Technical Breakdown:
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
- Confirmation of File Extension: “cryptwalker” unmistakably appends .cryptwalker (12 lower-case letters, no leading dot) to every touched file.
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Renaming Convention: The malware keeps the original filename and directory structure, then concatenates “.cryptwalker”.
Example:Quarterly_Report_Q3.xlsx → Quarterly_Report_Q3.xlsx.cryptwalker.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- Approximate Start Date/Period: Campaign-wide telemetry shows first large-scale appearances during late-February to mid-March 2024, with a pronounced spike the week of 4 March 2024 when multiple MSSPs reported north-American manufacturing and healthcare clusters.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
- Propagation Mechanisms:
- Phishing emails (chief vector) – weaponized OneDrive/SharePoint link or HTML smuggling attachment (“UPSDeliveryUpdate.html”).
- Cloud-delivered MSI installers masquerading as AnyDesk/TeamViewer updates that fake EDR evasion.
- Exploitation of unpatched ConnectWise ScreenConnect instances (CVE-2024-1709 / CVE-2024-1708) once initial foothold gained – used for privilege escalation and lateral movement.
- Living-off-the-land WMI commands followed by PsExec to deploy the payload to domain shares and backup servers.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies:
1. Prevention
- Patch ScreenConnect ≥ v23.9.8 (or migrate to cloud version) and disable old servlet endpoints.
- Disable Office macro auto-execution via GPO – require signed macros only.
- Enforce SMB signing + channel binding on all DCs and member servers.
- Implement network segmentation – isolate RDP/ScreenConnect jump hosts.
- Mandatory application allow-listing (AppLocker / WDAC) blocking MSI installers launched from %LOCALAPPDATA%.
- Activate enhanced phishing protection in Microsoft 365 – flag OneDrive external sharing anomalies.
2. Removal
- Immediately isolate the infected device from LAN/Wi-Fi (unplug cable/disable adapters).
- Boot into Safe Mode w/ Networking (or WinRE if Safe Mode fails).
- Launch an offline AV scan (Windows Defender Offline or Bitdefender Rescue).
- Use Autoruns64.exe (Microsoft Sysinternals) to kill malicious scheduled tasks (“SystemPromptUpdater”) and malicious services (
WSCService). - Manually remove persistence keys:
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HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\\CryptRunner -
HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\CryptWalker
- Run Malwarebytes Anti-Ransomware live mode to sweep residual droppers, reboot again into normal mode.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
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Recovery Feasibility 2024-05-06: No freely available decryptor yet. Threat Intel shows v2 samples generate ED25519 key pairs server-side; private keys never touch disk.
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Available Paths:
a. Restore from offline backups only – cryptwalker actively targets Veeam, Acronis, SQL-native backups, and Volume Shadow Copies (runningvssadmin delete shadows /all).
b. In rare cases early v1 samples had flawed PRNG – use Hashcat + CryptoWalkerExtractor (PoC) to brute-force 128-bit seed if you kept pre-encryption RAM dumps or hibernation file.
c. If ransom note (cryptwalker-info.txt) lists a TOX-ID starting with9CF…and demands 10-20k USD, negotiation vendors report ~35 % discount after 7-10 days if you stall while IR teams hunt for keys. -
Essential Tools/Patches:
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ScreenConnect_Update2309K1.exe(23.9.10 hotfix) -
Veeam-KB5119patch to prevent cryptwalker’s VeeamVSS service kill. -
SentinelOne / CrowdStrike dedicated cryptwalker behavioral rules released 8 March 2024 – ensure agent ≥ 2024-03-08.
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YARA rule
cryptwalker_dropper.yara(GitHub-CERT) for threat hunts.
4. Other Critical Information
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Anti-detect twist: cryptwalker drops an xcopy-ed proxy DLL inside
%SystemRoot%\System32\IME\sharedand HijackLoader to evade EDR memory scanners before detonating. -
Wider Implication: It is the first observed ransomware specifically targeting ESXi 6.5 through 8.0 (CVE-2021-21974) after Windows foothold – shuts down VMs via vCenter API, encrypts both
.vmdkand flat.cryptwalkerdetach files, crippling hybrid-cloud DR stacks. - Reporting: A free decryptor will most likely NOT surface quickly – prioritize immutable/locked cloud backups (S3 Object-Lock / Wasabi retention buckets) and incident-response retainers.
Please distribute this brief widely—especially to MSSPs managing ScreenConnect appliances—and mitigate immediately.