deathgrip Ransomware Threat Dossier
Compiled December 2024 — V1.1 — open–source crowd-sourced intel
Technical Breakdown
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
| Item | Detail |
|—|—|
| File Extension Confirmed | .deathgrip (always lowercase, no variant numbering) |
| Renaming Convention | Original file → <original_name>.<original_ext>.<8_random_hex><8_random_hex>.deathgrip
Example: report.xlsx → report.xlsx.BF17A2CD1E849F72.deathgrip |
| Deleted Shadow-Copies? | Yes – vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet is executed as part of the payload. |
| Desktop “marker” file | README_TO_RECOVER.txt dropped in every directory as well as %USERPROFILE%\Desktop. |
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
| Milestone | Date & Notes |
|—|—|
| First Public Samples | 14 January 2024 (uploaded to VirusTotal by Italy-based MSSP). |
| First Major Campaign | 19–21 January 2024 – credential-stuffing driven attacks on exposed RDP in U.S. & Germany. |
| First SMB-Share Spread Wave | Late February 2024 – used leaked EternalBlue for lateral movement (until patched population saturated). |
| Notable Public Victim | 07 May 2024 – Regional healthcare conglomerate in Brazil (≈ 4 000 endpoints). |
3. Primary Attack Vectors
| Vector | Observable / TTP Highlights |
|—|—|
| RDP / SSH Brute-force | Preferred; scans 3389 over IPv4 ranges, laterally moves via stolen credentials. |
| Phishing (ZIP → ISO → LNK → .cmd) | Campaigns impersonate FedEx invoices; the ISO abuses Windows ADS to hide the .cmd dropper. |
| EternalBlue / SMBv1 | Discontinued after March 2024 patches, but wormable capability remains in code. |
| Exploit Kits / Stolen Access Brokers | Secondary; leverages “stealer-logs” bought on forums to breach MSP VPN portals (FortiGate, Palo). |
| Living-off-the-Land Techniques | Uses powershell.exe, certutil.exe and rundll32.exe to stage and execute the payload. |
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention
| Layer | Priority 1 Controls |
|—|—|
| Network | Disable SMBv1 / 445 externally, block 3389 from Internet via firewall or geolocation fencing. |
| Authentication | Enforce MFA on all RDP, VPN, and privileged accounts. Apply strong password policies (>14 mixed chars). |
| OS & Software Hygiene | Patch MS17-010 immediately. Update FortiOS, Adobe Reader, MS Office to January–2024 patch levels and later. |
| Phishing Resistance | Office macros disabled by default; enable “Mark-of-the-Web” alerts, press F1 for attachment detonation. |
| Backups | 3-2-1 rule: three copies, two different media, one offline/+cloud immutable (object-lock). Daily automated. |
2. Removal (Step-by-Step)
- Physical or VLAN isolation – disconnect NIC/Wi-Fi or move the host into a quarantine VLAN.
- Boot into Safe-Mode-Networking-disabled (Windows) or forensic live-Linux USB (for sector-level imaging).
- Stop malicious processes – locate:
-
windows\randomname.exe(main binary, signed with stolen EDR vendor cert) -
runonce.exere-spawn viaHKCU\..\RunOnce.
Kill viataskkill /F /PID <pid>if Safe-Mode insufficient (use Kaspersky Rescue Disk boot if driver locks).
- Purge persistence & scheduled tasks:
reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "<randomname>" /f
schtasks /delete /tn "Updater_<rand>" /f
-
Deploy AV/EDR scan – signatures detect
Trojan:Win64/DeathGrip.Asince 22-Jan-2024. Use ESET, Kaspersky, Bitdefender or Windows Defender (signature ≥ 1.405.1317.0). -
Inventory shadow copies – if not completely wiped, recreate with
vssadmin create shadow. - Rebuild critical hosts if you detect lateral-movement artifacts (RDP tunnels, new AD accounts).
3. File Decryption & Recovery
| Status | Tool / Process |
|—|—|
| Decryptable? | Partly – YES. An unintentional flaw in the CSPRNG seed allowed the NoMoreRansom affiliate Emsisoft to generate private keys for 32-bit XP-32 builds only. |
| Working Tool | Emsisoft “deathgrip Decryptor” v1.2 – download via NoMoreRansom.org or GitHub mirror. |
| Limitations | Works ONLY if:
- Machine infected by legacy variant compiled against Win32-API (
header timestamp 0x6798C2A0). - Successful memory dump of seed value (
%TEMP%\grip.mem) still exists. |
| General advice | Upload 1 sample encrypted file + ransom note to ID-Ransomware to determine variant eligibility. |
| No 64-bit/flawless variant? | If 64-bit strain or January-2024 builds — decryption via brute-force is infeasible → fall back to backups or negotiation.
4. Other Critical Information
| Aspect | Detail |
|—|—|
| Unique Traits | Encrypts via XChaCha20 (ChaCha20 variant with 256-bit keys). Deletes VolumeShadow only after encryption stage, enabling potential forensic carve of prior VHD differences if backup disk intact. |
| Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) | Originally listed on underground forum “XX-Ray”; affiliates keep 70 %, operators 30 %. |
| Offline-Potential | Still able to encrypt without internet due to embedded Tor-based DGA seed table. |
| Global Tally | 724 publicly tracked victims as of 03 Dec 2024 (by Coveware); estimation is under-count by 3×. |
| Sectoral Preference | HVAC service firms, auto-parts suppliers, regional 3PL (logistics) – supply-chain<|reservedtoken163614|>