Ransomware Public Resource
Variant Focus: “BASTA” (.basta extension)
Technical Breakdown
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
• Confirmation of File Extension Every encrypted file receives the literal suffix “.basta” appended after the original extension, yielding names such as:
AnnualReport.xlsx.basta or salesdatabase.sql.basta
No additional markers, random IDs, or email addresses are appended.
• Renaming Convention The ransomware does not prepend or obfuscate the original filename; file names remain readable, only acquiring the new extension. Directory listings therefore retain clarity while contents are inaccessible.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
Initial public sightings of large-scale infections clustering around April–June 2022 with persistent campaigns continuing through 2023–2024. BASTA rapidly became the ransomware of choice for multiple Russian-speaking threat groups, frequently deployed as a second-stage payload after QBot/TrickBot footholds and as part of post-Cobalt-Strike intrusions.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
• Phishing & Malicious Attachments
Invoice or DocuSign bait emails with ISO, CHM or macro-laden Word files that download a BASTA dropper.
• Software Vulnerability Chains
Routinely arrives via ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473/34523/31207) and ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855 et seq.) on exposed Exchange servers, or after initial compromise from vulnerabilities in Fortinet, GoAnywhere MFT, and ScreenConnect (2024).
• Cobalt-Strike/Living-off-the-Land
Once inside the perimeter, attackers use WMI, PowerShell, RDP, and BITSADMIN to lateral-move, dump LSASS, and stage the BASTA encryptor.
• Defense-Evasion Techniques
Utilizes process injection, parent-PID spoofing, and clearing Windows event logs to evade EDR/AV.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention
Immediate hardening checklist
- Segment networks: isolate backups, production, and user VLANs.
- Disable SMBv1; deploy SMB signing and enforce NTLM downgrade restrictions.
- Patch promptly: Exchange, VPN appliances, and remote-management products.
- Restrict remote desktop to authorized sources via IP allow-lists + NLA + MFA.
- Enforce least privilege; disable PowerShell (v2) and CScript where not needed.
- Maintain 3-2-1 backup rule (3 copies, 2 media, 1 off-line & immutable).
- Essential software stack:
• Microsoft Defender with ASR rules enabled (“Block credential stealing”, “Block process injection”, etc.)
• Firmware-based credential guard / TPM attestation where possible.
2. Removal
Step-by-step eradication after breach confirmation
- Isolate the infected host (unplug NIC / disable Wi-Fi & USB ports).
- Collect volatile evidence: memory dump (WINPmem, FTK Imager) and triaged log files.
- Identify persistence:
• Run Autoruns64.exe (Sysinternals) and filter BASTA artifacts (scheduled tasks, RunOnce, WMI\root\subscription).
• Review recently created services (Task Scheduler tasks named “ServiceHubUpdater.exe”, “SQLAgent”, etc.). - Revert backdoors
• Remove scheduled .bat/.ps1 files in %Public%\ and C:\ProgramData.
• Ensure Cobalt-Strike beacon is disabled (look for process with unsigned .dll loaded). - Deep-scan & reinstall OS
• Boot from trusted media → full format → clean OS install. Alternately, for trusted gold-image restore → verify hash of install.wim. - Patch & harden before reconnecting to production LAN (re-run steps 1-5 on the mitigation checklist).
3. File Decryption & Recovery
Recovery Feasibility
As of 2024-Q2 there is no free public decryptor for BASTA’s robust ChaCha20 + RSA-4096 hybrid encryption. Off-line backups that were NOT encrypted or corrupted remain the only guaranteed restoration path. Some organizations with compromised BASTA actors have released private keys after law-enforcement takedowns, but these are case-specific.
Tools & Patches for Encryption Layer Mitigation
• No decryptor, but having kick-started development of anti-encryption code: security vendors (Bitdefender, Emisoft, Kaspersky) maintain “No More Ransom” portal; subscribe to their feeds for future tool release.
• Decryption may become possible if: credentials used to trigger endpoint encryption are extracted (attacker side) – depends on LE involvement.
4. Other Critical Information
Differentiators
• Simultaneous double-extortion: attackers exfiltrate data to Mega.nz or Cloudflare R2 buckets before encryption (RClone-based exfil pipelines).
• Custom Dark-Web leak site (HelloBoy.NotOnion): BASTA group posts proof-of-exfil screenshots with countdown timer (usually 7–10 days).
• No lateral-movement signature on the encryptor itself – the binary is purposely kept small; most functionality delegated to scripts and Cobalt-Strike allowing rapid updates that bypass signature controls.
Broader Impact
BASTA has hit >160 documented organizations worldwide, with a distribution skew toward English-speaking countries and high-value industries: shipping/logistics (VEEM islands), professional services (Morrison & Foerster), and critical infrastructure (regional water utilities). Losses per incident (including regulatory fines and ransom) have exceeded USD $50 million in 2023 alone, prompting FBI, Australia ACSC, and UK-NCSC to issue joint advisories highlighting BASTA’s “service-ready affiliate model” in which initial access brokers (IABs) are selling entry for a flat fee and then handing-off to BASTA affiliates paid by percentage of ransom.
Action Summary
- Verify presence of “.basta” extension after April-2022.
- Treat any exposure to QBot, Cobalt-Strike, ProxyShell logs post-2022 as potential BASTA precursor.
- Prioritize patching + MFA on public-facing Exchange/VPN after verified removal steps above.
- Do not negotiate unless legal counsel and incident-response retainer approved; instead consider incident-triggered cyber-insurance cover and invoke business-continuity plans for recovery via verified off-line backups.
Community contributors are encouraged to mirror this resource and share intelligence hashes of BASTA loaders or encrypted samples to maintain collective defense against this evolving threat.