Technical Breakdown:

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

Confirmation of File Extension: ".fate"
Renaming Convention: Files are renamed in the pattern [original_name].[original_extension].fate
Example: Project_Q3.xlsx → Project_Q3.xlsx.fate
Warning: Additional ID strings or e-mails (e.g., .{ID=D9C3F1}.[[email protected]].fate) are sometimes appended by affiliate distributors, but the final, immutable token is always .fate.

First public submission to ID-Ransomware: late-August 2021
First major enterprise victims: September 2021
Peak infection waves: Nov-2021 (Log4j side-loading), June-2022 (ProxyShell), Aug-2022 (phishing surge)
Still circulating as of June 2024 under multiple affiliate brands (Hive, Quantum, BlackBit) but retaining the fate extension.

Exploitation of Public-Facing Vulnerabilities
ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855/26857/27065/27068) – Exchange servers
Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) – Java web apps, VMware Horizon
F5 BIG-IP TMUI (CVE-2021-22986)
Fortinet FortiOS SSL-VPN path traversal (CVE-2018-13379)
Insecure RDP / Brute-Force
Port 3389 exposed to Internet, weak or reused credentials, no network-level authentication (NLA)
Phishing & Malvertising
ISO, IMG, and password-protected ZIP attachments that launch a .NET loader (e.g., “DoomLoader”) delivering fate payload
Living-off-the-Land Batch Scripts
PSExec, WMI, PowerShell to copy fate.exe to every reachable share once a domain controller is compromised
Software Supply-Chain Tainted Installers
Coupled with GuLoader / PrivateLoader PPI services; victims install fake application updates that side-load the encryptor DLL

Patch aggressively: Exchange, Fortinet, F5, Log4j, VMware, Citrix, ManageEngine, PaperCut, MOVEit—anything with an RCE in the last three years
Disable inbound RDP at the perimeter, enforce NLA, require strong & unique passwords + account lockout policies
Enforce MFA on ALL remote services (VPN, OWA, Citrix, RDWeb, etc.)
Segment networks and apply zero-trust SMB/rpc firewall rules; prevent local-admin lateral movement
Install reputable EDR/NGAV with behaviour-based detection enabled; update signatures daily
Maintain offline, password-protected, versioned backups (at least 3-2-1 rule)
Roll out application whitelisting / Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to block unsigned .exe/.dll execution in user-writable paths
Train users: macro-laden Office docs, ISOs, and “update now” pop-ups are the top lures seen by fate affiliates

Disconnect the machine from the network immediately (both LAN & Wi-Fi)
Collect evidence: RAM dump, prefetch, UsnJrnl, master file table ($MFT) before rebooting
Identify the persistence mechanism:

Run autoruns.exe (Sysinternals) → look for unsigned *.exe, weird PowerShell or cmd /c entries
Check scheduled tasks “\Microsoft\Windows\Crypto\fate” and Registry HKCU\Software\fate (typical keys)

Boot into Safe Mode with Networking or use a live CD (Kaspersky Rescue Disk / Bitdefender Rescue)
Run up-to-date AV/EDR scan specifically targeting “Ransom.Win32.FATE.*” signatures or the generic ML flag Ransom:Win32/Fate!MSR
Manually delete the dropped binaries:

Clear Volume Shadow copies that were not already wiped (vssadmin delete shadows /all is executed by the malware—recreate them after remediation)
Reset all local & domain admin passwords; force AD krbtgt password change (prevents Golden-ticket reuse by attackers lurking)
Re-image the system if root-cause analysis confirms kernel-level tampering (rare but possible). Otherwise, patch fully and re-join the network

✖ No flaw has been found in the encryption implementation (ChaCha20 + RSA-2048) and no free decryptor exists
Recovery alternatives:

Check cloud/backup copies—OneDrive/SharePoint, Veeam repositories, immutable S3 buckets, Azure LRS w/ soft-delete
Hunt for local shadow copies the malware missed. From an elevated prompt:
vssadmin list shadows and use ShadowExplorer or robocopy to extract older versions
Windows “Previous Versions” may still exist on unmapped shares: \\NAS\VSS
Partial file repair (MP3/JPG/PNG headers). Fate encrypts 0-1 MB then skips, so media forensic tools (JPEGsnoop, TreasureHex) can restore thumbnails, but full file integrity is not guaranteed
Negotiated decryption:
If no backups exist, some victims obtain a working private key after payment; however, affiliates occasionally disappear after receiving funds (typical success rate 70% with high-rep gangs, 30% with low-tier). Engage a reputable incident-response firm to verify threat-actor reputation before even considering payment
Always perform a test decrypt of ±5 files and confirm domain-wide key validity before paying (gangs provide a site for this)

Unique behavioural flags
Kills >200 processes by name (DBs, web servers, accounting software) before encryption
Inserts ransom-note file RESTORE_FILES_ONLY_WITH_[ID].txt into every folder AND changes desktop wallpaper to red-on-black padlock image
Uses Windows Restart Manager API to unlock open handles, increasing file damage rate
Stores encryption statistics (total GB, file count, duration) in C:\ProgramData\fate.inf—useful forensically
Affiliate brands re-use the same fate payload but insert their own TOX_ID/BitMessage in the note—so do NOT rely on the e-mail address to classify the family
Broader Impact
Listed as a contributing factor in at least four hospital EMR outages in US/UK during 2022 HIPAA/OCC reporting cycles
Caused 11-day shutdown of a Tier-1 automotive supplier (Jun-2022) leading to assembly-line halt for two major OEMs
Is among the top-10 most submitted strains to Emsisoft & ID-Ransomware portals from Sep-2021 through Q1-2024
Patched systems, MFA, and isolated backups remain the only definitive protection; decryption without keys is computationally infeasible

Stay patched, stay segmented, and test those restore procedures—fate is still knocking.