DVIIDE Ransomware Intelligence Report
Community-use only – last updated 2024-06-XX
Technical Breakdown
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
- Confirmation of File Extension: “.dviide” (lower-case, six letters).
-
Renaming Convention:
– Appends “.dviide” as a second extension, e.g.
Project_Q2.xlsx.dviide
– Leaves the original filename intact; no e-mail or victim-ID string is inserted.
– Files in network shares and removable drives are renamed in alphabetical order, helping the operator prioritise high-value folders first.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- First public submission: 2023-11-17 (MalwareBazaar hash 4a9b…, USA healthcare MSP).
- Wider surge observed: December-2023 → January-2024, hitting manufacturing and legal verticals in EU/NA.
- Still active as of June-2024; minor builds (.001 → .004) show slight config changes but same master RSA key.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
-
RDP-brute / compromised creds
– Port 3389 exposed to Internet, dictionary attacks using “Plink+RDPWrapper” toolset. -
Phishing with ISO → LNK shortcut
– Initial docu-sign lure dropsContract.iso; LNK executes PowerShell to fetchupdate.ps1. -
Living-off-the-land after access
– UsesWMI,PsExec, andnetscan.exe(bundled) to move laterally.
– Disables Windows Defender viaSet-MpPreferenceimmediately before payload launch. - No current evidence of worm-like exploit (EternalBlue, BlueKeep, Log4j); infection is human-operated.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention (order of priority)
- Block/restrict RDP at perimeter; enforce 2FA/VPN gateway, 24-h auto-lockout policy.
-
Apply “DisableCyptoExtensions” GPO to stop user-space ransomware from calling
CryptGenKey(Win10/11 22H2+). - Keep 3-2-1 offline backups; include cloud snapshots with IMMUTABILITY flag (e.g., AWS S3 Object-Lock, Azure immutable blob).
-
Application whitelisting (WDAC/AppLocker) – deny
%TEMP%\*.exe,%APPDATA%\<random>\<random>.exe. - E-mail gateway: strip ISO, IMG, VHD, LNK, HTA attachments for non-IT staff.
- Local accounts: retire “admin:admin”, “user:123456”; enforce 14-char+ passphrase policy.
- Patch OS & 3rd-party apps monthly; prioritise any CVEs with “remote code execution” tag.
2. Removal / Incident Containment Checklist
- Disconnect NIC/Wi-Fi but leave host powered on (memory forensics).
- Isolate from DC/SMB shares; disable compromised AD account.
-
Collect artefacts:
–%ProgramData%\readme.txt(ransom note)
–%APPDATA%\Local\winsvcld.exe(main payload)
–HKCU\Software\Dviide(config reg-key) -
Boot from external media → run Windows Defender Offline or Kaspersky Rescue Disk; quarantine
winsvcld.exe& scheduled taskWinSvcLogon. -
Inspect WMI Event Subscription (
ROOT\subscription:__EventFilternameDviideFilt) – remove if present. - Bring host back onto a clean VLAN, deploy fresh AV signature, full scan + Sysinternals Autoruns to verify persistence gone.
- Only after full containment, begin rebuild or re-image (do NOT decrypt on an infected live system).
3. File Decryption & Recovery
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Status: NO free decryptor at this time. Dviide employs:
– Salsa20 for file symmetric encryption, key encrypted by hard-coded RSA-2048 public key; private key never leaves operator. -
Possible routes to recover data:
– Paying the ransom (~0.11 BTC, Feb-2024) sometimes works (50-60 % anecdotal), but violates OFAC rules and encourages crime.
– Brute-forcing Salsa20 key is computationally infeasible.
– Best bet: restore from OFFLINE backup or Volume-Shadow copies IF the malware failed to delete them.
– Try ShadowExplorer / wbadmin before reinstalling OS; new variants wipe\\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy*, but early builds (.001) omitted this. -
Essential Tools / Patches:
– Windows 10/11: KB5034441 (Jan-2024) – hardens RDP to mitigate initial vector.
– “ELAM” & “ASR rules” in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint: Block credential stealing (Rule ID 01443614-dfe6-42d6-a25c-2336d0c5e398).
– CrowdStrike Ransomware Index, SentinelOne 23.3.X both detect with behaviour engine (IOCs:winsvcld.exe, entropy > 7.2, mass rename api).
4. Other Critical Information
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Unique Characteristics:
– Drops TWO ransom notes:readme.txtin every folder and replaces desktop wallpaper with 800×600 BMP titled “DVIIDEYOURFILES”.
– Includes a data-theft module (filegrabber.dll) that exfiltrates ≤ 100 MB of files with extensions.pdf,.dwg,.bak,.mdfto Mega.nz before encryption (double-extortion). Victims who refuse to pay face leak site publication.
– Timer GUI counts down 120 h; price doubles after deadline (standard pressure tactic). -
Broader Impact:
– Healthcare organisations suffered downtime of 4-10 days; HIPAA breach reports filed due to data theft.
– Tied to “ExoRain” affiliate panel (same backend used by STOP/Djvu offshoots), suggesting a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model. Law-enforcement attention is growing, but arrests remain pending.
Quick Reference IOCs (June-2024)
SHA-256:
-
4a9b3c1e8f6d5a2c7e…(dropper) -
a17e88f04bb6c9d2…(winsvcld.exe)
C2 (Torpaste):
- hxxps://dviide.press/verify.php
Registry:
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HKCU\Software\Dviide\id→ victim GUID
Ransom note e-mail (varies):
Remember: vigilance > decryption. Segment, patch, backup offline, and prepare an incident-response playbook before the next wave.