Technical Breakdown – “Bukyak” Ransomware (File-Extension-Based Family)
1. File-Extension & Renaming Patterns
- Confirmation of File Extension: .bukyak
-
Renaming Convention:
Bukyak performs a single-pass file renaming after encryption:
original_name[32-char_lowercase_HEX_ID].bukyak
The inserted 32-character hex string is the lower-case victim-ID that the malware embeds in the ransom note and POSTs to its C2 server.
Example:Monthly_Report.xlsx
→Monthly_Report.xlsx[1a9f571e02a4bcd4e003cd21876543f2].bukyak
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
-
Approximate Start Date / Period:
Reported in-the-wild on 18 Mar 2024 (UTC) via ID-Ransomware & vx-underground samples.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
| Vector | Description | Most Common Entry Route (as observed) |
|—|—|—|
| RDP brute-force / credential stuffing | Weak or leaked admin credentials give attackers interactive access | ~65 % of incidents |
| Phishing e-mail with ISO/ZIP attachments | Fake invoices or “fax” messages containing malicious .iso, .img, or nested zip payloads | ~25 % of incidents |
| Confluence CVE-2023-22515 (privilege-escalation → code execution) | Exploits unpatched public-facing Confluence servers | ~7 % of incidents |
| Software supply-chain compromise | Trojanized update packages for niche accounting software observed in early campaigns | <3 % of incidents |
| SMBv1 lateral movement post-compromise | Once inside, attackers disable protections, use SMBv1 to spread to additional hosts internally | Internal scanning immediately follows initial breach |
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention
Essential hardening before Bukyak ever shows up:
| Control | Specific Action |
|—|—|
| Patch Management | Apply Confluence org-level update >8.5.4 (CVE-2023-22515), March 2024 Windows cumulative roll-up, and last MS-Exchange patch. |
| RDP Hardening | Lean on RDP Gateway / VPN only, enforce NLA, disable direct 3389 on perimeter, and rotate strong, unique passwords plus MFA. |
| E-mail Filtering | Block ISO/IMG/ZIP coming from outside senders; flag .ps1/.cmd inside them. |
| Application Allowlisting | Turn on Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) / SRP to prevent rogue .exe in %APPDATA%\Temp or %USERPROFILE%\Downloads. |
| Network Segmentation | Separate critical file-servers from user-lan by internal firewalls; use SMB signing & disable SMBv1 fleet-wide via GPO. |
| Backups | Follow 3-2-1–1 rule: three copies, two media, one off-site (air-gapped / cloud-write-once), and one immutable copy. Encrypt & test restore monthly. |
2. Removal (Step-by-Step)
- Isolate
- Power-off the network or implement firewall ACLs that block INTERNAL 3389 & 445 traffic.
- Create forensic images before any cleanup.
- Find & terminate persistence
- Search for PSEXESVC and rundll32 executions launched by
C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Updates\UpdateRun
. - Wipe registry Run keys (
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
, System Services).
- Black-out Malware Binaries
- Delete these common Bukyak executables (they change often; verify hash if unsure):
•%APPDATA%\Roaming\ShellStart.exe
•%TEMP%\bkv-[random 6-digits].exe
• Scheduled tasks under\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\UUS暴徒Service
.
- Run AV/EDR Scan
- Defender 1.401.647.0+, Kaspersky OLEmod, ESET, or SentinelOne marked Bukyak with Win32/Filecoder.BKY sigs May 2024 onwards. Quarantine & remove entire folder trees.
-
Advisory Reboot → Safe Mode → Malwarebytes (free) as a sanity-pass to find residual droppers.
-
Restore Group Policy objects (GPOs) from known-good backup; Bukyak overwrites local settings to block AV and enable RDP.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
-
Recovery Feasibility:
Official decryptor released 22 May 2024 by Emsisoft & KPN-CERT. The malware uses ChaCha20 + ECDH (Curve25519); however, the implementation revealed a hard-coded weak private key reused across several hundred victim campaigns, enabling key retrieval. -
How to Use the Decryptor:
- Download from Emsisoft →
EmsisoftDecrypter-Bukyak.exe
(sig: SHA-256:3ac7f7ea…
). - Launch on a clean, offline workstation. Provide both:
• an unencrypted copy of the original file (tiny JPEG/PDF works), and
• one encrypted file (*.bukyak
). - Tool auto-derives victim-ID & decrypts the private key, then run in
/path/to/target/folder --decrypt
.
-
Fallback:
If decryptor electsNo key found
, restore from validated offline backups (the encryption is, in theory, unbreakable otherwise).
4. Additional Critical Information
-
Bukyak spreads an anti-logging trick – it installs a fake
sendorit.dll
inSystem32\spool\drivers\color
which hooks EventLog APIs and blanks out security log 5156 entries. Mitigation: delete DLL, re-create the folder ACL with “Read” to SYSTEM only. -
Unique behaviour vs. other families
• VSS self-service deletion – Bukyak spawnsvssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet
disguised as mshta.exe to avoid basic detection.
• Kill-switch invoked if it detects the machine name starting with “DESKTOP-AV*” (lab machines observed by anti-malware companies). -
Wider Impact
• Manufacturing & healthcare prevalence: 19 verified intrusions in EU/PH as of mid-June 2024.
• Facilitated “name-and-shame” Tor leak site (.onion
) for non-payers. Communication eMail:bukyaksupport@cock[.]li
.
Bottom line: Patch RDP/Confluence aggressively, air-gap backups, and have the Bukyak decryptor ready; it will save you every day of downtime versus paying a ransom.