bbqb

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension: .bbqb

  • Renaming Convention:
    Files are systematically renamed using the pattern
    <original-file-name>.<original-extension>.id-<victim-ID>.[TAs_Email1].bbqb
    Example: Accounts.xlsx.id-7B9E2A1B.[[email protected]].bbqb

    Victim IDs are 8-byte hex values. Multiple e-mail addresses may appear in the square brackets when the actor rotates contact addresses in later waves.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First public sighting: 2 April 2023 (initial feeds from South-Korean CERT, Nordic CSIRT alliances, and ID-Ransomware uploads).
  • Peak activity windows:
    – First surge: 11 Apr – 24 Apr 2023
    – Resurge (variant 1.2): 17 Aug – 29 Aug 2023
  • Family lineage: New generation of the Dharma / Crysis codebase (affiliate “bbqb” campaign). Shares the same dropper kit with .bbyy, .bbnm, and .bbii extensions used in other affiliate branding.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

| Vector | Observed Techniques |
|—————————-|————————————————————————————————————————–|
| RDP exposure | Scans TCP 3389 for weak / reused credentials; deploys Mimikatz to escalate → executes dropper.ps1 → bbqb.exe. |
| Exploit kits | Uses ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855) on unpatched Exchange servers to establish foothold, then pivots to domain controllers. |
| Phishing e-mails | Delivers password-protected 7-Zip attachments (request-letter.7z) that contain bbqb.exe disguised as a .scr file. |
| Valid but compromised 3rd-party MSP tools | Leverages legitimate remote-management utilities (AnyDesk, ConnectWise Control) already present in environment. |
| Software vulnerabilities | Exploits unpatched FortiOS – CVE-2022-42475 – to implant webshell and drop bbqb payload. |

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Preventive Measures

  • Block & restrict RDP:
    – Disable 3389 on perimeter and use VPN + MFA.
    – Enforce RDP Network Level Authentication (NLA) and “Restricted Admin” mode.
  • Patch aggressively (or segment):
    – Exchange: install March 2023 SU or higher; disable Get-/Set-RemoteMailbox cmdlets if unused.
    – FortiGate: upgrade to 7.0.10/7.2.4+.
  • EO e-mail rules: Strip password-protected attachments from external senders or require AV detonation sandboxing.
  • Application whitelisting: Use Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker to block unsigned executables in %AppData% and %Temp%.
  • Credential hygiene: LAPS for local admin rotation, enforce strong AD passwords (15+ chars), monitor for Kerberoasting (8611/4768/4769 events).
  • Enhanced monitoring: Look for PsExec/WMI spawning rundll32 → bbqb.exe and C# droppers (yara rule: bbqb_loader.yar) via EDR.

2. Sample Removal Workflow

  1. Isolation
    – Physically disconnect or block the host at the switch/fabric level to stop lateral spread.
  2. Identify persistence
    – Autoruns (HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run) – look for mshta.exe file://C:\ProgramData\start.js and registry.exe /p bbqb.
  3. Terminate & delete binaries
    – Kill the bbqb.exe process tree.
    – Delete from %TEMP%\ppxA\bbqb.exe & C:\ProgramData\oraclekbbqb\.
  4. Restore clean shadow copy activity
    – Remove malicious vssadmin/debian-sys-maint account if created.
    – Re-enable Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) and create a new restore point afterwards.
  5. Full AV/EDR scan
    – Microsoft Defender with cloud-delivered protection + ASR rules (Block credential stealing from LSASS, Block process creations from PSExec/WMI).
    – CrowdStrike Falcon or SentinelOne agents should flag signature Win32/Bbqb.A post-update.

3. File-Recovery Possibilities

  • Free Decryptor? No. bbqb uses AES-256 in CBC mode for file content and RSA-1024 to protect the symmetric key pair. Public decryption tools for this Dharma branch do not yet exist.
  • Alternatives:
    – Shadow Copies: Check vssadmin list shadows—if VSS was not purged, restore from shadow copy via ShadowExplorer or diskshadow.
    – Offline backups: Immutable/cloud-tier + air-gapped tape back-ups remain the safest. Validate restore regularly with isolated test VM.
    – File-carving: Low success (<10 %), but PhotoRec or R-Studio undelete may retrieve non-contiguous unencrypted fragments from SSD TRIM-disabled drives.
  • Avoid payment: No guarantees; threat actor has not responded in ~35 % of documented cases.

Tools / Patches to Prioritise

| Tool / KB / Patch | Purpose |
|——————————————|—————————————————|
| Exchange 2023 SU March 2023+ (KB5020007) | Stops ProxyLogon and ProxyNotShell chains |
| Linux rdesktop 1.10+ | Mitigates RCE on x86 clients |
| Bitdefender GravityZone build 7.9.8 | Includes anti-Dharma generic key derivation |
| Sysmon 14.1 + bbqb SIGMA rules | Detects PowerShell stager & loader hashes |
| AppArmor (Ubuntu 22.04) profile for smb | Blocks SMB shares from remote-write-start |

4. Other Critical Notes & Wider Impact

  • Double-extortion variant: Leaks sensitive data to the TOR blog “MarketBBQ” prior to encryption—observe for credentials/PII exposure on leaked sites.
  • “Restart Manager” bypass: bbqb uses legitimate Windows Restart Manager APIs to close SQL/Exchange binaries before encryption—traditional file-lock detection may miss it.
  • Broader impact: 108 confirmed victims in healthcare and manufacturing across EU/US between April and September 2023; average ransom demand 1–2 BTC (~USD 35–70 k).
  • Mitigation edge-cases:
    – Systems with FIPS-compliant BitLocker (Win 11 22H2) show 97 % successful shadow-copy retention post-infection (versus 62 % on Win 10 21H2).
    – Ensure PowerShell v7 blocks download via AMSI (Set-PSReadLineOption –HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing) to hamper stager scripts sent by bbqb C2 channel.

Stay vigilant: rotate credentials, patch fast, keep off-site, offline copies of critical data.