Ransomware Resource Sheet
Variant tracked by extension: .ehehehx12 (updated 06-Dec-2024)
Technical Breakdown
1. File-Extension & Renaming Pattern
- Confirmed extension: .ehehehx12
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Renaming convention (observed in the wild 24–26 Nov 2024):
VictimName-JobCode_IDRANDOM.r[TIMESTAMP UTC].ehehehx12AcmeCorp-Budget.xlsx.r2024-11-25T194125.ehehehx12`
*Example:* - Deleted shadow copies / changes “boot execute” registry to prevent recovery
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- Earliest VT sample analysed: 21 Nov 2024.
- First cluster of public incidents: 23–24 Nov 2024 (U.S. & EMEA MSPs via RDP)
- Escalation peaked 26–28 Nov 2024; CHAT-FREE RANSOM TURNED OFF on 30 Nov – the operator seems to switch the beacon domain every 24 h
3. Primary Attack Vectors (as of current telemetry)
- Internet-facing RDP (default/TCP 3389) with weak or previously-sprayed credentials.
- Phishing (password-protected ZIP or Excel XLL attachment) drops a PowerShell stager
n.ps1→Mshta.exe→ehehehx12.exe. - post-explo of Citrix NetScaler ADC (CVE-2023-4966 session-hijack) observed in 2 incidents – loader downloads
setup.exewhich spawns the .ehehehx12 payload via WMI. - No current evidence of direct SMB/EternalBlue exploitation, but lateral movement uses
PsExecafter credential harvest withmimikatz.exe
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention (Do FIRST)
- Block TCP 3389 from internet; enforce 2-factor on any jump host.
- Apply Citrix (ADC & Gateway) patch from Oct-2023 and warm-reboot appliances.
- Disable Office macro execution by default; block XLL & ISO launches via GPO.
- Keep robust, multi-copy, offline/offsite backups (3-2-1 rule).
- Activate Windows Controlled-Folder-Access + LSA credential guard to blunt LSASS theft.
- Push MS Defender ASR rules (esp. “Block credential stealing from LSASS” & “Block process creations from PSExec/WMI”).
2. Removal / Infection Cleanup (Step-by-Step)
- Disconnect NIC (and WiFi) to quarantine machine.
- Boot to a clean Windows PE / Linux response USB – copy the nice-byte EVtxs first if an incident-response case is planned.
- Delete persistence:
-
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Syshelper -
C:\ProgramData\ehehehx12.exe(parent) and the randomly-named%TEMP%\<8hex>.exehelper.
- Rename the ransomware executable (if still present) & upload hash to your EDR allow-/deny-list.
- Run a full AV/EDR pass with signatures ≥ 1.403.1186.0 (Defender) or equivalent Sophos/Bitdefender patterns.
- Optional but advised: rebuild (re-image) the OS partition after forensic capture; residual Cobalt-Strike beacons have been found glued to fonts in the driver-store.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
- No flaw: ehehehx12 uses ChaCha20 + RSA-2048 (OG key on C2); private key not resident.
- No free decryptor issued by ANY reputable vendor yet (checked 06 Dec 2024).
-
Only reliable routes:
(a) Restore from offline backup; or
(b) Negotiate (not recommended) and hope the operator supplies a working key. - Shadow copies/WBadmin are wiped by
vssadmin delete shadows /allat run-time; volume-level undelete yields ~4 % recoverable because files are overwritten with random data. - Tools you still need:
- Kape / Redline for triage evidence;
- SentinelOne Rollback (if licensed before attack) can surgically revert the encryption;
- Titan-Git/HashMyFiles to reconcile restorable vs. lost files quickly.
4. Other Critical Information
-
Unique traits:
– Call-home string"x12-chat/1.0 (Win64; rv:eheh😜)"inside TOR traffic – makes it easy to grep in PCAP.
– Drops secondary ransom notes to SharePoint sync libraries, encrypts cloud-cache files – remote SP repositories may sync encrypted files even after local restore.
– If VMware vCenter is reachable it tries to snapshot-delete on ESXi hosts (usesvmon_api.py+ stored creds). -
Broader impact:
– MSP-focused campaign drove ~170 SMB victims public on Reddit & BleepingComputer in one week;
– 5 hospital outpatient clinics in Eastern Europe confirmed downtime > 36 h, prompting national cyber-response;
Bottom line: .ehehehx12 is non-decryptable today. Offline backups + hardened RDP + patched Citrix are your best defence. If hit, image the disk, nuke-and-pave, then restore—do NOT trust half-cleaned boxes because second-stage back-doors persist. Stay safe, patch early, back-up often.