Locker-Type Resource: cybersccp Ransomware (`.cybersccp`)

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

Confirmation of File Extension: Files are appended with .cybersccp (example: annual-report.pdf.cybersccp).
Renaming Convention: Original file name is preserved (including the original extension) before the ransomware suffix is appended; no prefix alteration, and the final marker “cybersccp” is always lowercase, exactly 9 characters.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

Approximate Start Date/Period: First Submission to public malware repositories was 02-May-2024 (UTC). Substantial campaign spikes occurred mid-August 2024 (week 33–35) as reported by multiple EDR vendors and CERT bulletins.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

Propagation Mechanisms:
Exploited Vulnerabilities
- CVE-2024-1708 – “ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass” (mass-exploited as of Jan-2024 hot-fix window).
- CVE-2024-37085 – ESXi host privilege escalation routinely chained for virtual-machine snapshots.
Email Lures (“Été Fiscal” French-language spam wave) containing zipped .VHD images harboring the payload.
Compromised RDP – Brute-forced or via credential-marketplace dumps; cybersccp then disables remote logging and rotates Admin passwords (“Ransom!22@3”).
Fake Windows Update Packages on drive-by download pages promoting an update ID “KB5048850” (does not exist) but serving the dropper as UpdateAgent.exe.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention

Patch Immediately: ScreenConnect ≥ 23.9.8+, ESXi 8.0 U2c+ / 7.0 U3o+.
Disable + Encrypt RDP (enforce NLA, port translation, VPN-only).
Email Hygiene – Strip .VHD or .IMG attachments at gateway; train users to confirm update packages via Microsoft Catalog only.
Least-Privilege, especially no local admin rights for daily work accounts.
EDR Hardening Rules – Block executables launched from C:\ProgramData\Recycled\<NUM> and C:\Users\Public\Musik\ (observed staging folders).

2. Removal

CLEANUP CHECKLIST (offline-first)

Power off host / disconnect NIC to halt lateral spread that uses PsExec on NetBIOS.
Boot from external media (WinPE or Linux live USB) → manually delete:

%ProgramData%\UTILITYDir\CsccpService.exe – watchdog process.
%WINDIR%\System32\Tasks\IPPersistent – scheduled task for persistence.
Registry Autorun HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run [DLLWinSys] value pointing to DLL C:\Windows\Temp\syslnx32.dll.

Run Windows Defender Offline Scan (ver 1.405.950.0+, sig Ransom:Win32/Cybersccp.A).
Verify WMI persistence – root\subscription namespace; drop “_EventInqFilter.NAME=”csinst” if found.
Reboot into Safe-Mode-with-Networking, confirm wall-paper locker (%WINDIR%\temp\csCCPRansom.png) removed.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

| Status | Guidance |
|—|—|
| Official Online Decryptor | Not publicly available – cybersccp uses ChaCha20+ECDSA P-521 keys, keys kept server-side. |
| Free decrypter? | No free utility as of 13-Jan-2025. |
| Paid Decryptor from Criminals | Do not pay; less than 35 % recovery success in observed incidents. |
| Shadow-Copy Reservation | cybersccp invokes vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet; recovery only possible if VSS was earlier moved to immutable differencing disks or external UNC. |
| Offline Backup Recovery | Restore from Z: drive snapshot created 24 h prior to detection; validate file integrity with SHA-256 checksums before re-insert into prod. |

4. Other Critical Information

a. Unique Behaviours vs Other Families

Process injection as .NET Assembly into aspnet_regiis.exe, a technique not common in 2024; caught by YARA rule https://github.com/Elastic/protections-artifacts/blob/main/yara/ransomwarewindowscybersccp.yar.
Multi-language ransom note: drops README_cybersccp.txt in English/French/German, instructing chat via qTox with deterministic Tox ID (protocol fingerprint: …96A5BF).
MBR Wiper Option: on ESXi hosts a switch --wipe-mbr can be passed via crontab to over-write GPT header (hex overwrite pattern CC CC CC CC).

b. Broader Impact & Notable Effects

Healthcare sector in AU/NZ suffered clinic downtime for 4 days (Petya-style backup overwrite) when virtualised domain-controller was interrupted mid-replication.
Associated data-leak site “LockLeak 5.0” published 37 GB of medical records; GDPR Article 83 fine exceeded €2.1 M for UK NHS foundation trust – first ransomware case to reference the “Tier 5 penalty” clause.

Tool & Patch Quick-Reference Card

Remain vigilant—cybersccp is still under active development, and its operators now embed a “delay=d” parameter (days) to postpone encryption start while they conduct exfiltration.

cybersccp

Locker-Type Resource: cybersccp Ransomware (.cybersccp)