Technical Breakdown:
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Confirmation of File Extension:
.ezzyl
-
Renaming Convention: Files are re-written in the pattern
<original-name>.id-<unique-ID>.<attacker-email>[].ezzyl
Example:Budget2024.xlsx
becomesBudget2024.xlsx.id-3E5A2B46.[[email protected]].ezzyl
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- Approximate Start Date/Period: First large-scale submissions to public sandboxes and ID-Ransomware were recorded in the third week of November 2023; activity peaked December 2023 – January 2024 and remains ongoing.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
- Propagation Mechanisms:
- Phishing with ISO/IMG or ZIP attachments – messages impersonate invoices, job offers, or SaaS expiration notices. Archives contain a .NET loader that fetches the final payload from a Discord CDN or a throw-away GitHub repo.
-
Compromised RDP / brute-force – attackers use “gold” credentials bought from infostealer logs, then manually drop
ezzyl
via PsExec. -
Exploitation of public-facing vulnerabilities – observed cases include:
– CVE-2023-34362 (MOVEit Transfer SQLi)
– CVE-2023-36884 & CVE-2023-38180 (Windows/Office 0-days used in limited targeted hits)
– Legacy SMBv1 use for lateral movement once inside (NOT the initial vector).
Remediation & Recovery Strategies:
1. Prevention
-
Proactive Measures:
– Disable SMBv1 at the organisational level (if still present).
– Enforce 2FA / account lock-out on all external RDP & VPN gateways; publish services behind a secure gateway (Citrix, RD-Gateway, ZTNA).
– Patch CVE-2023-34362, CVE-2023-36884 and keep Office/Windows fully updated.
– Mail-gateway rules: strip ISO, IMG, VHD, and macro-enabled documents by default; require admin release.
– Application-control / WDAC – block unsigned binaries in %TEMP%, %PROGRAMDATA%, and user-writable paths.
– Maintain offline, password-protected backups with immutable snapshots (S3 Object-Lock, Azure immutable vault, WORM tape). Test restore monthly.
2. Removal
- Infection Cleanup (high-level):
- Physically isolate the affected machine(s) – pull Ethernet / disable Wi-Fi; do NOT shut down (you’ll lose volatile artefacts).
- Collect forensic artefact before cleanup: memory dump,
C:\$MFT
,C:\ProgramData\
,C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Temp\
,Scheduled Tasks
,HKCU\Software\
,services.exe
hives. Store on an external disk. - Boot into Safe-Mode-with-Networking or mount the OS disk from a clean, patched WinPE/WinRE USB stick.
- Delete the service / scheduled task “EzzyExec”:
sc stop EzzyExec
sc delete EzzyExec
del /f /q “C:\ProgramData\EzzRun\svchost.exe”
(name varies slightly) - Remove persistence registry keys, e.g.
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\EzzL
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\<random>
- Run a reputable, fully-updated AV/EDR scan (Microsoft Defender with cloud block, SentinelOne, CrowdStrike, etc.) to pick up residual droppers.
- Patch / harden the entry vector (reset breached AD creds, apply firewall rules, re-image if business-critical) before returning the machine to production.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
- Recovery Feasibility: The encryption is AES-256 in CBC mode per file, key blob RSA-2048-encrypted with an attacker-controlled public key. Offline decryption is currently computationally infeasible.
- Public Decryptor: No free tool exists; the family is associated with the “ZoDoV”/”NoWay” cluster (Phobos lineage) whose master RSA private key has not been leaked.
-
Practical options:
– Restore from backup or Volume Shadow Copy (the malware deletes shadows withvssadmin delete shadows /all
, but some unsupported systems or interrupted runs still retain older copies – checkvssadmin list shadows
and use ShadowExplorer).
– File-integrity monitoring / EDR telemetry sometimes catches the encryptor mid-run; compare creation-time vs. modify-time stamps to identify partially encrypted files (header-only) – the untouched remainder can be carved out.
– Third-party file-repair services (digital-forensics firms) may assist if negotiated ransom is off the table.
– For awareness: ransom note fileinfo.txt
prices vary 1500-3000 USD in XMR; the actors’ email list (rotates) currently includes{[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]}
.
4. Other Critical Information
-
Additional Precautions:
–.ezzyl
is a twin-binary threat – if scheduled task “EzzyExec” fails, a second packed dropper is launched via COM hijacking in\Control Panel\
. Add CFA (Microsoft Controlled-Folder-Access) exclusions forcontrol.exe
to block this fallback.
– Network discovery is aggressive; expect credential-dumping viaprocDump lsass
and RDP lateral movement within 10-30 min of first execution.
– Screenshots of the active desktop are collected and exfiltrated together with the PIDGuid key, forming a primitive “proof-pack” used in double-extortion e-mails to victims who refuse to pay. -
Broader Impact:
Because “helper” droppers (legitimate tools repurposed) are fetched from reputable cloud hosts (Discord, Git), hash-only blocking is ineffective. Organisations that rely on default allow-lists for well-known cloud CDNs have a higher hit-rate. The group’s leak blog naming convention has switched from SHA-512 to victim initials + random word (e.g. “COMP-acute”, “HOSPlingo”), making OSINT monitoring trickier. In the first 8 weeks the blog listed 54 victims, 70% < 500 employees, suggesting that mid-market firms with limited IR budgets are prime targets.
Essential patch & tool quick-links
- MoveIt: https://community.progress.com/s/article/MOVEit-Transfer-Critical-Vulnerability-31May2023 (patch or temp work-around)
- Microsoft Defender latest KB (for cloud-delivered protection): https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/defenderupdates
- MSERT (standalone malware scanner) – run from Safe-Mode: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/intelligence/emergency-update
Stay secure, stay backed-up, and never run unsolicited attachments—even if they arrive on a Friday afternoon. Good luck!