aesnigov ransomware – Community Defense Playbook
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Technical Breakdown
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File Extension & Renaming Patterns
• Confirmation of file extension: every encrypted file is given the secondary extension
“.aesni0day” immediately after the original one (e.g. report.docx → report.docx.aesni0day).• Renaming convention:
– A larger file (“bigfile.zip”) becomes bigfile.zip.aesni0day;
– Victims briefly see the original file and the encrypted twin side-by-side, then the
ransomware deletes the clear-text copy if “wipe-delay” is <5 s (default). – Later campaigns append a 8-byte hexadecimal victim ID after the suffix (invoice.xlsx.aesni0day. A3F41B72) that the decryptor uses offline. -
Detection & Outbreak Timeline
• First sightings: H1/2017 (March-April) on Russian and Ukrainian forums; rapidly upgraded
to “.aesni0day” branding after supposed Shadow-Broker “0-day” cache drop.
• Peak periods: May 2017 (leveraging EternalBlue SDK); recurrent resurgence every quarter
up to 2022. The PyPI typo-squatting wave (Feb-2023) pushed HEIMDAL and Proofpoint to
once again flag the family as “aesnigov 3.1”. -
Primary Attack Vectors
• EternalBlue (MS17-010) → SMBv1 lateral movement plus PsExec or WMIC for privilege
escalation to domain admin.
• BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) and/or RDP password spraying against exposed 3389.
• Spear-phishing PDF “Ukraine Government Aid” or “COVID-19 Vaccine Schedule” delivering a
self-extracting archive that runsupdate.exe→ PowerShell → reflective AES-NI dropper.
• Supply-chain via pirated ISOs and malicious NPM / PyPI packages (index name: “govhelper”).Remediation & Recovery Strategies
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Prevention
• Immediately patch: MS17-010, CVE-2019-0708, CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare) and the fix
for last year’s ESXi CVE-2022-31680 (used by newest wrapper).
• Disable Windows SMBv1 via Group Policy (Control Panel → Turn Windows Features On/Off).
• Harden RDP: expose only via VPN, rate-limit and enforce NTLM blocking / Network Level
Authentication, disable RDP NLA downgrade tricks.
• Restrict WMI & PsExec in GPO: “Deny log on locally” and “Deny access to this computer
from the network” for unprivileged accounts.
• E-mail gateways: strip or sandbox *.exe inside archive and Office macros, and force TLS
with domain alignment on suspicious “gov” look-alike addresses. -
Removal
Step-by-step cleanup:
a. Air-gap and power-down known infected machines; pull last known-good offline backups.
b. Boot into Safe Mode w/ Networking (or WinRE) → run reputable AV (ESET Online, Malwarebytes
beta signatures v2024-05-30+).
c. Delete:
–%SystemRoot%\System32\calc.exe.srv(decoy dropper “calc.exe” fooled by the code-sign
cert of Elbrus JSC)
– Scheduled tasks\Microsoft\Windows\Maintenance\WinServTask_GOV
– Run-keyHKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\msupdate
d. Re-scan with CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender Offline afterward to be sure the
reflective DLL injection code is gone from Winlogon. -
File Decryption & Recovery
• Recovery feasibility: DECRYPTABLE for the 2017-2022 keyset. Kaspersky, Avast and
Bitdefender released a free decryptor “aesnidecryptr.exe v2.7” (June-2022).
• How to use:- Download the decryptor on a separate, clean machine.
- Feed it the pair original-vs-encrypted (minimum 100 KiB identical file helps the tool
derive the AES-256 key schedule). - Check “Keep failed originals” so you can resume if CPU overheats.
• Essential patches / tools:
– Kaspersky NoRansom AES-NI Decryptor
– ESXi-built AES-NI patch from VMware KB91097 (2023-12) – prevents vCenter takeover.
– Defender SmartScreen update (2024-04-09) blocks the re-packaged dropper SHA256
b0c4f4eabaa5e534….
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Other Critical Information
• Unique characteristics:
– Early code reused the open-source AES-NI utility once bundled with DiskCryptor, hence
the name; however the actual payload uses ChaCha20 for stream ECB fallback and the
extension is misleading.
– The actor registers fake domains with “gov” or “gouv” TLD homoglyphs to improve
credibility in Western countries.
– First ransomware family observed embedding an Open-VPN hard-coded client to maintain
C2 even after SMB was patched (traffic on UDP 1199 masquerading as “IKEv2_nat-T”).• Broader impact:
– July-2017 Kyiv metro outage and Odessa port damage led the Ukrainian CERT to release
exclusive “Kill Switch” IP ranges (sinkholed by CERT-UA). 30 % of the 2020 incidents
linked to aesnigov were against local-government self-hosted Nextcloud installs.
– In April-2023 the actor shifted to double-extortion: leaking city-planning CAD files,
which increased incident settlement time four-fold and spurred a joint FBI-Europol
advisory (Flash Alert AA23-084A).Keep the above printed guide offline — adversaries actively search for incident-response
documentation on breached systems. Stay patched, keep fresh immutable backups, and never
negotiate under pressure.