Ransomware Deep-Dive: Understanding & Fighting “apis”
Technical Breakdown
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Extension used:
.apis(lowercase, four characters, no additional sub-extension). -
Renaming Convention:
Files are first altered in-place, then the original name has a single 6-character “victim-ID” appended, followed by the new extension.
Pattern:original_name.{victim-id}.apis
Example:Budget-Q3.xlsx.f4G1z2.apis
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- First documented samples: Mid-October 2022 (circa 18-Oct).
- Escalation period: November 2022 wave targeted small-to-mid size healthcare providers (US, UK, CA).
- Still active (low-volume but ongoing) with occasional clusters reported via SOC mailing lists through April 2024.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
-
Exploitation of Public-Facing Services –
Entry point in >60 % of confirmed cases:
• Progress Software MOVEit Transfer (CVE-2023-34362) last year.
• Citrix ADC / Gateway (CVE-2022-27510) and Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) in earlier waves. -
RDP Brute-Force / Credential-Stuffing – Uses common username/password lists then deploys Cobalt Strike beacon, followed by manual launch of binaries named
out.exe,winorde.exeorservicespi.exe. -
Phishing Lure – ISO Image – ZIP attachment > ISO > LNK shortcut to
wscript.exerunningsetup.js. Script downloads the.apisloader from a Discord CDN link (media.discordapp.net/attachments/xxx/...). -
Lateral Movement : EternalBlue (MS17-010) on legacy SMBv1 still present inside network segments – then PsExec push of secondary
.apisdropper.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention
- Patch or sunset internet-exposed products: MOVEit Transfer (2023 May patches), Citrix ADC 13.1-49.13+, any Log4J >2.17.2.
- Disable SMBv1 globally via Group Policy (
Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature –Online –FeatureName SMB1Protocol). - Rate-limit & geoblock RDP; enforce NLA and 2-factor (Duo, Azure MFA).
- End-user controls:
• Block ISO, VHD & LNK files from external email by mail-gateway policy.
• Deploy SRP / Applocker rules blocking execution from%userprofile%downloads. - EDR telemetry: Look for
whoami,arp -a,wevtutil cl,nslookup myip.opendns.com, behavior chains typical of.apisactivity.
2. Removal – Step-by-Step
- Isolate infected host(s) at the switch-port or via EDR push of host firewall rule.
-
Locate primary binary (most often in
%AppData%\Adobe\addons\out.exeorC:\ProgramData\dskqry.zipunpacked to temp). -
Kill process & remote Beacon session (PID visible via
netstat -ano). -
Remove persistence:
a. Registry Run keyHKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SystemCare = "%AppData%\Adobe\addons\out.exe"
b. WMI persistence object namedWinDiagItem(wmic /NAMESPACE:\\root\subscription PATH __EventFilter GET __RELPATH) -
Delete shadow-copy wiper scheduled task
oab2sc.exeunderC:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\Offline Files\oablogon.exe. -
Full AV/EDR scan to pick up secondary payloads (
msiexec.exe.hijacked DLLcrypt32.dll) then reboot.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
- Current State – No universal decryption. No freely available decryptor; offline keys are AES-256 (RSA-4096 wrapped).
-
Exceptions:
• A handful of victims who privately negotiated and had their decryptor leaked (Nov-2023) contain hard-coded keys for offline encryption variants. Upload a pair of encrypted & plaintext to tools such as NoMoreRansom “ID Ransomware” – if the leak applies, decryption is 100 % feasible.
• Otherwise recovery = restore from validated, air-gapped backups (common >24-hour RTO observed where backups existed). - Verification: Always patch backup repositories against the same initial access path before re-enabling network visibility.
4. Other Critical Information
-
Ransomnote: Plaintext file
Readme_for_Decryption.htadropped three places (desktop, C:\, root of mapped network drives). Contains base64 key + blog URL on the TOR siteegm7dve4yqxid7uvfbb7tf4n3gnm3qblifab2vcrzgfx42rrydyd7tqd.onion/pay2me. -
Uncommon characteristic: Apis encrypts incrementally and pauses when idle software-installer cache paths (
C:\Windows\Installer,C:\MSOCache) are detected, likely to avoid triggering WDAC logs. -
Double-extortion: Stealers (
psExec.exe+ Cobalt) exfiltrate Proof-of-Play/Patient data for additional pressure before triggering encryption; a leak site found on the same onion domain. - Industry impact: Besides ~25 health-system incidents, a notable November 2023 attack on a children’s hospital (secure-delete turned off) led to an FBI seizure notice on the onion blog in March 2024, indicating ongoing law-enforcement scrutiny.
-
Decoy files: Dll
.apissampler (sample.dll.apis) placed at the root of USB drives to tempt analysts into execution; hash: sha2569cc3667 af7d00....
Immediate Recommendations → Verify backup integrity, enforce least-privilege, and patch/segment any Move-it or Citrix edge devices today.