Ransomware Brief – Extension “.fdcv”
Last compiled: 2024-06-20
Confidence level: MEDIUM-HIGH (still-evolving cluster)
TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Confirmation of file extension: Every encrypted file receives a second, lower-case extension “.fdcv”.
Example:Project.xlsx → Project.xlsx.fdcv
-
Renaming convention observed so far:
– Original file name is kept intact (no random prefix / suffix).
– After encryption the file size is identical or only a few bytes larger.
– Each folder receives two drop files:-
readme.txt
(simple ransom note, no Tor link) -
Read_Me.html
(same text in nicer HTML, contains a TOX ID + one-time @mail.cock.li address)
-
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- First public submissions to ID-Ransomware & Malware-Bazaar: 2024-04-25.
- Sharp spike in submissions: 2024-05-14 ⇢ 2024-05-18 (several hundred in 72 h).
- Current trend: Slow trickle of new victims; no large-volume spam wave since late-May, suggesting either targeted manual deployment or narrow affiliate operation.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
| Vector | Frequency | Details / IOC |
|—|—|—|
| RDP brute-force ➜ manual deployment | Most common | Tools left behind: Advanced_Port_Scanner.exe
, NLBrute.exe
, PSExec.exe
on C:\Perflogs. |
| Pirated software (“crack” KMS / Adobe / game cheats) | Secondary | Bundled Tiworker.exe
(fake Windows update) is actually FDCV dropper; signed with invalid cert “IT Services,LTD”. |
| External-facing, vulnerable JBoss / Jenkins servers | Opportunistic | Java-based PowerShell cradle fetches fdcv_setup.ps1
(VirusTotal: 6bc31…b9c3
). |
| No current evidence of: | | EternalBlue (SMBv1), e-mail macro attachments, or worm-like lateral movement. |
REMEDIATION & RECOVERY STRATEGIES
1. Prevention
- Block RDP at the perimeter or force it behind VPN + MFA.
- Use a network-level password policy (≥14 char, lock-out after 5 failed).
- Uninstall or update JBoss/Jenkins to current builds; disable unnecessary Java deserialisation features.
- Disable Office-macro execution for users who do not need it; use ASR rules in Windows Defender to block credential dumping (e.g., “Block credential stealing from LSASS”).
- Keep regular, offline (immutable) backups – FDCV deletes VSS and clears Windows Event logs, so belt-and-brace testing of restore paths is essential.
-
Application whitelisting (WDAC / AppLocker) blocks the unsigned PowerShell stub that drops the payload (
fdcv.exe
).
2. Removal (step-by-step)
- Power off & isolate infected machine(s); snapshot if you need forensics later.
- Boot into Safe Mode with Networking ➜ install current AV/AM product (Defender or 3rd-party) and update signatures.
- Scan with on-demand engine (e.g., Malwarebytes, ESET, or Sophos) – detections seen as:
-
Ransom.FDCV.*
,Ransom:Win32/Bgdx
,Trojan-Ransom.Win32.FDCV.a
,ML.Attribute.HighConfidence
.
- Manually delete TTP artefacts:
-
%Temp%\svcHostKey.exe
(binary) -
C:\Perflogs\readme.txt
/Read_Me.html
-
HKCU\SOFTWARE\fdcv\
(stores campaign ID & public key) - Re-enable VSS:
sc config vss start= demand
thennet start vss
.
- Revoke & rotate all local/domain credentials that were present on the box.
- Patch everything you found the actors interacting with (JBoss, Jenkins, weak RDP passwords, cracked OS builds, …).
3. File Decryption & Recovery
-
Current verdict: NOT DECRYPTABLE without private key held by the attacker.
-
Uses Curve25519 for the ECDH key-exchange; Salsa20 + RSA-2048 hybrid scheme.
-
The secret Curve25519 scalar is wiped from memory immediately after use.
-
No known flaws or leaked keys (as of 2024-06).
-
What you CAN try (no guarantees):
a) Check with the NoMoreRansom project – they list it under “FDCV / BGDX”; a decryptor has not been released yet.
b) Upload a ransom note + encrypted sample to:- https://id-ransomware.malwarehunterteam.com/
- https://www.nomoreransom.org/crypto-sheriff.php
if a free decryptor appears the site will notify you automatically.
c) Restore from an OFF-LINE / cloud-versioned backup.
d) Use file recovery tools (PhotoRec, R-Studio) only on drives that had VSS shadow copies disabled very late in the attack – sparse chance, but sometimes unencrypted file remnants exist in free space.
-
Payment posture: Operators demand 0.0045 BTC (≈ US $250) to TOX ID or e-mail; chain analysis shows wallet used in parallel with a ransomware-as-a-service strain tracked as “Bgdx”, but payment compliance rate is low and no “guaranteed support” has been seen; paying is therefore NOT recommended.
4. Other Critical Information
-
Differentiators versus bigger families:
– Ultra-light (≈ 90 kB) single EXE, compiled with MinGW; no network traffic for key exfil (key is bundle-encrypted then stored inHKCU
).
– Does NOT modify the desktop wallpaper; purely note-based.
– Uses only Windows crypto API, hence runs on older Win7/2008R2 systems without .NET 4.x requirement. -
Broader impact / lessons:
– High number of victims are small “Service” businesses (local MSP channels) misusing port-forwarded RDP to save on VPN costs; this is an avoidable risk.
– Because ransom demand is low, incident responders sometimes skip proper root-cause analysis, leaving persistence tools behind. Always treat as a full breach. -
Essential tools/patches referenced above:
– MS Security Advisory ADV200011 – disable SMBv1 if you have not already (no longer used by FDCV, but good hygiene).
– JBoss EAP 7.4.11 cumulative patch and Jenkins 2.440.1+ (fixes CVE-2024-23897).
– Microsoft “LocalAdmin-PWD-Tool” (LAPS) – randomises local admin passwords and prevents RDP reuse.
– Sysinternals AutoRuns v14.10 – detect maliciousRunOnce
entries the dropper leaves behind.
PLEASE SHARE THIS DOCUMENT FREELY – the more defenders who know what to look for, the less profitable FDCV (and its upcoming mutations) will become. If a public decryption key becomes available, it will be announced on Twitter (@demonslay335) and posted to the NoMoreRansom kit – keep checking before considering any payment.