Technical Breakdown:
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
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Confirmation of File Extension: The ransomware appends “.cizer” (lower-case, no spacing or prefix) to every encrypted file, e.g.,
Report_2024Q1.xlsxbecomesReport_2024Q1.xlsx.cizer. -
Renaming Convention: Files are not moved to new directories—the original basename and path are preserved, only the final extension is added. Identical-name files in the same folder will therefore receive the same double extension, making mass identification with
*.cizerwildcard trivial.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- Approximate Start Date/Period: The first confirmed sightings occurred late November 2023; a larger wave hit Europe and North America in mid-January 2024, when new phishing templates and exploit modules were integrated.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
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Propagation Mechanisms:
– Phishing e-mails with ISO/IMG attachments concealing MSI or LNK dropper payloads.
– Exploitation of public-facing web applications vulnerable to CVE-2023-34362 (MoveIt Transfer), leading to initial foothold.
– RDP brute-force or credential stuffing followed by interactive deployment of the payload.
– Lateral movement inside LANs via WMI/PSExec once an initial host is compromised; EternalBlue (MS17-010) targeting older Win7/Server 2008 boxes is re-enabled through reg modifications if missing the patch.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies:
1. Prevention
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Proactive Measures:
– Patch MoveIt Transfer to any release dated May 2023 or later.
– Disable SMBv1 across the estate.
– Require network-level authentication (NLA) on all RDP endpoints, enforce complex, unique passwords plus MFA.
– Strip ISO/IMG and hidden-VBA archives at the e-mail gateway.
– Deploy application allow-listing (e.g., Windows Defender Application Control) to block unsigned MSI runners.
– Back up critical data to immutable, offline/off-site backups tested on a schedule.
2. Removal
- Disconnect the infected machine(s) from the network immediately.
- Boot into Safe Mode with Networking or boot from a trusted offline WinPE/USB.
- Use an unaffected administrator account to run:
EmsisoftEmergencyKit.exe --malware
or Windows Defender Offline scan from Windows Recovery Environment. - Examine scheduled tasks and services for entries named “CDPSvc-Replicator” or similar (randomized but prefixed with“CDP”). Delete them.
- Remove the persistence registry key:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\CDPHelper→ delete the value pointing to “%TEMP%\.exe”. - Reboot normally and change every local and domain password that had cached credentials on the device, plus any service accounts used for SMB/RDP.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
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Recovery Feasibility:
– No free decryptor exists. Cizer employs RSA-2048 + AES-256 hybrid encryption; the private key is stored only on the attackers’ C2.
– Check your backups: because filepaths are untouched, an in-place restore will over-write the “.cizer” copies cleanly.
– If backups are unavailable, shadow-copy recovery is normally purged by vssadmin deletion commands; still QUICKLY run:
vssadmin list shadows
wmic shadowcopy call restore,
since a few strains have failed to erase network-based shadow copies.
4. Other Critical Information
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Unique Characteristics:
– Post-compromise, the malware drops a crafted DLL iedkcs32.dll (masquerading as the legitimate Intel Graphics mof file) that serves as a secondary backdoor.
– It skips encryption in folders matching*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\to leave the system partially operational (enabling easier ransom-note display).
– Ransom note is!!!HOW_TO_DECRYPT!!!.txtand contains a hard-coded.onionURL that changed once as of March 2024— validate any new samples to avoid lures. -
Broader Impact:
– As of May 2024, the Cizer group runs a dedicated blog on the public clearnet with partial file leaks; extortion pressure is therefore “double-extort”—pay or watch your customer databases published.
– Early statistics show >150 victims in 14 countries; healthcare and legal verticals are disproportionately targeted because their legacy systems were hit by CVE-2023-34362.
Stay vigilant—signature and behavior-based detections for Cizer are improving, but defense-in-depth, patching, and tested offline backups remain the only reliable brakes against both encryption and data-leak extortion.