bbq*

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Technical Breakdown:

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension: bbq (appears exactly as “.bbq” with no additional random characters or prefixes).
  • Renaming Convention: Files are renamed to the pattern
    <original_filename>.<original_extension>.bbq
    (Example: “AnnualReport.xlsx” becomes “AnnualReport.xlsx.bbq”).
    Only the last (outer-most) extension changes; the authentic one is preserved just before the appended .bbq, which means directory listings still show the true file type but make encrypted data unusable.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • Approximate Start Date/Period: First large-scale detections surfaced in June 2023 as part of Babuk-V2 activity clusters. Public telemetry references and victim submissions on ID-Ransomware spiked late-June through early-August 2023.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  • RDP Compromise: Credential stuffing against exposed 3389/3389+NAT gateways is the favored entry point.
  • Phishing with Geared Payloads: Emails impersonating procurement invoices or transportation invoices carry password-protected ZIPs (*.doc.zip) containing LNK droppers that ultimately fetch the bbq loader.
  • Known Exploits:
    – CVE-2021-34527 “PrintNightmare” used for privilege escalation on un-patched Windows servers.
    – Saw intermittent use of SQL Server UDP 1434 hijacking for lateral movement once inside.
  • Cobalt Strike Beacon: Used as secondary payload to move laterally, dump LSASS, and push the ransomware binary to every reachable host.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies:

1. Prevention

  • Close RDP from the Internet or require VPN-only MFA-protected access; disable /admin consoles.
  • Patch immediately: Apply Windows cumulative updates covering PrintNightmare (June 2021+), RDP (BlueKeep), and SMBv3.
  • Block malicious macros / LNK file execution via Group Policy; use Windows Defender ASR rules to prevent Office spawning child processes.
  • Application allow-listing (e.g., Microsoft Defender Application Control or AppLocker) that permits only signed executables to run in user-wide locations.
  • Network segmentation: Separate domain controllers, SQL, and file shares from end-user networks using VLANs and strict firewall rules (TCP/135–139, 445, 3389).

2. Removal

  1. Isolate: Physically disconnect affected hosts from LAN/Wi-Fi or force VLAN isolation on the switch.
  2. Suspend privileged accounts: If credentials are suspected of being compromised, force password reset for all domain-level accounts from a clean host.
  3. Boot to Safe Mode with Networking or Windows PE external media to prevent the malware from running again.
  4. Scan and identify:
  • Run Defender offline or ESET Emergency Disk – the bbq dropper is usually under %APPDATA%\Roaming\[random3-digit]\ or C:\ProgramData\ with random .exe names.
  • Check for scheduled tasks referencing cmd.exe /c C:\Users\…\name.exe.
  1. Wipe/Restore if tamper evidence is found in registry (e.g., run keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run).
  2. Validate with a second offline scan (Malwarebytes ADW/ESET or CrowdStrike WinPE). Return the lowest-privilege, clean cloned VM first, followed by incremental volume restores.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Recovery Feasibility: Babuk/Bbq (v2) uses secure Curve25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305; files cannot be decrypted without the attacker’s private key.

  • Free Decider Status: No known public decryptor; Emsisoft and NoMoreRansom do not list a working tool for .bbq.

  • Data-restoration Options:
    – Restore from offline backups (no online, direct-attached volumes).
    – Consider Windows Server VSS shadow-copy rollback if the ransomware did not explicitly delete them (rare but worth checking via vssadmin list shadows while offline).
    – Negotiation: Some affiliate groups left victims for months; law-enforcement never recommends paying but keep legal counsel involved if a business decision is made.

  • Essential Tools/Patches:
    – 2023-06 Cumulative Updates for Windows 10/11 and Server 2012 R2-2022 (addresses PrintNightmare, Netlogon EoP).
    – Latest Microsoft Defender engine signatures dated after July 2023 correctly tag the PE as Ransom:Win32/Babuk!cfg.
    – CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch or SentinelOne EDR signatures for lateral-movement beacon detections (use to retro-hunt once clean).

4. Other Critical Information

  • Unique Behavior: The Babuk fork .bbq does not append a fixed ransom note filename; the note is generated in every folder as Decrypt-Me.Txt(txt) via scheduled task every 15 minutes. It also auto-terminates if ru keyboard layout is detected, decreasing Russian incidence.
  • Ecosystem Impact: Babuk’s public source code (leaked Feb-2021) resurfaced in privatized “as-a-service” form. Thus, .bbq infections exhibit multiple affiliates, each potentially using different intrusion tactics—expect variability in IOCs across incidents.
  • Regulatory Considerations: Under US sanctions (OFAC guidance), paying Babuk affiliate wallets held by OFAC-designated persons could expose organizations to civil/criminal penalties—engage legal and incident-response firms early.

Bottom line: .bbq is a Babuk offshoot without a free decryptor. Prioritize robust backups, minimal-RDP exposure, and immediate patching; rely on clean restore rather than decryption when impacted.