[email protected]

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

community@ransomware-911 | last update: 2024-05-24

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension:
    [email protected] (first_seen build ≈ Nov-2022) appends the literal domain [email protected] to every encrypted file.
    Example before → after
    Report 2024.xlsx → Report [email protected] (no extra ID or hex string).

  • Renaming Convention:
    Same as above – single appended suffix, always in lower-case, separated by a dot.
    |
    Note: Unlike older families (STOP/Dharma), the extension itself contains the ransom-contact e-mail. This can fool simple scripts that parse for 4-char extensions.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

Late-November 2022 – early-January 2023 saw the first clusters reported on MSSP analytic feeds for North-American healthcare MSPs. Limited geographic outbreaks through March 2023, then quiet.
April 2024 re-emergence wave observed in EMEA logistics providers, now using WordPress plug-in exploits.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  • Exploitation of Public-Facing Services
    – Confluence (CVE-2022-26134, OGNL injection)
    – Citrix Netscaler (CVE-2023-3519 RCE)

  • Phishing + Maldoc → Cobalt Strike
    Once initial foothold is obtained, a reflective loader (ELF or DLL) delivers CoderLoader which drops the ransomware binary – always named NVIDIAupdate.exe or winrng.exe in %PROGRAMDATA%\NVIDIA Corporation\Updater.

  • RDP / SMB Spray
    Post-foothold tool set includes SharpRDP.exe, PortBender.sys, or zerologon for privilege escalation and horizontal spread.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention

  1. Patch CVE-2022-26134, CVE-2023-3519, CVE-2020-1472, and CVE-2019-0708 across all public VMs / branch sites.
  2. Disable external RDP; enforce MFA (RDP-Tcp > Network Level Authentication = On).
  3. Block .exe and .dll in %PROGRAMDATA% from running unsigned via Microsoft Defender ASR rule “Block unsigned processes from running from Downloads and Desktop”.
  4. Deploy mail-flow rules quarantining *.doc*, *.xls* that originate externally and contain VBA macros.
  5. Backup volume-level and object-level daily, verify with immutability (WORM / Safeguard) ≥ 14 days retention in separate tenant/Azure LRS or immutable S3.

2. Removal

  • Quarantine immediately – power down affected hosts to prevent NTFS MFT wipe (v894+ build introduced overnight fsutil cleanboot).
  • Boot off clean WinPE or Linux LiveUSB so the ransomware service (WinRingSvc) never starts.
  • Manual trace & kill from Recovery
  1. Delete %PROGRAMDATA%\NVIDIA Corporation\Updater\winrng.exe
  2. Delete HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WinRingSvc
  3. Clear PendingFileRenameOperations in the registry (keys backup stored at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Coder007)
  4. Scan with updated Malwarebytes 4.6+ (definition build 2024-05-23 detects as Ransom:Linux/[Trojan]Coder007.A and Ransom:Win32/Coder007.A).
  • Re-image hosts failing confidence; rootkits have been seen with signed-but-stolen WHQL driver catalog (SHA1 5EB….67A).

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Recovery Feasibility
    At the time of writing NO public decryptor exists; the threat actor uses Salsa20 + RSA-2048 OAEP-SHA256. Keys are generated locally & immediately encrypted with the Tor C2 master public key.

  • Brute-force offline keys possibility was evaluated – the shortest discovered RSA modulus was 2048-bit (prohibitive).

  • Essential tooling
    – Backup restore to air-gapped immutable volumes GREATER than 48 h old (infection-delay window).
    – If Linux variant hit NAS, restore from btrfs/ZFS snapshots (zfs send tank@pre-Coder007 | zfs receive).
    – Shadow-copy (“Previous Versions”) survives on machines where WinRingSvc was killed early; run:
    vssadmin list shadows → robocopy <shadow path> <recover path>.

  • Patch-track sheet (XML feed)
    https://ransomware-911.github.io/feeds/patches/coder007.xml – auto-updated with latest Control-M & Confluence hot-fixes.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Stealthy behavior
    – After encryption completes, it moves renamed [email protected] files back to their original path in lowercase. Classic file managers and PowerShell gci hide the extension illusion better than GUI shells—making kill-switch scripts mis-target fronts.
  • Persistence mechanism
    Registers a per-OS-driver service entry (WinRingSvc) with Automatic startup; reboot safely from WinRE to avoid driver hook.
  • MITRE ATT&CK Index
    T1210/T1195/CWE-798/CWE-863 for public exploit vector, T1021.001 for RDP lateral.
  • Wider impact
    Until 2024-05-10, only 53 victims reported (kept low-volume via affiliate program). The MFA-bypass script they use once compromised domain admin credentials has since been integrated into TrickBot code-base, raising hybrid ransom-wiper potential.

Stay vigilant. Do not email the provided address unless you have court-approved authorization / active law-enforcement engagement.