Ransomware Dossier – “Bowd” (file-extension “.bowd”)
Technical Breakdown
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Confirmation of File Extension:
.bowd
-
Renaming Convention: Each encrypted file is renamed using the scheme:
<original_filename>.<original_extension>.bowd
Example:Project_Draft.docx → Project_Draft.docx.bowd
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- Approximate Start Date/Period: First samples telemetry-collected in early April 2024. Rapid propagation waves observed during late May–June 2024 tied to large-scale phishing lures.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
- Malspam / Phishing
- Themes: fake “Invoice”, “DHL Parcel Update”, “MS Teams message” PDFs attached or linked.
- Next-stage payload is either a macro-laden Office doc or an ISO (
.iso
) archive. - Document droppers often leverage Microsoft Word Template Injection pointing to a remote DOTM hosting the bowd loader.
- RDP / Remote Desktop Protocol Exploits
- Scans for TCP/3389 exposed to the internet.
- Brute-force dictionaries + credential stuffing using previously breached credential databases.
- Vulnerability Exploits
- ProxyShell (Microsoft Exchange: CVE-2021-34473, 34523, 31207).
- Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) against publicly facing Java products.
- EternalBlue (SMBv1 EternalBlue exploit / DoublePulsar backdoor) – note: recent samples embed the nsa-equation-group RDP equivalent (BlueKeep-inspired RCE) for lateral movement once inside.
- Supply-chain & Pirated Software Bundles
- Cracked Photoshop, AutoCAD, and keygen torrent seeds observed distributing bowd’s downloader.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. PREVENTION – Proactive Measures
- Patch Management
- Apply patches for ProxyShell, Log4Shell, BlueKeep MS17-010, and all Windows cumulative updates.
- Disable SMBv1 via GPO or PowerShell:
Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName SMB1Protocol
. - Email & Web Filtering
- Block all inbound
.iso
,.img
,.vhd
, macro-enabled Office files from external senders unless on an allow-list. - Configure mail-gateway rules to drop messages with suspicious TLD (
.tk
,.ml
, etc.) attachment sources. - Credential Hygiene
- Force MFA on external RDP access (Azure AD conditional access, Duo, etc.).
- Enforce complex, unique passwords; audit for re-used passwords via HaveIBeenPwned feed.
- Network Segmentation & Zero-Trust
- Restrict lateral SMB/LSASS access via Windows Firewall using host-based rules:
netsh advfirewall firewall set rule group=“File and Printer Sharing” new enable=No profile=Domain,Private
- Application Whitelisting
- Enable Microsoft Defender ASR rules (Block Office VBA macros from the Internet, Disable LSASS memory dumping, etc.).
- Approve-by-policy signed code via Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker.
2. REMOVAL – Infection Cleanup
Note: Perform this ONLY after the victim environment is completely isolated from the network (air-gapped) to avoid re-encryption.
- Identify and kill active bowd processes / services:
taskkill /f /im bowd.exe
taskkill /f /im bowdldr.exe
- Disable scheduled tasks used for persistence:
Get-ScheduledTask -TaskName "*bowd*" | Unregister-ScheduledTask -Confirm:$false
- Delete bowd executed files – default locations:
-
%APPDATA%\bowd\
-
%LOCALAPPDATA%\bowd-updater\
- Windows\System32\drivers\bowd.sys (kernel driver)
- Revert registry persistence:
- HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run → “bowdStatus” value.
- HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\bowdDrv.
- Run a reputable, fully updated security product to perform full-disk remediation (preferably offline boot).
- Microsoft Defender Offline, Kaspersky Rescue Disk, Bitdefender Rescue CD.
- Ensure lateral-re-encryption rules disabled before bringing machines back online.
3. FILE DECRYPTION & RECOVERY
-
Recovery Feasibility
– At the time of writing, NO free decryptor released for bowd.
– Encryption algorithm: AES-256 (CBC mode) with uniquely generated 256-bit key, itself RSA-2048 encrypted using the attackers public key stored inside the binary (offline). -
If Decryption Not Possible:
-
Restore from isolated, versioned backups (Veeam, Druva, etc.).
-
Verify backup integrity (checksums) before restore.
-
Implement 3-2-1-1 rule: 3 copies, 2 media types, 1 off-site, 1 offline/immutable.
-
Essential Tools/Patches for Prevention & Recovery
-
Patch Installer: MS17-010 (EternalBlue fix), KB5004442 (RDP hardening), KB5021131 (ProxyShell).
-
MDE “Ransomware protection” toggle & Controlled Folder Access.
-
Sysmon config to detect LSASS memory access (for Powershell Empire/downloader).
-
PowerShell logging + ELK/Splunk detection rules (keyword:
bowd
, entropy >7 edits/bytes).
4. OTHER CRITICAL INFORMATION
-
Unique Characteristics
-
Bowd deletes volume shadow copies (
vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet
) twice: during initial encryption and again at every reboot via scheduled task, drastically reducing native recovery options. -
Adopts “double extortion”: before encryption, bowd exfiltrates filenames/path statistics to a Mega[.]nz folder; victim receives public data-leak threat.
-
Broader Impact
-
Targeted sectors in 2024: healthcare (U.S. midwest clinics), legal/LPO (India/Philippines), and SMB regional governments.
-
Average ransom demand: 0.27 BTC (~US $10,200 at time of campaign, 2024-05-21).
-
Labour-surgical extortion group operating out of former STOP/Djvu affiliates (Russian-language underground forum xss[.]is).
-
Dark-web leak site: domain
hxxps://2bowdleaks6rmcrnmd[.]onion
listing non-payers with proof-of-exfiltration screenshots.
TL;DR Quick Reference Card
- Prevent: Patch ProxyShell/Log4Shell, disable SMBv1, MFA everything.
- Detect: Files renamed
*.bowd
, scheduled task “bowdStatus”. - Remove: Power down network, offline scan, delete tasks & registry keys.
- Decrypt: Not feasible without official decryptor → rely on backups/offline media.