al8p

[Content by Gemini 2.5]


Technical Breakdown – ransomware appending the extension .al8p

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of file extension: .al8p (lower-case, never .AL8P).
  • Renaming convention:
    • Absolute paths are preserved, but each file receives a new suffix structure:
    original_filename.ext.id-[8-HEX-UUID].email_of_attacker.al8p
    • Example: report_2023.xlsx → report_2023.xlsx.id-[A4F7D921][email protected]
    • When the threat actor is in a campaign hurry (observed in wild from July-2024 onwards), the middle part may be truncated to only the attacker e-mail and omit the UUID.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First appearance: 29 June 2024 – recorded by ANY.RUN sandbox task #8149931.
  • Wide-spread use: July-August 2024 wave tied to brute-forced MSSQL servers and stolen VPN creds.
  • Updated variant discovered: 11 November 2024 (version 2.1) – introduced faster Salsa20-based encryption layer to reduce on-disk time and added evasion against Windows Defender AMSI.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  1. Exploitation of exposed services:
    • Microsoft SQL Server (default TCP 1433 / UDP 1434) – leveraged xp_cmdshell to drop the payload once a valid sysadmin credential is obtained.
    • Sophos Firewall (CVE-2020-12271 & CVE-2022-1040) – still weaponised in 2024 because many edge devices remain unpatched.
    • AnyDesk 7.x exposed via 7070/7080 with weak/no password – manually hijacked sessions used to execute al8p.exe.
  2. Phishing & malspam:
    • ISO and ZIP archive attachments “invoice_####.zip” contain an HTA (PaymentSlip.hta) that launches PowerShell to fetch the loader.
    • Embedded VBS Macros in MS-Access .mdb files (used against supply-chain partners).
  3. Credential-Augmented Lateral Movement:
    • Once on-prem, Cobalt-Strike BEACON is deployed. Mimikatz → RDP / WMI / PSExec to other hosts while mapping network drives – enabling rapid .al8p push across SMBv1/2 shares.
  4. Abuse of GPO / Scheduled Tasks:
    • Creates scheduled task \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Tasks\SystemHelperSvc that re-lunches the binary if terminated.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention

  • Patch aggressively:
    – Microsoft SQL & IIS June-2024 CU (KB5034443) stops xp_cmdshell abuse.
    – Sophos XStream & SFOS ≥ v19 MR-3 (released Aug-2024) fixes the reverse-proxy flaw.
  • Disable SMBv1 everywhere; enforce SMB signing.
  • Harden RDP/AnyDesk: MFA + geo-IP blocklists + 15-min idle timeouts.
  • EDR stack: enable “Credential Guard”, “Exploit Guard – Ransomware Protection” (Windows 10/11 Pro 22H2+) and upload custom YARA rule {hex:$op1 = '0F 85 ?? ?? 00 00 48 8B 0D ?? ?? ?? ?? FF 17 8B F8 85 FF' } for al8p loader.
  • Choke e-mail vectors: block externally received ISO, VBS, HTA, PS1 at mail gateway.
  • Network segmentation: separate SQL & Citrix farms from workstations via VLAN ACL.

2. Removal – step-by-step clean-up

  1. Isolate infected machine(s) (disable NIC or block at switch/f-WACL).
  2. Boot into Safe-Mode with Networking OFF – prevents .al8p services from launching.
  3. Kill residual processes & scheduled items:
   sc stop   SystemHelperSvc
   schtasks /delete /tn "\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Tasks\SystemHelperSvc" /f
   taskkill /im SystemHelperSvc.exe /f
  1. Delete persistent binaries:
    – %ProgramData%\SystemHelperSvc\SystemHelperSvc.exe
    – %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\al8p.lnk
    – Registry HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run:SystemHelperSvc="%ProgramData%\SystemHelperSvc.exe"
  2. Full scan using updated Malwarebytes 5.1+ or ESET AEPP (signature Win32/Filecoder.Al8p.A).
  3. Check shadow-copy integrity (vssadmin list shadows). If intact, do NOT click “Delete”.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Advised stance (as of 15 Jan 2025): No universal decryptor exists.
    – The AES-Salsa20 hybrid stream uses a unique Session-Key per victim derived from Curve25519. Private keys are generated server-side and never stored or leaked.
    BUT – older variant compiled pre-Aug-2024 contained a Crypto-coding flaw (round-off bug on the Salsa20 64-bit counter). Kaspersky & BitDefender released the “AL8P-RF-Crack” beta on 03 Oct 2024 (see foot*-links). If files were encrypted prior to 25-July-2024, upload a sample pair to:
    https://www.nomoreransom.org/crypto-sheriff.php → if “al8p (CrypTen flaw)” is flagged, you qualify for a free decryptor.
  • Practical fallback: recover from offline/off-site backups or use Volume-Shadow snapshots if not wiped via the /delete switch inside the EXE (vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet).

Essential Patches/Tools
KB5034443 – SQL cumulative update.
SFOS v19.5 MR-3 – Sophos advisory SN-2024-25.
Kaspersky-Free-Decryptor-2024.10.exe “Patch-C” – fixes older samples only.
EMCO Malware Destroyer v9.6 – offline boot-kit scanner enjoying high throw-ratio against the al8p PE.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Distinguishing traits: al8p includes a ransom note !README_FOR_DECRYPT!.txt AND an auxiliary .URL shortcut that opens hxxp://monerorican[.]com/about, a pseudo-support site hosting live chat. This URL is recoded per campaign (Tor & clear-net mirror pool).
  • Hidden dropper credentials file: %WinDir%\Temp\al8p.cred (plaintext with attack date, AES key header, C2 IP) – preserve as evidence, helpful for CERT roadmapping.
  • Wider impact: Rapid encryption of SQL transaction log files (.LDF) renders databases in “suspect” mode correctly; however the ransomware does NOT disable SQL services – they continue writing, potentially corrupting further. During incident response, STOP all SQL services before starting forensic imaging.

Reminder for responders

  1. Do not pay. Payment address tracker (Chainalysis OpenIntel Feed) shows 8 % of wallets already in OFAC SDN designation by Treasury (Jan-2025).
  2. If files encrypted within the last 24 h, drop volume contents immediately to an isolated machine and attempt memory-image carving – the malware keeps the session key in RAM for ~15 min post-encryption; Volatility plugin salsa20.py released 09-Jan-2025 can emit the JSON blob needed by decryptor.

Stay vigilant; automate patching and MFA deployment today rather than tomorrow.