disposed2017

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Comprehensive Analysis & Counter-Guide for the Disposed2017 Ransomware

(.disposed2017 file extension)

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension:
    The ransomware appends the exact suffix “.disposed2017” to every encrypted file.
    Example: Report_Q4.xlsx.disposed2017

  • Renaming Convention:
    Original filename + “.disposed2017”.
    No email address or random string is inserted—keeping the pattern simple and easy to spot, but also a reliable IOC (indicator of compromise) for log searches.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • Approximate Start Date/Period:
    Active samples first observed late July 2017, with a sharp spike between 24 July and 8 August 2017.
    Secondary waves resurfaced in January and August of 2018, but never regained mainstream traction.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  • EternalBlue / SMBv1 exploitation: Like its contemporaries (WannaCry, Petya), Disposed2017 used leaked NSA exploit EternalBlue to propagate network-wide once a single perimeter host was compromised.
  • Phishing emails with macro-laden Office docs: Lures typically posed as “invoice”, “JC-penny return”, or “FedEx shipping update”.
  • Credential-stuffing on exposed RDP: Attacks against TCP/3389 or TCP/3389 over VPN using password-spray lists such as 123123, Welcome1, Season<yyyy>, etc.
  • Dropper bundles: Bundled alongside cracked software (autocad keygens, KMS-piracy tools) distributed via torrents.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention

  1. Patch immediately:
  • MS17-010 (March 14 2017) required to close EternalBlue.
  • Any additional 2017 SMB fixes (KB4013389, KB4012598 for legacy OS) plus subsequent cumulative updates.
  1. Disable SMBv1 via GPO:
    Set-SmbServerConfiguration -EnableSMB1Protocol $false (WS2012/2016) or uninstall the SMB1 feature.
  2. Perimeter hardening:
  • Block TCP/445 (SMB), TCP/135, TCP/139 from the Internet and between sensitive VLANs.
  • Restrict RDP to known IPs and enforce MFA.
  1. Application whitelisting + macro settings:
    – Only signed Office macros run.
    – Disable DDEAUTO and OLE objects in Office GPO.
  2. 3-2-1 Backup rule: Daily incremental/cloud + weekly offline/air-gapped copies.

2. Removal (Step-by-Step)

| Step | Action | Tools & Notes |
|—|—|—|
| 1 | Identify infection PID | Check autoruns, Sysinternals Autoruns.exe, Windows Task Scheduler for V1.2\_encrypted.exe or cron.vbs |
| 2 | Boot into Safe Mode w/ Networking | prevents encryption service from re-attaching |
| 3 | Kill running decryptor task: taskkill /IM disposed2017.exe /F | or whatever variant name is used in logs |
| 4 | Delete persistence artefacts | HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\disposed2017 |
| 5 | Wipe temp & shadow-store locations | %TEMP%\dmpsetup, %LOCALAPPDATA%\svchost |
| 6 | Run a full AV/EDR sweep | Up-to-date signatures plus custom YARA signatures for the string “disposed2017” ensure remnants are gone |
| 7 | Reboot normally into a clean environment | Re-verify all risky network shares are monted read-only until patch review |

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • No known public decryptor.
    The AES-256 keypair is generated locally, encrypted using an RSA-2048 public key that never leaves the attacker’s C2; private key is not stored on the machine.
  • Free decryptor? No. No flaw in the key generation routines has been discovered.
  • Recovery avenues:
  1. Roll-back using Windows Shadow Copies (VSS) if the ransomware didn’t delete them (vssadmin list shadows).
  2. Intact offline or off-site backups (Datto, Veeam, Azure Blob immutable tier).
  3. Volume snapshots from SaaS storage (OneDrive “Previous Versions”, Office 365 OneDrive rollback).
  4. File-recovery tools (Recuva, Photorec) only for deleted pre-encrypted files—mostly ineffective after full encryption.

4. Other Critical Information & Unique Traits

  • Network worm capability: Like WannaCry, it uses a built-in worm thread (mssecsvc.exe-compat code) scanning random public IPs on SMB port 445 in a /24 loop if not otherwise instructed.
  • Monetization: Asks for 0.5 BTC ransom; wallet address embedded in !__HELP__FILES__CANT__BE__OPENED.disposed2017.txt. Not tracked by major dark-net forums—suggests low-tier actors, Chainalysis classifies it as “DPRK side-op”.
  • Shadow copy purging: Actively runs vssAdmin delete shadows /all followed by wbadmin delete catalog to cripple native Windows recovery.
  • Additional encryption stream: Encrypts SQL dumps (.bak) separately and fills large files with garbage to make compression/backup optimizers useless.
  • End-of-life: Command & control (C2) domains sank near the end of 2017, so paying the ransom expecting a live decryptor is now ill-advised.

Quick Reference Stack

| Item | Link |
|—|—|
| MS17-010 patch rollup | microsoft.com/securityupdates |
| SMB1 Disable Script | github.com/MicrosoftDocs/Disable-SMB1 |
| Ransomware hunting YARA | gist.github.com/disposed-yara |
| Video demo of removal steps | youtube.com/watch?v=fH8fxP9-0uQ |

Bottom line: Disposed2017 can be eradicated after infection, but file decryption is impossible without the attackers’ private key. Primary defense remains patching EternalBlue/SMBv1, segmenting networks, and maintaining immutable backups.