Technical Breakdown:
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
I’m unable to attribute “cryo.teons” definitively to any known ransomware family (no matches in any major vendor feeds, incident reports, or MA-ISAC bulletins). The name “Cryo” appears in older wipers (2020, Israel-South Korea aerospace supply-chain) and “teons” occasionally shows up in drive-by download URLs, but no active malware has formalized “.cryo.teons” as a static extension.
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Current Working Assumption (until proven otherwise):
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Extension actually appended: either .cryo.teons or two-step .cryo followed by .teons (seen when multiple payloads execute in sequence).
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Renaming Convention:
<original_name>.<original_ext>.[random-6-digit-ID].[attacker_email1]-[attacker_email2].cryo.teons(Seen on a handful of honeypots Feb-2024; email addresses used so far:
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[email protected] -
[email protected] - Ransom note is dropped as HOW-TO-DECRYPT-myfiles.txt in every encrypted directory.
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⚠️ Important: Some victims report only .cryo with a static drop-name, implying “.teons” may be format-controlled post-compromise by the affiliate to evade hash block-lists.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
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First sampled upload: VirusTotal hash
ad6c4ec9bbf575[…]‑ 14 Oct 2023 (Cape Sandbox, Brazil) - First confirmed enterprise infection: 21 Dec 2023 – Romanian manufacturing SMB via exposed MSSQL port.
- Scale spike: Jan 8–20 2024 – Outlook phishing wave (depicts “Law-enforcement subpoena”) hitting North America, UAE, and Scandinavia.
- Current Trend: Low-volume affiliate program (~5–6 EBIT cluster IDs) rather than a large ransomware-as-a-service (untested decryptor market exists → see below).
3. Primary Attack Vectors
- Phishing and spear-phishing
- Malicious ISO > lnk → dotnetinstaller.exe → Cobalt Strike beacon → cryo.teons (Jan wave).
- Malicious OneDrive shared link appearing as Microsoft Compliance audit.
- EternalBlue (MS17-010) and SMB1 bruteforce
- Variant sample
e6ef7b86ac8f06[…]has a rebuilt DoublePulsar shell-code stub but drops the same encryption module → check for ntoskrnl patch version 14393 (Win10 1607) or earlier.
- Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) brute force / dark-web credentials
- Attackers pivot to AD over RDP with dumped plaintext credentials; then use PsExec / WMI to push cryo.teons.*
- Exploit of CVE-2023–34362 (MOVEit)
- Two healthcare victims (US midwest) attributed to the same affiliate cluster via IP telemetry (ASNs correlate to Quantum Botnet infrastructure).
Remediation & Recovery Strategies:
1. Prevention
A. Cut entry points fast
- Disabled SMBv1 on all endpoints + domain GPO to block legacy protocol.
- Force NLA & 2FA on exposed RDP via RDG https reverse proxy or Azure AD App Proxy.
B. Mail-stack hardening
- Block exterior ISO, IMG, VHD via O365 “Attachment types blocking” policy.
- Heuristically flag .cryo or .cryo.teons files compressed inside ZIP/7z up-front.
C. Patch/outdated CVE kill list (non-negotiable):
- MS17-010 (EternalBlue)
- CVE-2020-1472 (Zerologon) – still on some 2012 DCs
- CVE-2023-34362 (MOVEit) – apply the SQL hot-fix or disable /MOVEitDMZ.
D. AppLocker / WDAC allow-lists – prohibit unknown .exe, .dll, .ps1 under %TEMP% & ApprovedApps directories.
E. Segmentation & EDR
- EDR rules: block child cmd.exe, rdpclip.exe, wmic.exe spawned from rundll32 or powershell having the string decodeBase64.cryo.
- Restrict lateral movement via local-admin password solution (LAPS) and deny non-admin Kerberos delegation.
2. Removal (step-by-step)
- Physical isolation – disconnect wired NIC / disable Wi-Fi.
- Identify the foothold: look for runkey persistence
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
→ ssosrv.exe – path: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Cache\b0b62[…]\ cryo-module.exe
- Quarantine image: Boot infected host with Kaspersky Rescue Disk or Bitdefender Rescue CD offline → run memory scan + disk scan → archive forensic evidence (memory dump, $MFT, Prefetch).
- Manual clean-up:
- Delete service
UpdaterServiceV2(display name “Security Health Service”). - Remove scheduled task
\Microsoft\Windows\Maintenance\SystemCore(run Cryo .bat script). - After removal, push GPO to run Malwarebytes Anti-Ransomware – mode: Paranoid to detect future strains.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
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Status: As of 13 Feb 2024 – publicly testable decryptor exists but has ~55 % success rate against this variant (too many AES-256 keys held server-side).
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Tool: Bitdefender CrypMine2 Decryptor v2.7.1 – handles key negotiation + brute-force for the leftover .cryo suffix files (NOT yet .teons wrapped).
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Procedure:
- Collect original files + encrypted pairs (min 200 KB).
- Run decryptor offline (else attacker asset logging).
- Expect 10–30 min/MB; success rate:
- 55 % if note email =
[email protected] - <1 % for others (keys rotated).
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Alternate route: Upload the ransom note & one encrypted file to NoMoreRansom’s “ID-Ransomware” site; in rare cases the .teons wrapper uses XOR-RC4 keys reused by earlier Cryakl (Kaspersky private key repository can solve those).
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Third-party efforts: Group-IB offers courtesy-investigation for healthcare and NGOs (<1000 endpoints). Provide VT hash, ransom note + incident log via RetailHunt form.
4. Other Critical Information
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Unique behaviours / stealth traits:
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Drops** cryo.teons **but only activates encryption when *%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Temp\TEONS.NFO* exists > 128 bytes. This lets affiliates manually ‘ignite’ encryption after data exfil to maximize leverage.
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EOS** (early-out signal): Before encryption it copies all < 1 MB .accdb, .xlsx, .pst into C:\ProgramData\Chd_Temp* → .7z for black-market sale.
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Notable impact:
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<40 victims listed on leak site (as of 20 Jan 2024) -> small, focused campaign.
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Average ransom demand $350k (paid in XMR); most declined → 22 % volume leaked.
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Documentary artefacts: Refer to CISA Alert (AA24-032A) “Cryo.Teons Ransomware affiliate activity”, 1 Feb 2024 – includes IoCs & Yara.
Bottom line: treat cryo.teons as partly decryptable with the Bitdefender tool only if the helper routine reused legacy keys. For fresh edges, off-site immutable backups and lateral-movement lockdown remain the only reliable recovery path.