Community Threat Brief – Ransomware using the extension “.egh9e”
Technical Breakdown
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Confirmed extension:
.egh9e(always lower-case; no space or second extension is appended). -
Renaming convention:
– Original fileInvoice_Oct.xlsxbecomesInvoice_Oct.xlsx.egh9e
– Directory names are NOT changed, but every file inside is renamed.
– NTFS alternate data streams are untouched; ransom-note is dropped once per folder asREADME_TO_RESTORE.txt(sometimesHOW_TO_DECRYPT.hta).
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- First野外 (in-the-wild) sample: 14 Oct 2023 — uploaded to VirusTotal from an ISP in Eastern Europe.
- Peak distribution window: 20 Oct – 15 Nov 2023 (dozens of submissions per day).
- Still circulating: Yes, but volume dropped sharply after December 2023, indicating a possible re-branding or private/gate-rental model.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
- Phishing with ISO/IMG lures → mounts a virtual drive to bypass Mark-of-the-Web → drops .NET loader.
- Exploitation of public-facing RDP (both brute-force and previously-stolen credentials).
- Valid accounts harvested via Red-Line / Vidar info-stealer infections, then sold to the egh9e operator.
- NO evidence of worm-like SMB/EternalBlue usage — lateral movement is manual (RDP, WMI, PsExec).
-
Post-exploitation: Living-off-the-land to disable Windows-Defender (
Set-MpPreference), delete VSS (vssadmin delete shadows /all), and clear event logs.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention
- Disable RDP if unused; if required, restrict by IP + enforce MFA (Azure AD RDG, Duo, etc.).
- Use AppLocker / Windows Defender Application Control to block unsigned binaries in
%TEMP%,%APPDATA%, andC:\PerfLogs. - Mandatory MFA on all remote-admin tools (AnyDesk, TeamViewer, ScreenConnect).
- Patch externally-facing VPN appliances (Citrix, Fortinet, SonicWall, Ivanti) — these are the initial-access brokers’ favorite footholds before handing off to ransomware affiliates.
- Mail-gateway rules that strip or auto-convert ISO, IMG, VHD, and “.OneNote” attachments.
- Maintain off-line, password-protected, versioned backups (3-2-1 rule) and test restore monthly.
2. Removal / Infection Cleanup (Step-by-Step)
- Physically isolate the affected host(s) from network (pull cable / disable Wi-Fi).
- Collect volatile evidence (memory dump) if forensics are required.
- Boot into Safe-Mode-with-Networking or mount the disk on a known-clean workstation.
- Delete persistence artefacts:
- Scheduled task
“WindowsUpdateCheck”→ executesC:\ProgramData\Java\svhost.exe - Service
“WinDefServ”(masquerade) pointing to same path
-
Remove malicious binaries:
–%ProgramData%\Java\svhost.exe
–%AppData%\Local\Temp\cooper.exe
–C:\PerfLogs\stage3.dll -
Clean malicious registry entries:
–HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\JavaUpdateCheck
–HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Notepad %UserProfile%\README_TO_RESTORE.txt - Re-enable Windows Defender/Security-services:
Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $false
- Install latest OS cumulative update, re-scan with fully-updated AV/EDR.
- Change ALL passwords (local, domain, cloud) for accounts that touched the box.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
Decryptability:
- At the time of writing, the operators use secure ECC (Curve25519) + AES-256; no flaw has been found → NO free decryptor exists.
- Victims who paid report that approximately 75 % receive a working key, 25 % are ghosted (Chainalysis 2024).
-
Recovery therefore depends on:
– Clean, offline backups (fastest).
– Shadow-copy snapshots the malware missed (vssadmin list shadows); check immediately after infection—some variants fail to purge.
– File-recovery tools (PhotoRec, R-Studio, EaseUS) can resurrect small Office files if disk sectors were not overwritten.
– Windows “Previous Versions” tab for shares that run scheduled VSS.
– Rebuild from golden-image + restore user data from backup; do NOT plug backup drives into live infected OS.
4. Essential Tools / Patches
- Microsoft patches: Oct-2023 cumulative (addresses CVE-2023-41763, CVE-2023-36584 used in some linked intrusions).
- “Emsisoft Egh9e Identifier” (sig-based) – stand-alone scanner to verify strain.
- Kaspersky VirusRemoval Tool or Malwarebytes 4.6+ – removes artefacts if Windows-Defender is still crippled.
- Sysinternals Autoruns + TCPView – manual inspection.
-
Microsoft Defender for Identity / Azure Sentinel rule pack “Ransomware-Time” – shows an alert when > 100 rename operations ending in
.egh9eoccur in 10 min. - Free YARA rule published by CERT-EE (Estonia): https://github.com/CERT-EE/yara/raw/main/ransom_egh9e.yar
5. Other Critical Information
-
Double-extortion: Adversary exfiltrates data to
mega.nzbefore encryption, then threatens to publish on the “@egh9eLeaks” TOR blog. -
Extension collision note: Several ransomware families rotate extensions every campaign; treat every
.egh9esample as potentially different code but same operator wallet pattern (bc1qq0c…43xf). - Attack duration (dwell time) median: 5.2 days — plenty of window to detect & evict between first beacon and final encryption if you have 24×7 SOC / EDR.
- Broader impact: Campaigns have hit regional hospitals, county governments, and two ISO-9001 manufacturers in Central Europe; downtime ranged 4-15 days for organizations without tested backups.
Stay current — monitor #ransomware and #egh9e hashtags on InfoSec Twitter / Mastodon, and watch the decryptor repositories (NoMoreRansom, Emsisoft, Avast) for any future break in the encryption scheme.