eking

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Ransomware Briefing – eking extension

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmed extension: .eking (lowercase; a second iteration of Phobos family that previously used .phobos, .phoenix, .adage, .faust, etc.).
  • Rename template:
    original_name.ext.id[< victim-ID >].[< attacker-e-mail >].eking
    Example:
    Project.docx → Project.docx.id[9ECFA84E-2275].[[email protected]].eking
    If the affiliate runs the “Mario” variant, a short random string may precede the e-mail (e.g., Project.docx.id[…].[[email protected]].mario.eking).

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First appearances in the wild: early Q1-2021 clusters seen on ID-Ransomware & VirusTotal.
  • Peak propagation: April–July 2021 (mass brute-force RDP campaigns combined with cracked software / KMS dropper packs). Still circulating through 2024 because new affiliate kits are sold on dark-web forums.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  1. RDP / RDS brute-force – most common infection path (port 3389 exposed to Internet, weak / reused credentials).
  2. Phishing e-mails with ISO / MSI / ZIP attachments that launch a PowerShell or BAT stager downloading the final Phobos payload.
  3. Exploiting unpatched VPN appliances (Citrix ADC/Gateway, Fortinet, SonicWall) to drop Cobalt Strike, then manual .eking deployment.
  4. Pirated software + “crack” sites – KMS/auto-activator tools bundled with the ransomware.
  5. Living-off-the-land propagation: once inside, uses netscan, nlbrute, PSexec, SharpShares, and Empire modules to move laterally; no wormable exploit (NOT based on EternalBlue).

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention (highest ROI controls)

  • Close or restrict RDP (VPN + MFA, or RDP-Gateway with MFA; set “Account lockout threshold” ≤ 5).
  • Unique, 16+ character passwords for every local & domain admin; disable built-in Administrator & guest.
  • Patch public-facing apps immediately: VPN, VDI, Citrix, Exchange, AD/DS.
  • Application whitelisting (Windows Defender ASR rules, AppLocker, WDAC).
  • Segment LAN + block SMB/RDP between VLANs; enable Windows Firewall “private profile” default-deny.
  • Maintain 3-2-1 backups: offline copy + immutable cloud (object-lock) + quarterly restore drill.

2. Removal / Incident Containment

  1. Disconnect affected machine(s) from network (both NIC & Wi-Fi).
  2. Collect volatile data (RAM dump, Prefetch, ShimCache) if you intend to prosecute; otherwise power-down to limit further encryption.
  3. Boot from a clean Windows PE / Linux pendrive and copy the encrypted data to a sterile disk before any remediation.
  4. Scan & clean with fully-updated EDR (Defender, CrowdStrike, Sophos, Kaspersky, ESET) – all detect Ransom:Win32/Phobos.P or Ransom:Win32/Eking.A!MSR.
  5. Re-image the OS partition; manually remove persistence:
    HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\\“Adobe” = “C:\Users\Public\Libraries\service.exe”
    The ransomware also drops *.bat files in %TEMP% to delete shadow copies—delete them.
  6. Patch credential exposure: reset ALL domain & local passwords, revoke RDP tokens, inspect for newly-created accounts.
  7. Rebuild from known-good backup media; verify lateral-movement paths are closed before re-joining the network.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • eKing = Phobos family ⇒ each file encrypted with a unique, randomly generated AES-256 key, then that key is RSA-1024 encrypted with the attacker’s public key.
  • NO free public decrypter exists. For older variants that had the server-side key leaked (.ROGER, .MONEY), a decryptor was released; .eking is not among them.
  • Brute-forcing a 1024-bit RSA key is computationally infeasible.
  • Recovery avenues:
    a) Restore from offline / immutable backups (fastest).
    b) Roll back Windows shadow copies IF the attacker’s BAT script failed (rare).
    c) Use file-recovery tools (PhotoRec, R-Studio) to carve earlier versions that were deleted; success depends on free-space overwrite.
    d) Negotiation / paying the ransom carries a ~70 % decrypt probability but:
    • No data integrity guarantee, supports criminal enterprise, may violate sanctions, and you still must rebuild because backdoors remain.
  • Include the .eking extension in your DR run-book so responders do not waste hours hunting for a non-existent decryptor.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Extension scope: targets everything except critical Windows files (boot.ini, pagefile, etc.). Stops if keyboard layout = Russian/Ukrainian/Belarusian (typical Phobos geofence).
  • Double-extortion: some affiliates exfiltrate data with MEGASync or Rclone before encryption and threaten publication; review outbound traffic logs for port 443 to *.mega.nz during the dwell time.
  • Drop locations: %APPDATA%, %PUBLIC%, C:\ProgramData\, often masquerading as svchost.exe or RuntimeBroker.exe.
  • Ransom note: info.txt + info.hta (opened every boot). Payment e-mails change per campaign ([email protected], [email protected], [email protected]).
  • Registry key that stores campaign ID: HKCU\Software\[random8] (inspect for attribution).

Broader impact: Hospitals, county governments, SMB manufacturers, and schools hit; average demand US $7 k – 45 k but negotiable to ~30 %. Because infection is manual, attackers perform Active Directory reconnaissance and often deploy additional lockers (LockBit, Hive) later if first ransom unpaid—hence “clean & rebuild” is mandatory.

Share this document freely—the sooner potential victims close RDP, enforce MFA, and validate backups, the less profitable eKing (and Phobos) becomes for its criminal affiliates. Stay safe, patch fast, and keep an offline copy.