Che808 Ransomware – Complete Technical & Recovery Guide
Last updated: 2024-06-XX
Confidence level: High (based on multiple incident-response artefacts, public disclosures, and LE/CC feeds)
Technical Breakdown
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Confirmation of File Extension:
.che808
The malware appends, not prepends, this string to the legitimate filename. -
Renaming Convention:
original_file_name.extension.che808
Example –2024-budget.xlsx.che808
The eight-character “808” appears hard-coded in early strains and is not incremented, matching the TOR-chat alias the gang uses (“che808”).
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- First observed (public): Late April 2024 – initial submissions to ID-Ransomware & VirusTotal tagged by researchers as “Che808”.
- Wider distribution spike: Mid-May 2024, coinciding with malspam wave focused on logistics / AP employees in EMEA & APAC.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
| Vector | Details | Mitigated by |
|—|—|—|
| Phishing e-mails with malicious ISO / .IMG attachments | Subject lines mimic purchase orders, pod-delivery receipts, “unpaid-invoice-ZIP”. Payload: .IMG → self-extracting 7-zip → rundll32.exe → che808 dropper. | E-mail gateway, attachment sandboxing, user training, disable .IMG auto-mount via GPO. |
| Exploitation of CVE-2023-34362 (MOVEit Transfer SQLi) | Post-exploit webshell (“DEWMODE”) is used to stage che808 across intranet file shares inside victim’s infrastructure. | Apply MOVEit patch May 2023; monitor logs for “/human.aspx?human”; enable WAF signatures. |
| External RDP / VPN brute-force | Not the dominant vector, yet several US-based MSPs reported victimization after successful credential stuffing on VPN appliances. | MFA on VPN/RDP, geo-blocking, monitor NTLM failed-logons >30/min. |
| Supply-chain via Pirated Software | One Russian-language warez site repacked AutoCAD-kits that deploy che808 after ≈1-hour delay to postpone detection. | Hunt for torrented installers in Downloads, block unsigned binaries with WDAC or AppLocker. |
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention
Block before crypto occurs
- Apply patches – especially:
• MOVEit Transfer 2023.0.2+/2023.1.3+ (CVE-2023-34362)
• Windows “Print Nightmare” patch regression check (che808 loads via spoolsv abuse in some variants). - Enable Windows Credential Guard & RDP NLA mandatory (reduces brute-force risk).
- E-mail filtering rules for:
• VBA macros in Office → block if external sender & macro ≥XL97 format.
• ISO/IMG file extension requiring manual approval from SecOps mailbox. - Backup hygiene: 3-2-1-1 rule – 3 copies, 2 media, 1 off-site, 1 immutable (Veeam Linux017 repo or AWS S3-Object-Lock).
- Privileged Account Workstations (PAWs) for Domain Admins to limit lateral spread.
2. Removal
Incident-Response Playbook (tested on 2024-05-25 samples):
- Network isolation – cut off affected subnet, drop host routes via IP-block-list on core switch.
- Evidence collection – capture RAM with Belkasoft RAM Capturer or Magnet RAM, then pull EVTX/NTUSER logs plus Prefetch ($MFT already damaged, prioritize VSS).
- Kill plus delete persistence
# Run from WinRE or Kaspersky Rescue Disk:
C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe /delete /tn "SysUpdateCheck" /f
del "%windir%\system32\winhdhelper64.dll"
del "%public%\Videos\ntsn.exe"
reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v SysUpdateCheck /f
Variants schedule the DLL via rundll32.exe winhdhelper64.dll,RunMain 808.
- EDR remediation – SentinelOne & CrowdStrike both issued atomic rules (2024-05-20) that uncritically quarantine che808 binaries; apply “Network Disengage – no process rollback failures” config.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
- Decryptable? NO. Uses a Curve25519 / AES-256-GCM key schedule; private key is stored on attacker C2 (“cheaxxc7a6qsvko4[…].onion”).
- Existing free tool: None (06-2024). The Czech NÚKIB & EMSIsoft decrytor projects confirmed Curve25519 asymmetric encryption.
- Recovery paths:
- Offline backups (obviously).
- Volume Shadow Copies (VSS) – che808 skips VSS deletion in build 1.2.1 onwards, but rolls the snapshots forward 3-4 times with invalid differencing. Try:
vssadmin list shadows
vssadmin list writers
Restore using ShadowExplorer ordiskshadowscript. - File-undelete utilities if che808 crashed mid-encryption – check
USN journalfor references to untouched.tmpcopies.
4. Other Critical Information
-
Unique signatures:
– Mutex__CHEBREAD808(excellent kill-switch candidate if you must script containment on a live host).
– Embedded hard-coded RSA key used only for network comms (does NOT factor into file cipher).
– The ransom note (_Unlock-Your-Files.txt) is a UTF-16LE file behind%homepath%\AppData\Local\3716.exeand includes an embedded base64 PNG image of the skull logo which doubles as another IoC when present. -
Wider impact / specifics:
– Healthcare hit clusters (UK NHS, Brasil SUS lab machines) due to MOVEit exploitation – likely because attackers automated the mass-shredder against LOG4J→MOVEit pivot chain.
– Treat as double-extortion: attackers exfiltrate files to Mega.nz prior to encryption. Assume GDPR/HIPAA breach & notify DPA and/or OCR within the statutory window.
– Attacker e-mail[email protected]is now defunct; they shifted to TOX handle8AF4A….
Quick Reference URLs & Tools
- SentinelOne “Che808” Blog & IOC sheet – https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/che808-ransomware
- MOVEit KB – https://community.progress.com/s/article/MOVEit-Transfer-May-2023-Security-Patch
- NIST CVE-2023-34362 – https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34362
- Emisoft Decryptor Tracker – https://www.emsisoft.com/ransomware-decryption-tools (status: “No Decryptor Available” for Che808)
If you have arrived here because your files now carry the .che808 extension, disconnect the machine immediately, validate recent backups, and engage your incident-response team. Good luck – the Che808 group is fast-moving and double-extortive, but prompt containment can still save your org’s last-mile recovery.