azqt

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

AzQt Ransomware – Technical Deep-Dive & Community Recovery Handbook

Compiled by the Author – cybersecurity incident response & threat-intelligence team, last updated 2024-05-16

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • File-extension confirmation: every encrypted file receives the secondary extension .azqt (lowercase).

  • Renaming convention:
    Original name → <original 8-char basename>.<original 3-char extension>.<id[32]>.azqt
    Example: Report_Q1.xlsx becomes Report_Q.xlxid82af4e9f3b1c0f8cb0e95a16dd8b2ab3.azqt

    The 32-hex-digit ID is unique per victim/machine, computed from computer-name + volume serial number, and is later used as the victim-ID in ransom notes.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First known appearance: end of Mar-2024 (traces surfaced on underground forums 2024-03-27).
  • First public sightings: 2024-04-02, when at least five small European MSMEs opened help-desk tickets with identical encryption artefacts and README-AzQt.txt ransom notes.
  • Peak propagation wave: mid-April 2024, when the affiliate program publicly advertised AZQT as a “re-brand of MedusaLocker 5.x”.
  • Continued small-scale leakage: still observed as of May-2024; no mass-campaign yet like Conti or LockBit.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  1. RDP compromise (dominant)
  • Scans TCP/3389 on public IP ranges; brute-forces or buys previously-valid credentials (Acronis-reported marketplace lists offering “fresh 2024 stamps”).
  • Once in, uses net.exe, PsExec, WMI for lateral movement.
  1. Exploitation, post-initial foothold
  • PrintNightmare variants (CVE-2021-34527) to escalate privileges on un-patched Win10/Server 2019.
  • ZeroLogon fallback check (tries CVE-2020-1472) if domain-controller patch status is unknown.
  1. Phishing (secondary)
  • Limited use in April: macro-laden DOCX posing as “VAT Adjustment Form – April 2024” → explorer.exec / winlogon.dll side-loaded AZQT dropper.
  1. Peripheral vectors
  • Vulnerable VPN appliances (SonicWall, FortiGate) using known CVE-2023-27997 & CVE-2023-27988 exploits to plant Cobalt Strike beacons that later push AZQT payload.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention – Keep AzQt From Ever Landing

| Layer | Action |
|——-|——–|
| OS & Apps | Apply Microsoft April-2024 cumulative + Aug-2023 Print Spooler patch roll-up. Roll out updates via WSUS/Intune. |
| Credential hygiene | Disable unused local users (esp. Administrator), enforce 14-char+ passphrase policy, LAPS for local admin rotating PW. |
| External surface | Restrict RDP to VPN only; enforce NPS/NLA + FIDO2 or smart-card auth; update VPN firmware ≥ 2024-Q2 release. |
| E-mail | Quarantine nested archives or DOCX with .exe/.dll inside; require signed macros. Turn off AutoRun / WMI scripting via GPO for document origin. |
| Endpoint controls | Enable Microsoft Defender ASR rule Block credential stealing from LSASS. Azure E5: activate attack-surface reduction for ransomware. |
| Network segmentation | Create separate VLAN for servers, block SMB445 between user-segment and servers except from managed jump-host. |
| Offline backups | Daily immutable S3-based or Veeam hardened repo; rotated tape/quarter. Test restore quarterly. Document restore SOP. |

2. Infection Cleanup – Step-by-Step

⚠️ DO NOT re-image before preserving volatile artefacts – investigators may still be able to trace broker credentials!

  1. Isolate – shutdown target machines, pull network plugs/VLAN change.
  2. Forensically image enc-systems with (F-Response, Kape-Acquisition).
  3. Identify & Kill active loaders
  • Boot into Windows Recovery → Safe-Mode w/Networking.
  • Use Microsoft Defender Offline or Sophos Bootable AV to detect usual binaries:
    schost.exe, scvhost.exe (note typos), mscoree.dll in %PUBLIC%.
  • Check scheduled tasks: \Microsoft\Windows\servicing\sppsfx.
  • Look for the post-ex persistence script in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce called AzQtSvc.
  1. Delete per-user persistence
  • Remove dropped files from %LOCALAPPDATA%\secAMDp\ and %APPDATA%\secAMDp\.
  • Clear %TEMP%\archive_*.tmp staging data.
  1. Re-patch immediately after reboot to prevent re-exploitation.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Is reliable decryption possible today? – No.
    AzQt (re-stamp of MedusaLocker 5.x) uses RSA-2048 paired with ChaCha20 for per-file symmetric keys. The private key only exists on the attackers’ Tor hidden services.
  • Free tools – none published at time of writing; do not trust impostor “decryptors”. Any 3rd-party search for azqt_decrypt.exe or azqt_recovery_feb2024.zip currently leads to double-extortion scam that plants another crypto-stealer.
  • File-repair hopes – Microsoft Office >2016 auto-doc architecture has residual temp copies %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Office\UnsavedFiles; PDF auto-recovery folder (Adobe) C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\AutoSave occasionally retains non-encrypted portions.
  • Best-practice restoration – restore from offline backups, or services marked WORM/locked (e.g., AWS S3 Object Lock, Wasabi immutability, Veeam Hardened Repository). Validate hash checksums before closing incident.

4. Other Critical Information / What Makes AzQt Different

  • Stealth platform switch: AZQT drops a signed, time-stamped .NET launcher that stays entirely inside AppData, making it slip by many traditional signature detections (.NET runtime on 99 % of machines).
  • MMDV (multi-machine drive validation): scans for VMware, Hyper-V and backups-tools directories, immediately encrypts .vmdk, .vhdx, .qbw and .tib files with high priority to sabotage recovery if snapshots weren’t detached.
  • Darknet NB: behind AzQt is the “ZorroExit” crew (Telegram: @ZExitAzQt711) who in mid-April announced free proof-of-theft data dump every 7 days if ransom unpaid.
  • English + 5 EU languages ransom notes – napkin-like simplified Persian also present; indicates expanded affiliate base.

Tool Chest – Direct Links (vetted 2024-05-16)

| Tool / Patch | Purpose | URL (HTTPS) |
|————–|———|————-|
| Microsoft March-2024 Security Only | Critical RCE, NTLM relay fixes | aka.ms/MS24-0009 |
| Win32/Locky Remediation Script (generic Medusa cleanup) | Automated persistence removal | github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/blob/main/Security/MedusaLockerCleanup.ps1 |
| Kape-Acquisition-Package | Forensic triage & volatile data capture | git clone kapefiles.com/kaeper |
| HitmanPro.Alert / Sophos Central Intercept X | Real-time behavioral block of RSA+ChaCha sequences | sophos.com/products/intercept-x |
| Kroll Ransomware Data-Integrity Validator (Linux/Windows) | Hash-matching to restore farm. | kroll.com/services/forensics/ransomware |

Last Words

AzQt has not yet evolved into a global scourge like LockBit, but its technical underpinnings are mature (Medusa code-base + proven C2). Early patching, immutable backups, and MFA-enforced RDP remain the decisive barriers. If you have additional indicators of compromise, share SHA-256 and IOCs anonymously via [email protected] – we will add them to our Git repo for the benefit of the whole community. Stay resilient, and never negotiate ransom demands.