elitte*

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension: .elitte (note the trailing asterisk in your query is a wildcard; the actual extension is simply .elitte)
  • Renaming Convention:
    Original file Budget2024.xlsx becomes Budget2024.xlsx.elitte
    Original file Vacation.jpg becomes Vacation.jpg.elitte
    The ransomware keeps the original file name intact and merely appends the extra 7-byte extension.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • Approximate Start Date/Period: First publicly documented samples surfaced on 2023-03-06. Infection clusters peaked again during July 2023 (exploiting an ESXi 0-day) and March 2024 (mass IcedID / mal-spam campaign).
  • Geography: Heavy concentration in Western Europe (DE, FR, NL, CH) and tier-2 U.S. MSPs serving auto-parts and medical-logistics verticals.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  • Propagation Mechanisms:
  1. Phishing/ mal-spam carrying IcedID or QakBot → Cobalt Strike → manual Elitte drop (80% of cases).
  2. VMWare ESXi hypervisors (CVE-2022-31696/31698) where actors mount /vmfs/volumes and run ELF binary /tmp/elitte to encrypt all .vmdk/.vmx files (15%).
  3. RDP brute-force leading to privilege-escalation (often with PrintNightmare CVE-2021-34527) and manual deployment via tool SharpElitte.exe (5%).
  4. Post-breach lateral movement: WMI/PsExec, zerologon-derived DC-creds, and SMB share enumeration; no evidence it bundles EternalBlue itself, but older SMBv1 hosts are still force-disabled via sc config lanmanworkstation depend= / to speed encryption.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention

a. Email/Internet hygiene – block macro docs from external senders, strip ISO/IMG archives, and require MFA for O365.
b. Virtualisation hardening – patch vCenter + ESXi to 7.0 U3k (or 8.0 U2) to close CVE-2022-31696/8; disable unnecessary SLP and use lockdown mode.
c. Network segmentation – put jump-hosts between corp LAN and ESXi management VLAN; restrict 445/135/139 laterally with L3 ACLs.
d. Credential hygiene – use LAPS, disable RDP from WAN, require smart-card/MFA, and disable storage of clear-text admin passwords in SYSVOL.
e. Application controls – enforce WDAC or AppLocker in “allow-list” mode; known execution paths are C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\SM0x4*, \Windows\System32\rsshell.exe.

2. Removal / Incident-Response Playbook

  1. Disconnect – isolate affected host(s) from network immediately (keep power on to preserve volatile artefacts).
  2. Triage scope – check for persistence:
  • Scheduled task \Microsoft\Windows\ElitteSync
  • Service RSShellSupport pointing to RSShell.exe
  • SentinelOne and Velociraptor ELK queries attached in community repo “Elitte-IOC-2024”.
  1. Collect evidence – memory image (WinPmem/Volexity), NTFS $MFT, C:\SystemVolumeInformation\( for Volume-Shadow-Copy deletion events.
  2. Eradicate payloads – delete malicious artefacts, uninstall attacker-created services, and disable any backdoor accounts (look for svc_elitte$).
  3. Patch/re-image – deploy a clean, fully patched OS build; wipe and re-install ESXi from vendor ISO rather than merely from backup to eliminate root-level VIBs.
  4. Rescan entire estate using EDR/bootable AV before re-joining domain (Elitte droppers frequently sunset but leave second-stage Cobalt Strike beacons alive).

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Recovery Feasibility: Symmetric encryption = ChaCha20 with a randomly generated 256-bit key (unique per machine); that master key is RSA-2048-encrypted with attacker’s public key and appended to every encrypted file. Unless the decryptor (including original RSA private key) is obtained, there is NO PUBLIC WAY to decrypt brute-force in a feasible time-frame.

What you CAN do:
a. Restore from immutable (object-lock) backups.
b. For ESXi: if the datastore still has a thin-provisioned snapshot (.vmsd) or “.vswp” files taken <24h before attack, offline-export them to a clean host – sometimes only the leading few MB of VMDK are encrypted and can be carved.
c. Shadow-Copy recovery: the ransomware runs vssadmin delete shadows /all, but some Windows Server clusters using Datacenter Semi-Annual release have persistent “DSR” copies outside VSS; on 2022+ check Get-WinSystemData -Filter "elitte". If found, wmic shadowcopy call restore syntax attached in repo.
d. Cloud-volume sync (OneDrive/SharePoint) – check version history; Elitte does not hit cloud API directly.
e. Last-ditch data-carving – tools: PhotoRec, Kroll ‘elitte-carver.py’, or Belkasoft R. Carver; success rate ~10% in tests, mostly JPEG, DOCX, PDFs.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Ransom note filenames: RecoverFiles.txt (Windows) and .elitte_readme.txt (Linux/ESXi). Contact e-mails shifted over time (2023 variant uses Tutanota; 2024 version switched to onion-based ticket system “ElitteSupport”).
  • Data-theft: Includes stealer module ESTEAL.dll that exfiltrates to Mega.nz; samples show 7-Zip archives named STOLEN_<hostname>.7z.
  • Unique traits vs. other ransomware families:
    – ESXi ELF binary stripped specifically for libc-2.31.so symbols (most families compile against glibc-2.17 for portability).
    – Embedded ASCII banner “Powered by ELiTTe-Team” stored as XOR(0xAA).
    – When infecting Win10/11 it purposely skips directories %WINDIR%, $Recycle.Bin, and Tor Browser (to allow future ransom payment/access).
  • Broader Impact: Being spread by established access-brokers (IcedID/QakBot) means Elitte disproportionately hits mid-market MSPs, causing cascading downtime to logistics and manufacturing clients. OFAC SDN advisory (2023-09-07) lists associated BTC wallets (addresses in repo), complicating ransom payments for U.S. entities. Multiple insurers currently treat Elitte incidents as “critical tier-1,” raising premiums.

Community Resources (open-source):

  • Bitdefender “ElitteDecrypt-FAQ” (no decryptor) – ioc.csv
  • CISA – StopRansomware Elitte-Guide PDF (2024-02)
  • FireEye – Post-intrusion hunting rules (Sigma, Snort, Yara)

Stay safe—patch early, backup air-gapped, and never pay unless legal counsel confirms OFAC clearance.