\system32\«variant_name».exe.
    e. Reboot into normal mode, install OS updates, rerun full-scan.

  3. File Decryption & Recovery
    • Feasibility statement:
    – If «EXT» belongs to a family for which public decryptors exist (e.g., GandCrab, STOP/Djvu, Old TeslaCrypt), state the tool & link to the .ZIP:
    • Emsisoft Decryptor for «EXT» – https://emsisoft.com/decryptor-blank (update blank after confirming family).
    – If the family is newly emerged without flaw, decryption is not currently possible; rely solely on offline backups or volume-shadow-copies (VSS).
    • Tool chain:
    – ShadowExplorer 0.9, Veeam Agent for Windows, Windows Server Backups.
    – Windows built-in vssadmin list shadows + robocopy.

  4. Other Critical Information
    • Ransom note name – usually dropped as README_RESTORE_FILES_«EXT».txt or DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html.
    • Payment method – Monero (XMR) wallet 4«…» (check note for string).
    • Unique identifiers –
    – Leaves registry blob under HKLM\SOFTWARE\«EXT» (stores “UID” and “userpublickey”).
    – Terminates SQL, VMware, Veeam services via cmd.exe /c net stop *" /*.

  1. Action required
    • Replace every «…» bracket with the real data you collected during triage.
    • Publish this filled-in version in your incident-response Wiki and share with affected departments.

Once we have the accurate extension, happy to deliver the fully populated guide.