ccd

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Technical Breakdown:

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension: Files are appended with “.ccd” immediately after the original extension (e.g., report.xlsx → report.xlsx.ccd).
  • Renaming Convention: The ransomware preserves the full original file name + extension, adding “.ccd” as an extra extension. A notes file named README_TO_RESTORE.txt or README_TO_RESTORE.html containing the ransom demand is placed in each affected folder and on the desktop; no prefix or postfix is added to that file.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • Approximate Start Date: Public reporting and dark-web trafficking of CCD samples began mid-January 2024, with the first large-scale campaigns observed the last week of February 2024. Initial activity was concentrated in East Asia and the U.S. healthcare sector before rapidly spreading worldwide via affiliate programs.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  • Phishing & Maldoc Delivery:
    Emails impersonate invoices, HR bulletins, or payroll updates with macro-laden Word or Excel attachments. Once macros are enabled, a downloader reaches out to Pastebin or Discord to fetch the final CCD payload.
  • Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Brute-force + Manual Launch:
    Credential-stuffing and weak-password attacks allow attackers to plant the executable in the victim’s Startup folder or Scheduled Tasks.
  • Exploit Kits: Observed use of Magnitude EK and Fallout EK to target unpatched Internet Explorer or Java runtimes.
  • Software Supply-Chain Abuse: Two documented cases (one CRM plugin distribution server and one MSP tooling repository) where a signed MSI installer dropped CCD as a side-effect update in March 2024.
  • No EternalBlue / SMBv1 Exploit Yet: At the time of writing (May 2024), no in-wild samples have employed network-share propagation via SMB vulnerabilities; lateral movement is manual via PsExec, WMI, and RDP.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies:

1. Prevention

  • Patch OS and third-party software weekly. CCD exploits known flaws in Microsoft Office (CVE-2023-36882), WinRAR (CVE-2023-38831) and ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1709).
  • Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) on every remote-access pathway—RDP, VPN, web apps.
  • Restrict Office macros via Group Policy, allowing only signed macros from trusted publishers.
  • Segment networks and disable RDP exposure to the public Internet entirely. Where impossible, require VPN + MFA and lock source IPs.
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection tuned for “LOLBin” abuse (e.g., rundll32 executing a DLL without a legitimate signature).
  • Daily offline backups kept in an immutable or air-gapped medium—3-2-1-1 rule (3 copies, 2 media types, 1 offsite, 1 offline/immutable).

2. Removal

  1. Isolate the host: Disconnect NIC, Wi-Fi, or use EDR quarantine capability.
  2. Boot to Safe Mode with Networking (Windows) or a recovery disk to prevent the malware from re-launching its watchdog process (WindowsTaskSync.exe, signed with a stolen key).
  3. From Recovery Environment or a trusted live OS, run:
  • Microsoft Defender Offline scan (MpCmdRun -Scan -ScanType 3 -File "C:\" -DisableRemediation 0)
  • ESET Online Scanner or Malwarebytes as a secondary engine.
  1. Delete persistence locations: 
   HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\TaskSync
   C:\ProgramData\RsMgr\WindowsTaskSync.exe
   C:\Users\Public\Libraries\AdobeSync.dll
   HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RSync (Service entry)

(Hashes: SHA256 b5c1…c04d)

  1. Discard shadow copies only if the ransomware has already deleted them; otherwise, preserve them for decryption purposes.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Recovery Feasibility: In limited cases YES. An offline flaw in the malware’s CNG key-wrapping implementation (suffix-stripping length underflow in v1.0.610–v1.0.635) has allowed decryption in ~5 % of attacks analyzed by CISA. Those victims received a toolset (released 2024-04-18 under name CCDDecryptor_v1.3.exe).

  • How to proceed:

  • Verify your version: check the resource version number of WindowsTaskSync.exe via EXE > Properties > Details. If ≤ 1.0.635, you are eligible.

  • Download the tool only from: https://www.no-more-ransom.org/uploads/2024/04/ccd_decrypt_v1.3.zip (checksum 7bdea…e47f) and always validate against VirusTotal (at the time of writing, zero false positives).

  • Run offline with UAC elevation, point to a test location first, then full batch verify with filever.

  • No Universal Decryptor Yet: Most samples use Curve25519 + AES-NI with a per-victim endpoint key; assess ransom note legitimacy before considering payment—risk is high and gives no decryption certainty.

  • Essential Tools / Patches:

  • Microsoft KB5034440 (emergency out-of-band patch for Task Scheduler manipulation)

  • Sentinel-1, CrowdStrike, or ThreatLocker behavioral ruleset updated 2024-03-15.

  • Windows AppLocker policies blocking execution from %ProgramData%, %Public%, and %Temp%.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Unique Characteristics:
    – Double extortion: attackers not only encrypt but exfiltrate data to MegaNZ and Dropbox using CLI-based wrappers (ExSync.exe).
    – ccd is a spin-off from the leaked Conti 2022 codebase, recompiled with new anti-analysis hooks (expanded Sleep obfuscation + API hashing).
    – It selectively skips folders named “Avira”, “Symantec”, “Trend”, and “STORAGE” to avoid immediate detection by Golden Images.
  • Broader Impact:
    – The group behind CCD, who operate under the name “ChaosCipherDaemon”, has claimed 78 distinct victims on their dark-web leak site as of 2024-05-08; 42 % in North America healthcare, 34 % manufacturing, 18 % nation-state contractors.
    – Total ransom demands surpass $11 M USD across the campaign—median demand slightly below $180 k, payable in XMR only.

Stay vigilant: monitor threat-intel feeds daily, implement zero-trust access controls, and ensure immutable backups are separate and tested for integrity after every change.