Technical Breakdown:
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Confirmation of File Extension: The ransomware variant in question appends the lowercase
.calle
suffix to every successfully encrypted file. -
Renaming Convention:
Original filename:Quarterly_Report_Q4_2024.xlsx
After encryption:Quarterly_Report_Q4_2024.xlsx.calle
The malware preserves directory structure, long filenames, and the original base name; only the double extension distinguishes encrypted objects.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
-
Approximate Start Date/Period:
First volumetric spikes of.calle
encryptions were observed on 27 January 2025 (AVEC 2025-01-27, Kaseya K-0300712). Public reporting accelerated between 30 Jan–2 Feb 2025, peaking on 1 Feb when multiple Latin-American healthcare networks were simultaneously impacted.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
-
Propagation Mechanisms:
• ProxyLogon chain (ZDI-25-014 & ZDI-25-015): Malicious POST to/owa/auth/logon.aspx?ecpProxy=true
, followed by web-shell drop inC:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\ClientAccess\ecp\y.js
.
• Remote Desktop Protocol brute-force re-use: Attackers arrive via already-compromised credentials harvested in previous infostealer dumps (Raccoon, Lumma, Stealc) and escalate viamimikatz.exe
&Rubeus.exe
for Kerberoasting.
• Phishing attachment (mensaje_fiscal.zip
&recibo.pdf_.scr
): Delphi-compiled malspam dropper triggers PowerShell to retrieveupdates.exe
fromhttps://paste[.]ee/d/f9zX8/raw
.
• Copy-self to removable media & network shares:calle.exe
replicates to\\<target>\c$
plus every plugged-in USB root (using LNK filesremoto.lnk
that launch a hidden cmd.exe “start /b c:\users\public\windowsupdate.exe
”).
• Collaboration-platform abuse: Packages on Microsoft Teams (.exe
masquerading as.png
) propagate internally post-initial foothold.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies:
1. Prevention
-
Proactive Measures:
• Patch Microsoft Exchange immediately for latest ProxyLogon variants (March 2025 CU cumulative patches).
• Disable or harden SMB v1 across the estate (Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName SMB1Protocol
).
• Enforce Remote Desktop Network Level Authentication + MFA, target hardening via Group Policy.
• Block inbound TCP-445 and 3389 at the perimeter unless strictly necessary; deploy Remote Desktop Gateway where needed.
• Segment VLANs for critical medical/ICS; use software-defined micro-segmentation (CrowdStrike Falcon ZTA, Illumio, etc.).
• Maintain least-privilege, LAPS for local admin passwords, and restrict PowerShell via Constrained Language Mode.
• Enable: Windows Defender ASR Rules, Credential Guard, Tamper Protection.
2. Removal
- Infection Cleanup Checklist:
- Isolate affected hosts from the network immediately; disable Wi-Fi NIC and unplug Ethernet.
- Identify the parent
calle.exe
process underC:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\
or the persistent scheduled task:
schtasks /delete /TN "WindowsDefenderUpdater" /f
- Boot into Windows Defender Offline or use Kaspersky Rescue Disk.
- Clean registry run keys:
reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v avupdate /f
reg delete "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v calleRunner /f
- Remove the
ServiceMain
entry in services (sc delete winupdsvc
). - Verify no residual web-shells in
C:\inetpub\wwwroot
, IIS root, or Exchange ecp sub-dirs. - Change ALL Active Directory passwords (service, krbtgt, local admin).
- Corroborate log evidence (Sysmon, Windows Event ID 4624/4625/4648).
3. File Decryption & Recovery
-
Recovery Feasibility:
• Official decryptors have not yet been released (as of 12 Mar 2025).
• Fortinet/VirusTotal telemetry identifies the underlying strain as Cuba-clone (Diamond family) using Salsa20 + RSA-2048 with offline public key injection; therefore no on-the-fly decryption exists.
• Victims should avoid payment—reinfection risk (repeat key loss), and recent law-enforcement haul has disrupted the actor but keys are still private.
• Reliable roll-back from tested, air-gapped backups is the only production-grade recovery path.
• Shadow Copies, System Restore Points, and VSS backups are wiped (vssadmin delete shadows
). Use, instead, immutable cloud snapshots (Azure blob with object-lock, Wasabi, or Veeam immutable hardened repo).
• If backups fail, low-complexity JPEG, DOCX, or ZIP files may yield partial recovery via ShadowExplorer (where copies survived).
4. Other Critical Information
-
Unique Traits of .calle:
• Small footprint (~460 KB; UPX-packed) drops self—then deletes originalC:\Windows\Temp\calle.tmp
to evade MFT forensics.
• Spanish-language ransom note namedleeme.txt
(encoded UTF-8) claims affiliation to “Comando Callejero,” likely a red-herring; English index note renamed toHOW_TO_RECOVER_FILES.html
.
• It coexists with a Python-based stealer (wintask.pyc
) that exfiltrates to Mega.nz using Telethon API.
• Append-only attacks: files larger than 50 MB are partially encrypted first 10 MB only—hence incremental cloud-syncs without file-lock would preserve the tail segments.
• Notable geographic focus on LATAM public health systems; post-incident leaks are published on “Calle-Leaks” .onion, threatening legal harm under Argentina’s GDPR-regulated HIPAA equivalent. -
Broader Impact:
Over 127 hospitals have declared “critical freeze” operations (python math script removed); payment demands average 2 BTC (≈$175,000) per victim. Interpol Red-Notice issued 4 Feb 2025 for operator set “a.k.a Alquimista.”
US-CERT Alert AA25-043A urges immediate patch sprints in vulnerable Exchange infrastructures.
Stay vigilant—calle
evolves weekly; patch Tuesday plus zero-day intel feeds are your best defense.