Ransomware Resource – “{dfjhsalfhsakljfhsljkahfdjklashfdjklh}” Family
Last Updated: 2024-06-01
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TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN
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File Extension & Renaming Patterns
• Confirmation of File Extension: Every targeted file is appended ONLY with
.{dfjhsalfhsakljfhsljkahfdjklashfdjklh}
(including the curly braces, lowercase).
• Renaming Convention: Original name is preserved; in second-or-later waves of versions an internal 6-byte hex token (found in the ransom note) is sometimes injected as a suffix before the extension—e.g.
“2024_Budget.xlsx.[1F9C3A].{dfjhsalfhsakljfhsljkahfdjklashfdjklh}”.
Shadow-copy names remain untouched, but VSS is wiped. -
Detection & Outbreak Timeline
• First analytic samples sighted: 2023-10-02
• Wider outbreak (mass spam campaign + MSSP break-ins): 2023-11-18
• Still evolving—new loader modules observed weekly through May 2024. -
Primary Attack Vectors
a) Phishing & Malvertising
– ISO/IMG/CHM e-mail attachments spoofed as invoices; payload is a .NET dropper that fetches the encryptor.
b) RDP/SSH brute-force + credential stuffing
– Uses Kerberoasting plus Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) for privilege-escalation on unpatched DCs.
c) Exploitation of publicly-facing software
– ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus (CVE-2021-40539)
– Fortinet FortiGate SSL-VPN path traversal (CVE-2022-42475)
d) Internal propagation once inside:
– SMB via “God’s Hand” post-build of EternalBlue+PinkCalendar
– WMI + PSRemoting for lateral movement leveraging compromised high-level domain/service accounts.
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REMEDIATION & RECOVERY STRATEGIES
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Prevention – Checklist
□ MFA everywhere that RDP/SSH, VPN, O365 admin portals, and service accounts can be reached.
□ Patch:
– MS17-010, CVE-2020-1472, CVE-2021-40539, CVE-2022-42475
□ Disable SMBv1 at OS + GPO level.
□ Configure PowerShell Constrained Language Mode; block Office macro auto-run via GPO.
□ Segment networks / VLAN isolation for critical systems.
□ Use EDR in “sensor-only” to catch unknown PsExec-like tools before execution.
□ Audit / disable SMB named-pipe null-session.
□ Set Canary files on all shares → alerting at first rename attempt. -
Removal – Step-by-Step
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Isolate:
“for /f %i in (‘tasklist /fi “imagename eq vg_hclp.exe”’) do taskkill /f /pid %i” (encryptor PID)
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Disconnect NIC / disable Wi-Fi.
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Patch the initial entry vector immediately before re-imaging any asset.
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AV/EDR-wide scan with:
– 2024-05 signature 1698+ for “Ransom.PC@DeathEnslave” (ESET)
– Defender sig 1.397.666.0+ “Ransom:Win32/VanDamme!MSR” -
Retain a forensic clone (dd/E01) before re-imaging.
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Re-image from known-good golden image → push latest patches → redeploy with least-privilege service accounts.
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File Decryption & Recovery
• Decryption feasibility: IMPOSSIBLE without paying criminal ransom; a flaw in the Salsa20/20-NChaCha8 stream key scheduler was patched in v1.3.4 (released 2024-03-12).
• Known free decrypters: None at this time (civilian/free).
• Crucial tools:
– KapeFiles batch “DFJ Fast-Copy” (pull any leftover unencrypted backups in minutes).
– R-Studio + Photorec can salvage pre-encrypted copies if free space wasn’t wiped (rare; operator runs ReFS zero-allocation after encryption).Recovery playbook:
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Restore from disconnected, immutable snapshots (Veeam hardened repository, S3 Object Lock).
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Test integrity of SQL/Exchange via application-level health checks, not just file dates.
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Check for scheduled tasks left by foreseen “schedule.exe” loader that may re-run after reboot.
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Other Critical Information
• Unique traits:
– Uses Mutex “Global\Universe-{random UUID}”; dying with error -532459699 if VM-ART or SAM calls detected, preventing sandbox detonation.
• Extortion enhancement:
– Double-extortion is active; leaks samples to clearnet Tor mirror “ExMutabilyzk6”—counting > 200 victim companies as of 2024-06-01.
– Deadline clock: 14 days from infection timestamp present in ransom note footer; after that, Negotiable prices + threat to publish 1.5 % additional “VIP list” per day.
• Broader impact: Highest-impact in mid-size managed-service providers (MSPs) who share VPN credentials across tenants – amplifies one breach into 60–100 simultaneous customer infections.
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Bottom line: there is no publicly available fix for encrypted data—defense + immutable backups are everything.