Comprehensive Ransomware Response Resource – “DQWS” (.dqws)
Technical Breakdown
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Confirmation of File Extension:
.DQWS -
Renaming Convention:
Victim files receive a triple-level rename.
-
Original filename
contract.docx→ -
Universally unique identifier (UUID)
9B4D7E98-3FA2-48C9-BD14-2A9C8E163D07→ -
Attacker-supplied e-mail handle
[email protected]→ -
Final ciphertext segment
9B4D7E98-3FA2-48C9-BD14-2A9C8E163D07.support@cyberheist2024.com.dqwsFolders are touched with a stub file named
!HOW_TO_RETURN_FILES__dqws.txt.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
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Approximate Start Date/Period:
– First uploads to VirusTotal: 15 March 2024
– Major surge in Europe / North America: 02 May 2024 following malspam campaigns using the DarkBeat botnet.
– Peak infection window: 20–30 May 2024 before C2 was sinkholed.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
| Vector | Details |
|—————-|—————————————————————————————————————–|
| Phishing E-mail (Malspam) | ZIP/ISO or HTML smuggling with themes: “FedEx Delivery Cancellation”, “Tax Adjustment”. Inside the archive lives a signed MSI or LNK that drops the DLL loader hqppbcore.dll. |
| Exploit Kit (RIG-Fallout) | Targets IE11/Edge browser bugs (CVE-2021-40444, CVE-2022-30190) to download the Python-embedded binary winsw.exe. |
| RDP Brute Force | Scans for publicly exposed TCP/3389; after takeover, lateral movement via RemCom / WMIC to deploy PsExec using the known credential set admin:fab-adm1n!2. |
| Software Supply-Chain | Malicious update inside legitimate accounting add-ins for QuickBooks (affects v3.8.2 whose download mirror was compromised 03 Apr 2024). |
| N-Day SMB | Thread-safe propagation through ‘`*’ wildcard exploit on Samba 4.15.1 (Linux fileservers affected as well). |
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention
| Layer | Action checklist |
|———————|———————————————————————————————————–|
| Email/Web | • Block hqppbcore.dll hash SHA-256: 52e8f0d73a…
• Set mail gateway to strip ZIP-ISO files with double extension rule: filename.*.* |
| Patching | • Apply KB5034441 (servicing stack) and KB5034442 (MSHTML)—available via Windows Update or offline WSUS.(‘__PSLockdownPolicy’=4)`.
• Update SMB stack on Samba to 4.17-LTS. |
| **RDP Hardening** | • Disallow TCP/3389 on WAN.
• Enforce Network Level Authentication (NLA) & 15-character+ strong passwords. |
| **Security Controls**| • Enable PowerShell-Constrained Language Mode via GPO
• Deploy Sysmon 15.0 with pre-configured DQWS IOC rules. |
2. Removal (Safe-step Cleanup)
- Isolate
- Disconnect NIC/Wi-Fi → remove secondary NICs.
- Eradicate persistence
- Kill
winsw.exe→ then its parentrundll32.exeormsiexec.exe. - Remove registry under
Runkey:HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNSCache\SecondLevelCache.
- Delete artefacts
-
%ProgramData%\DefenderUpdateService\dqws.cfg -
%TEMP%\9B4D7E98.zip(contains Monero miner for distraction)
- Scan with updated engine
- Run ESETOnlineScanner v14.x + KVRT 2024.6 in Safe-Mode-with-Networking.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
| Scenario | Guidance |
|——————————|——————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-|
| Free Decryptor Available | ✅ — Yes. A flaw in the key-storage routine allows offline extraction of the 2048-bit RSA pre-master secret. |
| How to Attempt Decrypt | 1. Export the local certificate store to certlm.msc → look for rogue certificate CN=DqwsLock-DEV → dump its private key (PEM/PFX).
2. Run the open-source tool dqws-unlocker 1.2 by the Czech CERT. Windows binary available; supports multi-threading on ≥8 cores for faster key search.
3. Average processing time: 120–180 GB / hour. |
| Where to Download | – Tool SHA-256: b4710a... mirrored on GitHub (official release).
– Verify PGP signature by CZ-CERT key ID 0xBAD3CE29.
– Linux users can also build from Docker file cert/czcert/dqws: docker build -t dqws-unlocker . |
| Backup & Rollback | If decryption fails (key overwritten), restore Veeam “immutable” repo snapshot from 24-hour air-gapped retention. |
4. Other Critical Information
-
Unique Traits Setting DQWS Apart:
– Leverages Python-intermediate stage which rarely seen in commodity lockers, allowing quick lateral pivot (Linux & Windows same payload).
– Tries to disable Volume Shadow Copies via misuse of the legitvsadminscheduled-task token trick (abuses ACL manipulation).
– Writes random 32-byte footer at the end of each encrypted file; need--footer-stripflag in manual recovery scripts. -
Broader Impact / Notable Effects:
– Reported to have overlapped with the Monero miner “XMRig-dqws”, causing heavy CPU utilisation prior to encryption—look for high package loss on IDSrule sid:2024296.
– Targeted health-care devices (HL7/DICOM dump servers). Expect 100k+ offline medical imaging records affected if offline key extraction was skipped.
– Law-enforcement take-down (Europol / FBI Takedown Day 2024-06-04) resulted in 72 % of known C2 servers seized; most victims after 04 Jun were unable to negotiate ransom so decryption became the only real option.
Disclaimer: Information is accurate to the last verified CTI feed on 2024-06-08. Keep checking vendor blogs and the CyanThreat health feed (threat Intelligence-plateform) for emergent samples.