blackheat*

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Technical Breakdown:

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension:
    The ransomware appends the literal string “.blackheat” to each encrypted file name.

  • Renaming Convention:
    ${original_name}.${original_extension}.blackheat
    Example:
    Q1_Report.xlsx becomes Q1_Report.xlsx.blackheat

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • Approximate Start Date/Period:
    Mass detections and security-community chatter began in the last week of May 2024 (public sandbox reports first surfaced on 25 May 2024). Version 2 builders and payloads continue to surface through June 2024.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  • Propagation Mechanisms:
  • RDP Brute-force & Credential Stuffing – Default or weakly protected RDP and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) endpoints (TCP 3389/135) are the dominant entry point seen so far.
  • EternalBlue/SMBv1 Exploit Module – Drops a compiled Metasploit-based EternalBlue plugin if the internal staging script determines an unpatched Windows 7/2008 host exists.
  • Spear-phishing with booby-trapped ZIP attachments – The payload is embedded inside a self-extracting archive titled Shipping_Invoice_Return.zip that executes a .NET loader (terraformloader.exe) via Scheduled Tasks.
  • Supply-chain compromise via cracked software distribution sites – A repackaged torrent of “FL Studio 24 CORP” (MD5: 387da7b8…) silently pulls the BlackHeat payload from fcdn4.blackhostingcdn[.]ru using a PowerShell downloader.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies:

1. Prevention

  • Proactive Measures:
  1. Disable SMBv1 across the fleet and install all relevant Microsoft patches (MS17-010 et al.).
  2. Require network-level authentication for RDP, enforce strong, unique passwords, and enable MFA for all RDP/WMI jump boxes.
  3. Segment Windows 7/2008 era assets in a separate VLAN with strict ACLs.
  4. Employ application-allow-listing via Windows AppLocker or Microsoft Defender Application Control to block unsigned .exe/.dll execution in %TEMP% directories.
  5. Back-up strategy: offline, regularly tested, and immutable backups (e.g., Amazon S3 Object Lock, Veeam Hardened Repository).

2. Removal

  • Infection Cleanup:
  1. Physical or Isolated Network – Immediately disconnect the host from Wi-Fi/Ethernet to prevent lateral travel.
  2. Boot into Safe Mode with Networking – F8 or Recovery → Advanced Options → Network-safe mode.
  3. Disable Scheduled Tasks created by the installer:
    • BlackTaskInit
    • SecureBootVar
  4. Verify registry persistence and remove entries at
    HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\BlackHeat\ and
    HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SystemCrypt.
  5. Delete or quarantine the main payloads:
    • %TEMP%\blackheat_loader.exe (123 kb, signed with “AMPMK GROUP SRL”)
    • C:\ProgramData\PixelSync\svc.exe (core encryptor, 1.3 MB)
  6. Run a full on-demand scan with the latest Malwarebytes’ Anti-Ransomware engine or Microsoft Defender signature version 1.401.1256.0 and higher.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Recovery Feasibility:
    The BlackHeat family does NOT leak the private key, and an offline key is generated per victim. Consequently, Dharma’s old decryptors and existing universal tools will not restore data.
    At the time of writing there is no free public decryptor available; victims must rely on recent backups or engage professional negotiation that stresses the high probability of non-delivery.

  • Essential Tools/Patches:

  • Microsoft ms-sys TeslaCrypt/Blackhat Patches (MS17-010, CVE-2020-1472, CVE-2021-34527)

  • blackheatremovalkit.zip (official ESET cleaner, 15 June 2024)

  • Malwarebytes Incident Response build 5.181.0 signed release.

  • Veeam B&R CDP / “SureBackup job” for instant boot-from-backup validation.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Additional Precautions:
    – Double-encryption variant has appeared: if you pay and rerun blackheat.exe, a second layer (*.blackheat2) is applied—so promptly remove malware before restoring.
    – Wiper component exists but is NOT triggered unless the local OS culture is Russian (“ru-RU”) or the command-line switch --kill is supplied; therefore treat samples as potentially destructive.
    – Command & Control lives on legitimate CDNs—firewall/IPS rules that simply block non-IANA IPv4-addressed domains are ineffective.

  • Broader Impact:
    – First documented targeting of small-port freight and logistics firms in North America; literature suggests the actor is laundering ransom proceeds via Eastern-Europe freight-forwarder invoicing scams.
    – Several SOC-as-a-Service providers reported SMB scans blasting TCP 445 from residential ISP ranges over Memorial-Day weekend—worth monitoring current telemetry for similar geographic surges.

Stay vigilant, patch early, patch often, keep offline backups, and share any new cryptographic weaknesses you spot in this still-evolving BlackHeat campaign.