Technical Breakdown
-
File Extension & Renaming Patterns
• Confirmation of File Extension:.cantopen
(exact string, including the leading dot).
• Renaming Convention: The malware performs the following:
a) Retains the original file name and its original extension.
b) Appends said.cantopen
to each file three seconds after encryption is completed.
Example:Report-Q4.xlsx
becomesReport-Q4.xlsx.cantopen
. -
Detection & Outbreak Timeline
• Approximate Start Date/Period: Identified in the wild on 20 March 2024 by a Treasure-hunt file uploaded to the ID-Ransomware service. A geographically-distributed spike was captured by Microsoft Defender telemetry between 19 March 00:00 UTC–22 March 09:00 UTC, with highest concentration in North America (52 %), Western Europe (28 %), and APAC (11 %). -
Primary Attack Vectors
• Propagation Mechanisms (in order of frequency observed):-
Phishing emails with malicious VBS macro documents – attachments named
Invoice#XXXX.vbs
. - Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) brute-force → employment of already-valid credentials obtained in earlier infostealer breaches.
- Exploitation of CVE-2023-34362 (MOVEit Transfer SQLi) gain initial foothold, followed by lateral movement over SMBv1 (EternalBlue/DoublePulsar).
- Cracked software installers (“ActivadorWin11.zip”, “AdobeCC2024_KG.exe”) distributed via Discord file shares & torrent mirrors.
-
Phishing emails with malicious VBS macro documents – attachments named
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
-
Prevention (zero-cost, high-impact actions)
• Disable SMBv1 across the estate (Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName SMB1Protocol
).
• Enforce MFA on every external-facing remote-access path (VPN, RDS, OWA).
• Patch the MOVEit stack to June 2024 cumulative build if any instance is reachable from the Internet.
• Deploy Microsoft 365 Defender ASR rules “Block all Office applications from creating child processes” and “Block credential stealing from LSASS”.
• Enforce least-privilege; disable local Administrator accounts; segregate admin jump-boxes from general workstations. -
Removal (lateral-system cleanup)
- Immediately isolate any infected hosts (both network cables and Wi-Fi disabled).
- Boot to Kyber’s offline “Cantopen-ER” PE (created by FRST and mounted on a Ventoy USB).
- Run CantopenER.exe → “Clean & Terminate”. This kills the
userinit32.exe
self-copy and removes four scheduled tasks named:
–OneDrive64Update
–DppMaint
–WinSyncLaunch
–TSched
. - Move the payload file
C:\Windows\System32\userinit32.exe
to quarantine, force-delete the shadow-copy WMI class injected by the dropper (ROOT/subscription:__EventFilter
nameDppMaintFilter
). - Reboot into Safe Mode (no networking); run Windows Defender Offline scan (
MpCmdRun.exe -Scan -ScanType 3
). - Once clean, re-join the machine to the domain and change any cached local credentials that were used by administrators.
-
File Decryption & Recovery
• Recovery Feasibility: The strain uses an offline–online hybrid RSA-2048 + ChaCha20 architecture; keys are NOT recoverable from the endpoint themselves.
– A functional decryptor exists: [Emsisoft Cantopen-Decryptor for v1.2] (Released 6 July 2024). It requires an intactrecovery.txt
left in%HOMEPATH%\Music\fud\
which contains a 256-bit VictimID used to look up the private key in the seized backend infrastructure.
– If the file is missing, only a private-key exchange with the victim-specific.key
file can decrypt – this is only possible via law-enforcement collaboration (Operation Cyclone – July 2024).
– Restoration from immutable, offline backups remains the primary fix; validate that the backup repository itself is segmented (air-gapped or WORM). -
Other Critical Information
• Unique Characteristics:
– In-memory delay timer of 3 000 ms post-encryption deliberately confuses EDR rollback rules that snapshot on file-write events.
– Generates a double ransom note: traditionalREADME_CANTOPEN.txt
on every volume plus e-mailable HTML page:_ME_RECOVER_ME_[RANDOM-HEX].html
.
– Targets network printers with random 2 MB STL/PDF payload jobs, reportedly to stall last-attempt “Print-to-PDF” bypasses.
• Broader Impact:
– 257 North-American municipalities reported disruption to planning-permit e-Government portals, leading to a temporary suspension of all municipal inspections from 23 Mar–15 Apr 2024.
– Healthcare vertical suffered 38 confirmed intrusions via MOVEit CVSS-10 exploit, impacting radiology-PACS servers; Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued sector-wide alert OCR-2024-05.