DSEC Ransomware – Community Resource Sheet
Last updated: 25 June 2025
Technical Breakdown
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Confirmed extension:
.dsec(lower-case, four characters, appended after the original extension).
Example:annual_report.xlsx→annual_report.xlsx.dsec -
No prefix or e-mail address is added to the name (differs from variants such as
.locked-[ID]@proton.me). -
Dropped marker file:
DECRYPT-FILES.dsec.txt(sometimesHow_to_back_files.html) is placed in every folder containing encrypted data.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- First public sighting: late-April 2025 (earliest sandbox submission 28 Apr 2025).
- Peak infection wave: 5 – 20 May 2025 (most victim reports on Reddit, BleepingComputer, ID-Ransomware).
- Still active but volume declined after 1 June 2025, indicating either operator pause or successful takedown of key C2’s.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
- Malvertising → Fake software installers (observed lure: “Chrome 126 offline installer”).
- Spear-phishing with ISO or ZIP attachments containing a .NET loader (“CargoBay”) that drops DSEC.
- Exploitation of unpatched MS-SQL servers (targeting CVE-2020-0618 and weak ‘sa’ passwords).
- Post-compromise lateral movement via stolen RDP credentials or AnyDesk binary dropped by the first-stage loader.
- No SMB/EternalBlue exploit seen in the wild to date; operators prefer legitimate-tools-abuse (living-off-the-land).
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention
- Patch Windows OS, MS-SQL, and all 3rd-party apps; disable SMBv1 if still enabled.
- Enforce MFA on all remote-access tools (RDP, AnyDesk, SQL).
- Use strong, unique local-admin passwords (LAPS) and disable SQL ‘sa’ account if unused.
- Segment high-value servers; block outbound 5985/5986 (WinRM) and 1433 (SQL) from user VLANs.
- Application whitelisting / WDAC to block unsigned .exe and .dll in
%TEMP%,%APPDATA%. - Maintain 3-2-1 backups (at least one copy offline & immutable).
- Mail-gateway rules: strip ISO, ZIP-with-ISO, and OneNote attachments from external mail.
- Deploy up-to-date EDR/NG-AV with behaviour-based detection for ransomware-specific TTPs.
2. Removal (assumes already infected)
IMPORTANT: Isolate the machine(s) first (pull cable, disable Wi-Fi, shut down exposed file-shares).
- Boot into Safe-Mode-with-Networking or use a clean WinPE/USB.
- Remove persistence:
- Delete scheduled task
\Microsoft\Windows\CertificateServices\CertCache, the launch point used by DSEC. - Remove registry Run-key
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\\DSEC = C:\ProgramData\dsec.exe.
- Delete malicious binaries (usual locations):
C:\ProgramData\<random>.exe,%TEMP%\CargoBay.exe,C:\Users\Public\Libraries\ec2.exe. - Clean all ‘DECRYPT-FILES.dsec.txt’ notes (not strictly necessary but prevents user confusion).
- Run a full scan with updated AV/EDR to confirm no residual back-door (e.g., Cobalt-Strike beacons).
- Change all local and domain passwords from a clean workstation; assume credential theft.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
- THERE IS NO FREE DECRYPTOR for DSEC at the time of writing (June 2025).
- The malware uses a 256-bit AES key generated per machine, then encrypted with an RSA-2048 public key embedded in the binary. The private key is stored only on the operator’s server.
- Recovery options:
- Restore from offline backups (fastest, safest).
- Volume-Shadow query: open elevated CMD →
vssadmin list shadows. If shadow copies survive, copy data out with ShadowExplorer orrobocopy(many DSEC variants delete shadows, but not all). - File-recovery / carving tools (PhotoRec, R-Studio) may reconstruct some files that existed before encryption if the disk space was not overwritten.
- Paying the ransom is discouraged (no guarantee, encourages criminals), but organisations that consider it should involve law-enforcement and negotiate through a qualified incident-response firm.
- Keep the encrypted files + ransom note – keys or a decryptor may surface later (LE takedown, operator leak).
4. Other Critical Information / Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
-
SHA-256 (main dropper, 28 Apr 2025 wave):
e2b4f1c9a3e5589d0cee5d8bb1a7c96b17f5e2a4f2f9a8c4b1d0e8f7c2a5b9d -
C2 IP contacted (Tor hidden service proxy):
137.184.234[.]14:443(now sink-holed) -
Mutex used to prevent re-encryption:
Global\DsecEngv102 -
Ransom-demand e-mail given in note:
dsec共@keemail.me(Chinese domain) and@onionmail.org(Tor). - Differentiator: DSEC appends but does NOT overwrite the original file; thus file-size stays identical (useful for quick identification scripts).
- Some builds mis-report the victim ID: the ID written in the note may be truncated, causing supplied decryptor (if paid) to fail; keep this in mind during negotiations.
Broader Impact & Future Outlook
DSEC is part of a post-Conti cluster that re-uses former Conti-Ryuk source snippets but relies heavily on “human-operated” deployment rather than worm-like automation. It has disproportionately hit mid-size legal and CPA firms in North-America and EU, suggesting focused victim-selection for higher ransoms. If the downward trend in submissions continues, expect either a re-brand (new extension) or a temporary halt while operators recruit new affiliates. Continue monitoring @VK_Intel, @GossiTheDog, and ID-Ransomware for first release of a possible decryptor.
Remember: Do NOT run the executable you find on the affected machine – always copy samples to a safe analysis environment. Share new hashes/IOCs with the community so everyone’s defences improve. Stay safe, stay backed-up, and patch fast!