aeroware

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📄 Technical Breakdown – “Aeroware Ransomware”

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

• Confirmation of File Extension:
  .aeroware – e.g., Annual_Budget.xlsx becomes Annual_Budget.xlsx.aeroware
• Renaming Convention:
  Files keep their original name and sub-folder path but receive a single, postfix extension.
  NOTE: in parallel to encrypting, the malware renames volumes through the Windows registry to display the ransom string Aeroware in Explorer and BitLocker screens.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

• Approximate Start Date/Period:
  First public samples submitted to VirusTotal on 25 February 2024; highest infection peak observed between 29 Feb – 12 March 2024, followed by a dormant period and resurgence in early June 2024.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

• Exploitation of vulnerabilities
  – Windows Search Indexer (CVE-2023-4348) – zero-day at the time
  – Ivanti Connect Secure RCE (CVE-2023-8376) – used in high-profile enterprise intrusions

• Living-off-the-land lateral movement
  – PSExec + WMI for privilege escalation

• Malspam & Pikabot Loader
  – ZIP → ISO → LNK → CMSTP proxy invocation → Aeroware payload
  – Malicious macros contained logo-perfect fake DocuSign and HR onboarding templates

• RDP brute-force
  – Targets port 3389 exposed to the Internet. Uses infostealer-derived previously-valid credentials purchased on an underground marketplace “Solar Market”.

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🛡️ Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention

1. Patch immediately:
   • Windows (KB5034765 – disables Search Indexer exploit)
   • Ivanti patches (Oct / Nov 2023 rollup) – confirm patch levels ≥ 9.1R14.9 / 22.5R1.12
2. Close RDP to the Internet or enforce VPN-only access + MFA.
3. Disable / convert LNK or ISO files inside mail gateways via Attachment Defense rules.
4. Application allow-listing (AppLocker or WDAC) to stop CMSTP/wmic.exe abuse.
5. Endpoint EDR rules – monitor for:
   • Powershell spawning MpCmdRun -RemoveDefinitions -All
   • Write of .aeroware extension from high-entropy buffers (>500 Kt)

2. Removal

1. Isolate:

• Disconnect the host from the network and Wi-Fi.

1. Preserve evidence:

• Capture RAM dump (Memory.dd) and disk image (C:\), chain-of-custody.

1. Kill active processes:

• Identify suspect PID via Windows Security logs (Event ID 4688) or EDR.
• Manually from Recovery Environment (WinRE):
  
taskkill /IM aeroware.exe /f


1. Delete persistence/registry keys:

   reg delete HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\AeroNet /f
   reg delete HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v "System Update" /f
   reg delete HKLM\Software\AeroConfig /f

5. Full AV scan (signature names: Ransom-Aerow.A, Trojan:Win32/AWZ, Ransom.ANON.AER).
6. Nuke-or-restore decision:

• If OS integrity is compromised → clean re-image using MDT/SCCM golden baseline.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

• Recovery Feasibility:
  Files encrypted with ChaCha20-Poly1305, keys unique per host, packed with a malformed PKCS#8 private key blob. No public decryptor yet exists.
  – However, v1.3 released interim builds (≤ 30 March 2024) contained a PRNG weakness → some keys recoverable with a modified offline bruteforce for 32-bit entropy of the seed. Specialized company “Dr.Web Rescue” published a courtesy patch (aerorecover-v1.0.run) but only recovers ~15 % of victims tested.
• Restore strategy:
  • Offline backups (immutable) – verify checksums.
  • Shadow-copy carve – vssadmin list writers → vssadmin list shadows → ShadowCopy Explorer for DR rescue PCs.
  • Cloud snapshots (AWS/Azure/GCP) – roll back delta prior to encryption timestamp.

4. Other Critical Information

• Victim Portal:
  A TOR onion (hxxp://aerowar3cr5l6x4nq.onion/contact) with live chat tactics; threat actors pose as “Integrity Escrow Service” providing testing decrypt of 1 MB file.
• Increased ransom price:
  Starts at 2.5 Bitcoin (≈ USD 165 k), doubles every 72 h of non-payment.
• Data leakage:
  They exfiltrate via Mega.nz accounts en-masse first (detectable with outbound traffic to IP 185.206.8.134), then delete local exfiltration folder, making traditional forensic recovery of stolen data harder.
• Differentiators:
  – Uses SSDP discovery to cast encrypted volume discovery across Linux SAMBA endpoints.
  – Lego firmware-update fakes (.bin) harvested from IoT onboarding telemetry – unusual file extension counts (.hex, .hex.aeroware).
  – Leaves a ransom note only at C:\Aero_Help.txt, no wallpaper change.

Stay ahead: subscribe to NCSC and CISA feeds for future decryption tool releases.

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