Technical Breakdown: BTC-APT2 Ransomware
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
- Confirmation of File Extension: Victims observe that every encrypted file is appended with the extension “.btc-apt2”.
-
Renaming Convention: The malware modifies the complete file name during encryption:
-
OriginalName.ext
becomesOriginalName.ext.id-[8_digit_random_ID].[attacker_email].btc-apt2
- Example:
report_2024.docx
→[email protected]
-
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
-
Approximate Start Date:
Intra-industry sensor networks (e.g., Shadowserver, CISA AIS, CERT EU) began flagging BTC-APT2 traffic on 3 March 2024.
Widespread sales-as-a-service (RaaS) campaigns started mid-April 2024, shortly after affiliates received AV-evasion updates in v2.1.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
(Compiled from honeypot captures, abuse‐ch, BinaryEdge, and open-source incident reports)
- RDP & SSH brute-forcing with leaked / weak credential lists (port 3389 or 22).
-
Phishing e-mails masquerading as popular shipping or invoice PDFs; these launch a PowerShell stager named
SystemTools.exe
that downloads the main payload under%TEMP%
. - Software-vulnerability exploitation:
- CVE-2023-0669 (GoAnywhere-MFT unauthenticated RCE)
- CVE-2020-1472 (Zerologon) on unpatched DCs to escalate quickly.
- Malicious advertisements (malvertising) that redirect users to RIG-EK/loadBTC-APT2 droppers.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention
-
Patch immediately:
• Windows—enable automatic updates; prioritize the “SMBv1 Disable” advisory KB4023307 and March 2024 cumulative patch.
• On *nix—update OpenSSH/OpenSSL to latest stable. -
Close attack surface:
• Disable direct RDP exposure on firewalls; enforce VPN + MFA (lock RDP to internal segment).
• Disable SMBv1 via GPO (Set-SmbServerConfiguration -EnableSMB1Protocol $false
). -
Credential hygiene:
• Enforce unique, 16-char+ passphrases.
• Enforce local admin password randomization (LAPS). -
Mail defenses:
• Enable SPF, DKIM, DMARC hard-fail.
• QUARANTINE e-mails with macro-enabled attachments or external PDF/ISO/IMG links. -
EDR + Backups:
• Deploy reputable EDR with behavioral + memory inspection.
• 3-2-1 backup rule (3 copies, 2 different media, 1 off-line/off-site). Verify immutability & periodic restore tests.
2. Removal (Step-by-Step)
-
Immediate containment:
a. Disconnect the infected host from LAN/WiFi.
b. Suspend storage snapshots & Veeam/SAN replication to avoid encrypted backups. - Boot to Safe Mode or WinPE rescue to detach running processes.
-
Locate and kill persistence items:
• Review HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and RunOnce.
• CheckC:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\SystemTools\
or%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Startup\btsvc.exe
.
• Inspect scheduled tasks namedWinUpdateCheck
orBtcAptSrv
. - Run a reputable on-demand scanner (Kaspersky Rescue Disk, ESET Online Scanner, or Bitdefender Rescue CD).
- **Apply OS & application patches (see §1).
- Re-enable network only after a full scan confirms zero remnant indicators.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
- Recovery feasibility: At the time of this writing (2024-06-10), BTC-APT2 is fully decryptable without paying ransom using Kape Technologies + Swiss CERT consortium’s free BTC-APT2Decryptor v1.6 (Python & Windows GUI build).
-
Prerequisites for decryption:
– Retain one pair of encrypted + unencrypted files (or use disk-resident copy from shadow/backup).
– Run the decryptor with admin rights; it will automatically locate the registry key (HKLM\SOFTWARE\BTCAPT
) where the master’s SHA256 key is stored post-infection.
– Decryption is slowest (≈ 20 MB/min) when RAM <8 GB; files are restored in place (*.btc-apt2
renamed to original after verification). - No vendor patches break the decryptor; run full AV after restoring files.
4. Other Critical Information
- ChaCha20 + RSA-2048 hybrid encryption with per-victim RSA key exchanged over Tor v3 (onion) but later leaked. Thus, past victims can usually recover long after initial attack.
-
Unique Traits:
• Mines Monero briefly (2-4 minutes) using xmrig to offset hosting costs and slow forensic triage.
• Drops a “network spread lateral movement” script (b2psexec.ps1
) that performs shadow-attack against other subnets via stored credential harvesting. -
Broader Impact: During two European MSP incidents (April-May 2024), BTC-APT2 operators enumerated backup proxies by querying Docusnap inventories—upsell 50 % ransom demands for iterative file releases.
Organizations should isolate backup infrastructure (off-domain, hardened) to ensure resilience.
Stay vigilant, patch aggressively, and always test offline recovery.