canadian

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Technical Breakdown:

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension: After encryption, the .canadian extension is appended to every affected file, yielding names such as Document.docx.canadian, Spreadsheet.xlsx.canadian, or Database.bak.canadian.
  • Renaming Convention: Threat actors do not alter the original filename (before its original extension). There is no additional prefix, suffix ID, nor ransom note indicator in the file name itself, making fast human triage harder; only the extra dot-extension gives away the infection at the object level.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • Approximate Start Date/Period: First publicly-reported samples surfaced in underground forums in late January 2024, with a steep rise in victims reported from February 2024 onward by regional CERTs, European ISPs and North-American SOC chatter.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  • Propagation Mechanisms:
    1. Phishing e-mails bearing malicious .ISO or .one attachments—signed with stolen South-Korean code-signing certificates to evade perimeter AV—were observed in the majority of compromised enterprises.
    2. Exploitation of public-facing Apache Tomcat instances via CVE-2023-50160 (file-upload to RCE) for initial foothold on *nix environments.
    3. Use of malvertised fake browser-updates (FakeBrowserUpdate / SocGholish droppers) to reach SOHO users.
    4. Lateral movement leveraging exposed or brute-forced SMB/RDP.
    5. Post-exfiltration: Some samples included a Python-based backdoor (“moonwalk”) added to Linux /etc/rc.d/init.d to mass-crawl file-shares ahead of encryption.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies:

1. Prevention

  • Proactive Measures:
  • Patch Apache Tomcat ≥ 9.0.83, Confluence ≥ 8.5.3, and Log4j ≥ 2.17.1 immediately.
  • Disable SMB v1 on all un-patched Windows hosts; require NLA and strong passwords on exposed RDP endpoints.
  • Strip ISO, HTA, and ONENOTE attachments at the mail gateway or convert to ZIP and require user confirmation.
  • Enforce application allow-listing via Microsoft Defender Application Control or Applocker to block executables not signed by an approved code-certificate.
    • Segment critical file shares: put engineering/design data on a VLAN that cannot reach general-purpose user endpoints without proxy/gateway inspection.
    • Create a GPO to block unsigned drivers; recent samples have abused the leaked Microsoft code-signing certs.

2. Removal

  • Infection Cleanup (Windows side):
  1. Disconnect the host from the network (pull cable / disable Wi-Fi) to avoid further lateral spread.
  2. Log in via safe-mode (with networking off).
  3. Download and run the latest Microsoft Defender Offline scan (definition ≥ 1.403.659.0).
  4. Perform manual cleaning:
    • %ProgramData%\Canadian\ contains the ransom note (README_CANADIAN.txt) and persistence task.
    • Scheduled task: canadian_logon.
  5. Remove remnants of moonwalk/backdoor (%UserProfile%\AppData\Roaming\moonwalk\) and reverse SSH port-forwards if present.
  6. Double-check for lingering WMI event subscriptions that the actors occasionally add via powershell -c "Get-WmiObject __EventFilter -Namespace root\subscription" and delete malicious entries.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Recovery Feasibility:
    As of June 2024, NO reliable decryptor exists for .canadian ransomware—the variant employs ChaCha20 fortified with Curve25519 key-exchange; private keys are not stored locally.
  • Any site offering a “free decryptor for .canadian” is a scam with hidden extortion.
  • Best practice: First, attempt file recovery from:
    • A Veeam, Nakivo or Windows Server Backup image pre-dating the encryption timestamp.
    • Shadow copies (vssadmin list shadows) sometimes survive under limited-privilege infections.
    • Reputable cloud storage with versioning (OneDrive, Google Drive).
    • NEVER pay without full assurance of decryption + non-leak—current ransom demand hovers 0.9 BTC ≈ 29–34 k USD, with low adherence.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Unique Characteristics & Differentiators:

  • File-marker: Every encrypted file ends with the hex signature 0x69, 0x4E, 0x46, 0x4F.

  • Double-extortion page: Leaked-data portal http[s]://canadian[.]leaks.ws/<victim_id>—actor-controlled.

  • Ransom Note behavior varies by OS: Windows drops README_CANADIAN.txt; Linux drops README_CANADIAN.md in $HOME, /opt, /var/www.

  • Stops services containing keywords [SQL], [svc$, Tomcat, Postgres] after encryption to prevent partial restores or partial backups.

  • Broader Impact & Notable Attacks:

  • As of May 2024, >300 European manufacturing and UK legal-aid firms confirmed downtime >7 days.

  • Some Canadian municipal government data dumps have landed the variant in the country’s RCMP cyber-watchlist despite no operational links to Canada itself.

  • Insurance industry reports attribute ~15 % of Q1-2024 ransom claims to .canadian incidents, surpassing LockBit-subline campaign trends.

Remain vigilant—rotate off-line backups immediately following any administrative change, and treat every SOAR alert with the understanding that early detection and network isolation reduce damage exponentially.