blackmagic - NTAPINSIGHT

Technical Breakdown:

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

Confirmation of File Extension:
Yes—after encryption, the BlackMagic ransomware appends .blackmagic directly to the original filename.

Renaming Convention:
Each affected file is renamed in the following pattern:
original.file.name.xxxxxxxxxx.blackmagic
The 10-character string (x) is an alphanumeric victim ID generated at runtime; it is consistent across all files on the same machine.
Example: Report_Q1.xlsx.5f2a7be013.blackmagic

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

First public sighting: late-May 2021
Wider surge logged: June–August 2021; smaller waves resurfaced in Q1-2023 after new loader campaigns (most notably via SmokeLoader & Emotet resurgence)

3. Primary Attack Vectors

| Method | Details & Examples |
|——–|——————–|
| Phishing e-mails | ISO, RAR, or password-protected ZIP attachments titled “Invoice_Jul2023.iso”. Malicious MS-Office or .NET executables spawn PowerShell downloaders. |
| Exploit-Kits / Malvertising | Magnitude and Fallout EKs dropped BlackMagic before site operators switched to STOP/Djvu variants. |
| Compromised RDP (weak or re-used credentials) | Scans TCP/3389 and common external ports (3389, 5500, 5535, 135) followed by brute-force or “credential-stuffing”. |
| Software Vulnerabilities | Exploits have included: |
| | – CVE-2017-0144 (EternalBlue SMBv1) legacy Windows 7/2008 |
| | – CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep) RDP |
| | – CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare) for privilege escalation |

Remediation & Recovery Strategies:

1. Prevention

Prioritize patching of SMB (disable SMBv1 entirely), RDP blue-screen patches, and Print Spooler fixes.
Enforce MFA on all remote access (VPN, RDP, VDI portals).
Kill-chain defenses: EDR/XDR with behavioral detection for powershell -enc, living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins), and unsigned .NET payloads.
Network segmentation—block SMB/RDP between user VLANs.
Least-privilege + Protected Users group to temper impact of credential theft.
Frequent, air-gapped/offline backups with immutability (e.g., Veeam hardened repo copies, AWS S3 Object Lock).

2. Removal

Isolate the host immediately – pull Ethernet / disable Wi-Fi.
Snapshot or collect forensic image before system changes.
Kill ransomware processes & scheduled tasks:

Use Process Explorer / live-response console on EDR.
Typical process names: blackmagic.exe, svcmond.exe, systemupdate.exe (randomized).

Delete persistence:

Registry keys:
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\BlackMagic
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SystemUpdater
Scheduled tasks often named “System Update Service” (XML path: C:\ProgramData\BMSvc\task.xml).

Clean malicious files & hidden folders:

%ProgramData%\BlackMagic\, %TEMP%\updater\
Remove Shadow-copy deletions: vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet.

Run AV/EDR deep scan (Malwarebytes, SentinelOne, Sophos).
Reboot to Safe-Mode with Networking, scan again.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

No publicly available decryption tool exists as of 2024.
Encryption uses ChaCha20 on file contents and Curve25519 ephemeral keys; master(s) stay offline unless ransom is paid.
Option: retain encrypted samples in case keys are later disclosed by law-enforcement takedowns or affiliate arrests.
Preferred recovery path: last known-good offline backup.
Validate backups with sha256sum / file compare to ensure ransomware did not encrypt or chain the repository.
Use versioning in cloud buckets (e.g., Azure Blob “point-in-time restore@15days”).

4. Other Critical Information

Double-extortion now default: attackers also exfiltrate data via Rclone to Mega.nz; DDoS threat is sometimes layered after ransom deadline.
Notable incidents: 2022 hits on regional hospital, healthcare MSP, and 4 county-level US school districts; downtime averaged 7–12 days.
IoCs (as of 2023 wave)
SHA256: f1a7a8979fadc2f6b2b3ce0b1e60f4a5cfcb94c4745e0e3d268bcf0fc6a45ecb
C2 domains: major.freedns.io, dmca[.]cf, korea-registry[.]ru

Essential Tools & Patches (Quick Reference)

Stay vigilant—BlackMagic continues to iterate.