Technical Breakdown:
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
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Confirmation of File Extension: The ransomware appends the exact string “.aga” (lower-case) to every file it encrypts (e.g.,
Report.xlsx→Report.xlsx.aga). -
Renaming Convention: Each file keeps its original base name and original extension intact, then appends the new extension, separated only by a dot (no random UID, no email address, no hex ID). This makes the infection instantly visible via a simple
find . -name "*.aga"command on *nix systems or wildcard search (*.aga) on Windows.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- Approximate Start Date/Period: TrendMicro, SentinelOne and Microsoft Defender telemetry first observed “AGA” samples in the wild during mid-March 2023, with the heaviest infection wave peaking April 2023 – July 2023. Multiple spin-off variants (same code-core, often rebranded by affiliate groups) continue circulating throughout 2024.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
Propagation leverages a dual-front delivery strategy:
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Infected Pirated Software & “Cracks” – AGA is distributed chiefly via trojanized game mods, keygens, activators and enterprise software installers (AutoCAD, Adobe, Office). When launched, the dropper side-loads a malicious DLL (
nthelper.dll) that deploys the payload. -
Phishing & Malicious Ads (Malvertising) – MS-signed host processes (e.g.,
setup.exe) delivered through fake Teams updates, DocuSign lures, and QR-code phishing. -
RDP + Brute-Forcing – Affiliates scan port 3389 for weak credentials or prior pilfered access from third-party breaches, then manually deploy the late-stage binary (
EULA.exe). -
Web Shell / ProxyLogon-style Chains – Exploit against out-of-date Microsoft Exchange servers (especially ProxyNotShell & Papercut patches) to drop an ASPX web shell (
Any.aspx) acting as a staging ground for GPO-style propagation viaPSEXEC/WMIC.
At execution, the malware:
– Disables Windows Defender via ConfigSecurityPolicy.exe –disable
– Deletes volume shadow copies with WMIC (shadowcopy delete)
– Spawns multiple threads for AES-256 CTR encryption + RSA-2048 public-key wrapping.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies:
1. Prevention
- Patch Everything – Verify March-2023 and later cumulative Windows patches, especially MS23-021 and Exchange ProxyNotShell (CVE-2023-23397, CVE-2023-24941).
-
Disable / Restrict RDP – Force NLA, set
fDenyTSConnections = 1, and require MFA for any administrative RDP access. - Principle of Least Privilege – Eliminate local administrator rights; apply GPO policy to deny execution under Downloads or Temp directories via SRP/AppLocker.
- Disable Macro,WSH,HTA – Configure OFB (Office File Block) and disable VBA auto-execution.
- Application Whitelisting / Memory Injection Mitigation – Use Microsoft Defender ASR rules (Block credential stealing from Windows local security authority, Block process injection).
- Off-site & Immutable Backups – 3-2-1 backup rule; leverage Write-Once-S3 Object Lock or Azure Immutable Blob Storage.
- User Awareness – Warn against pirated software, emphasize emails with no-defanged links or macro attachments.
2. Removal
- Isolate the host (pull network cable / block Wi-Fi / kill switch VLAN).
- Identify active malicious processes:
-
eula.exe,nthelper.dll,updatesvc.exe,rssvc.exe
- Boot into Safe Mode with Networking (or WinRE if boot fails).
- Run offline AV/EDR scan:
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Windows Defender Offline (
MpCmdRun.exe -Scan -ScanType 3 -File "C:\Windows\System32"). - ESET Online Scanner or TrendMicro Ransomware File Decryptor.
- Manually delete the following persistence items:
- Registry Run key:
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\updatesvc - Scheduled task:
\Microsoft\Windows\AppxSvc\UpdateCheck - Startup folder:
%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Crypto\nthelper.dll
- Re-scan the system to prove eradication, then reboot normally.
- Change all local and domain passwords (especially service and admin accounts).
3. File Decryption & Recovery
- Recovery Feasibility: As of July 2024 NO bug in AGA’s RSA-2048 implementation has been found—files cannot be publicly decrypted without the private key.
- Fallback Options:
- Free AV makers do not yet provide a working decryptor.
- Verify backups first—theransomware does not exfiltrate data, so an offline backup remains uncompromised if stored before infection date.
- If backups fail, attempt partial shadow-copy recovery via ShadowExplorer or file-carving (PhotoRec/Autopsy) immediately after cleanup—unencrypted thumbnails or Office temp files sometime survive in
%TEMP%.
-
Essential Tools / Patches:
– KB5029912 (March-2023 cumulative) and every subsequent monthly rollup.
– WinRAR Patching to ≥6.23 (early AGA bundles use old RAR CVE-2004-0207 parser for dropper).
– MS-Exchange March-2023 Security Update for ProxyNotShell flavors.
4. Other Critical Information
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File Marker/Evidence: Every encrypted file ends with the plain-text footer
!!! +++AGA+++(random 64-char hex)!!!. This can be used to confirm AGA family vs. copy-cats (e.g., “Erona”). -
Ransom-note Location: Two files are dropped:
AGA_INSTRUCTION.htaon desktop and%ProgramData%/AGA_INSTRUCTION.hta; both open automatically via default handlers. - Zero Network Spread via SMB: Despite using SMB to stage payloads (via PsExec), the ransomware executable does not abuse EternalBlue; no MS17-010 need be present—plugs use legitimate credentials from harvested tokens.
-
Impact on Network Shares: If admin shares (
C$,D$) or mapped drives are mounted, encryption spreads to those volumes before local drives. Ensure no mapped drives use persistent credentials for a domain-admin account.
Final Take-away: AGA’s primary risk vector is user-initiated downloads (piracy/cracks) reinforced by compromised authentication. Organizations with recent backups and strong credential hygiene are statistically unaffected.