fargo3

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Ransomware Resource Sheet – “Fargo3” (also sold as “Mallox”, “TargetCompany”, “Mawaq”)

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Extension appended: .fargo3
    (earlier campaigns used .fargo, .fargo2, .mallox, .mafa1/2, .mawaq, .xollam, .backservice, .tocue, etc.)
  • Renaming convention:
    OriginalName.OriginalExtension.[VictimID].[ATTACKER-EMAIL].fargo3
    Example: ProjectQ3.xlsx.{F3E9A7C1}[email protected]
    If the file was in a deeply-nested path, only the file name is touched; the folder tree is left intact.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First public sighting: 24 Aug 2022 (ID-Ransomware & Twitter submissions).
  • Peak activity waves:
    – Sep-Oct 2022 (MS-SQL brute-force frenzy)
    – Jan-Feb 2023 (Log4j & Spring4Shell follow-ups)
    – June 2023-present (continual “Fargo3” rebrand to stay ahead of AV signatures).
  • Still very active – new samples appear weekly on malware-sharing sites.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  1. ** brute-forced or previously-stolen SQL-Server credentials** → xp_cmdshell → PowerShell download cradle.
  2. RDP / VDI credential stuffing (bought from Genesis, Russian-market logs) → manual deployment.
  3. E-mail phishing with ISO / IMG attachments containing a .BAT or .NET loader that fetches the final .EXE.
  4. Exploitation of vulnerable web faces:
  • Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) in Unifi, VMware, Elastic, etc.
  • Spring4Shell (CVE-2022-22965)
  • Oracle WebLogic (CVE-2020-14882, CVE-2022-21548)
  • MS-SQL “Ransom Ran” (CVE-2021-1636) to gain sa.
  1. Living-off-the-land:
  • Uses wmic to delete shadow copies.
  • Kills SQL, Exchange, MySQL, Veeam, Acronis, NTBackup, etc. via net stop & taskkill.
  • Clears Windows event logs (wevtutil cl).
  • Self-propagation inside LAN only if “KILL-NET” switch is absent (random SMB/IPC scan).

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention (highest ROI)

✅ Disable xp_cmdshell and lock-down MS-SQL sa passwords (>20 chars, no reuse).
✅ Expose zero public-RDP: require VPN + MFA; set “Account lockout threshold” ≤5.
✅ Patch Log4j, Spring, WebLogic, MS-SQL (CVE-2021-1636), and MOVEit if present.
✅ Application whitelisting / WDAC – Fargo3 is still unsigned 32-bit .NET; blocking unsigned EXE in %TEMP% neuters most runs.
✅ Segment LAN and block 445/135/139 between user VLANs.
✅ Maintain offline, password-protected backups (3-2-1) and periodic restore tests.

2. Removal (when the countdown screen is already up)

  1. Physically isolate the machine (unplug Ethernet / disable Wi-Fi).
  2. Boot into Safe-Mode-with-Networking (won’t auto-re-encrypt, keeps logs).
  3. Collect artefacts for possible LE takedown (storm.txt ransom note, .exe path, Run keys).
  4. Scan & clean:
  • Latest Malwarebytes, ESET, Bitdefender, Kaspersky rescue disc – all now have “Fargo3” sig.
  • Manually remove persistence:
    HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\\Fargo3
    HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\\FARGO3START
  1. Verify shadow-copy wipe (vssadmin list shadows) – if any remain, cloning tool may still restore.
  2. Only after the malware is confirmed gone proceed to network-reconnect.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • No flaw has been found in Fargo3’s implementation (256-bit AES → RSA-2040).
  • Free decryptor: None exists (Checked: ESET, Avast, Kaspersky, Bitdefender, NoMoreRansom).
  • Self-test: drop a 2 MB volunteer file into the gang’s Tor chat; if they offer free proof, keep the clean copy elsewhere.
  • Restore routes:
    – Volume-shadow copies (frequently skipped on small servers) – use ShadowExplorer or vssadmin.
    – Un-synced OneDrive / Google-Drive versions often survive – check cloud “Previous versions”.
    – SQL *.BAK, QuickBooks *.QBB, Veeam *.VBK on unplugged USB usually intact – validate integrity with vendor tools.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Unique behaviour:
    – Writes storm.txt / README_TO_RESTORE.txt in every folder; HTML name varies (“howtoback_files.html”).
    – Embedded TOR chat: http://fargorex2voicerecxia5y6bzehh3iszs2xkxm5k7hxdmyskqr5jw5bad.onion
    – The ransomware deletes itself after encryption unless /nodel switch is present – catches amateurs who can’t find the binary for forensics.
    – Performs a partial file overwrite (first 8 64 kB chunks) to hinder “raw” carving.

  • Ransom demand: 1.2 BTC (≈30 k USD) for <10 endpoints, negotiable downward to 0.4 BTC; threatens “publish on our blog” but leak site rarely updated, making data-extortion pressure low.

  • TTP overlap: Same C++/C# packer, same TOR panels and e-mail list ([email protected], [email protected], [email protected]) used by every “Mallox” rebrand – treat IOC lists for ANY Mallox variant as valid for Fargo3.

  • Wider impact: Actively hitting managed-database providers and small e-shops that expose 1433/TCP; because encryption skips DLL and SYS, victims sometimes believe “partial” infection occurred—however, all user documents, DB-dumps and CAD drawings are gone, crippling production plants within minutes.

Stay vigilant: Fargo3 changes its extension roughly every quarter to outrun Google dorks (“fargo3 decryptor”, “mallox decrypt”). Whatever the extension, if you see the [ID].[email].<ext> pattern combined with storm.txt and an onion URL ending in …fargorex…, you’re dealing with this family—follow the playbook above rather than waiting for a decryptor that still doesn’t exist.