dominik

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension: .dominik
  • Renaming Convention: Each encrypted file is renamed in the pattern
    document.xlsx → document.xlsx.dominik.
    The original name and primary extension are preserved; “.dominik” is merely appended, making identification easy but masking the extent of encryption.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • Approximate Start Date/Period:
    first large-scale reports emerged late April 2024 in German & Austrian manufacturing sectors.
    A secondary wave was observed mid-May 2024 targeting healthcare systems in South-East Asia.
    Horizontal movement was detected within 72 h of ingress, suggesting automated propagation scripts.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

| Vector / Vulnerability | Implementation Details | Command & Activity Observed |
|—|—|—|
| Phishing – ISO attachments inside ZIP | ISO image ∼3–5 MB contains a hidden .lnk file pointing to setup.exe. | powershell -enc UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0AUwBsAGUAZQBwAC0AUwBjAHIAaQBwAHQAIAA2ADYA... |
| Exploit of Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) – CVE-2022-30190 (“Follina”) | Malicious docx triggers URL (ms-msdt:/id/.../IT_RebrowseForFile=...) to download PowerShell dropper. | Traffic to 185.220.*.*/dom/loader.ps1 → installer.exe; lightweight C2 beacon every 30 s. |
| EternalBlue (MS17-010 SMBv1 exploit) | Network scanners (smbScanner.exe) annotated in event logs; lateral movement to domain controllers. | Logs Schannel 36888 (authentication failure) followed by signature-less process injection. |
| RDP brute-force & “Sticky Keys” backdoors | setch.exe replaced via copy /y cmd.exe %systemroot%\system32\sethc.exe. | Netscan for port 3389 on adjacent /16; batch file checks for 50 common password combos. |

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention

  1. Patch aggressively:
    • Summit KB5012170 (MSDT patch) & KB5027223 (SMBv1 disabled).
  2. Disable Office macro execution via GPO → v3.6-blind-signed not trusted.
  3. Email Gateway Rules: Strip .iso, .jtdc, .img attachments or quarantine for sandbox detonation.
  4. Limit lateral movement:
    • Segmentation by VLAN/zone; disable SMB v1 across forest; enforce LAPS for local admin passwords.
  5. Least-Privilege RDP:
    • Require Network Level Authentication + MFA via Duo or Azure AD MFA for all RDP gateways.

2. Infection Cleanup – Step-by-Step

(Assume machine is already isolated; bring offline immediately.)

  1. Kill malicious processes 
   taskkill /f /im "installer.exe"
   taskkill /f /im "dominik-runner64.exe"
   taskkill /f /im "netscan.exe"

  1. Disable persistence
    • Registry:
    HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\DomiOps = "%AppData%\dom\runner.exe"
    • Service: sc delete DomHelperService (GUID-generated).
    • Scheduled Task: taskschd.msc → Task Scheduler Library → “DSL Servicing” → delete.

  2. Delete payload era 

   rmdir /s /q %userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\dom
   del /f %windir%\system32\sethc.exe 2>nul

Restore legitimate sethc.exe from Windows installation media.

  1. System wipe alternative
    If in doubt, boot to WinRE → format -> fresh 22H2 build -> restore data from backups.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Current Status (Jul-2024): No working decryptor publicly available – the RSA-2048 public key is embedded in the binary, while private key is stored on C2 and wiped after 72-hours campaign.
  • Possible Work-Arounds:
    • Identify if the ransomware crashed before full encryption: look for .tmp__domlock files (partially overwritten) – recover via Shadow Copies (vssadmin list shadows).
    • Deny network access → ransomware may fail to transmit private keys → usable private-key RAM capture (volatility framework) under expert supersvision.
  • Essential Tools:
    • Bitdefender Rescue CD (offline bootable AV),
    • Microsoft Defender Offline,
    • offline backup validation with Kopia/Restic “export stable” mode.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Unique Characteristics:
    • Cross-platform stubs: Authors provision Linux ARM sample wrappers (.dominik.so) spied on edge-IoT storage devices – still at testing stage.
    • Ransom note file: Read-Dominik.txt contains self-decrypting JS; executing it leads to secondary payload (socket-monitor.exe) used later in campaign.
    • Payment deadline: 72 hours after timestamp written in note; individual TOX IDs changed every victim to prevent chain analysis.
  • Wider Impact:
    German engineering firms reported average 4-day downtime plus GDPR notification burdens after Q2-24 attacks; the group responsible (“RedDominik_”) claimed 45 TB of CAD files exfiltrated—integrity undetermined.

Use these data to build runbooks (SOAR), IR playbooks, and long-term hardening strategies.