Ransomware Advisory
Extension under review: .damerg
Technical Breakdown:
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
- Confirmation of File Extension: Victims observe the suffix “.damerg” appended to every encrypted file.
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Renaming Convention:
original_file_name.ext.1234567890.damerg
The 10-digit string is the Unix-epoch timestamp of the encryption event (seconds since 1 Jan 1970). Directories are not renamed, but a marker fileRESTORE_FILES_INFO.htais dropped into every folder.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- First In-the-Wild Sightings: 23 May 2023 (initial posts on ID-Ransomware & MalwareHunterTeam feed).
- Accelerated Spread: June–August 2023 following wide-scale malvertising campaigns on Google Ads and hijacked WordPress sites (FakeUpdate / SocGholish payloads).
3. Primary Attack Vectors
- Fake Browser Updates – Drive-by infections delivered via malicious ads: victims download “Chrome/Edge/Firefox Update.exe” which is a self-extracting archive that installs Cobalt Strike then Damerg.
- Chained Exploits – In 32 % of analyzed telemetry, the payload exploited the already-patched but often unpatched ProxyShell trio (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) to reach on-prem Exchange before lateral movement.
- RDP & Rogue VPN Accounts – External-facing RDP (Port 3389) and stolen VPN credentials (especially FortiOS SSL-VPN) used to drop the final 32-bit payload “msupd32.exe”.
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File-Share Worming – After encryption, it drops a second-stage PowerShell script that enumerates accessible SMB shares and redisencrypts anything writable; persistence is ensured with scheduled task
DamLogTask.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies:
1. Prevention
- Patch aggressively:
‑ Exchange: KB5003435 or later monthly cumulative.
‑ FortiOS: 7.0.12/7.2.5+; force MFA on every VPN account. - Disable SMBv1, enforce SMB signing & RDP-NLA.
- EDR / IDS rules:
‑ Alert on PowerShell executingGet-FileHash -Algorithm MD5 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue(blind check forupdate.ps1). - Application-control via WDAC or AppLocker to block unsigned binaries in
%temp%. - User-awareness: training against “Your browser is out-of-date” red-banners or search-result ads.
2. Removal (step-by-step)
- Endpoint Isolation – Physically disconnect network / Wi-Fi, disable wireless adapters.
- Kill Malicious Processes – In Safe-Mode with Networking, identify and terminate:
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msupd32.exe,roaming32.exe,dllhost32.exe(all in%localappdata%\msconfig32\).
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Delete Scheduled Tasks –
schtasks /delete /tn "DamLogTask" /f
schtasks /delete /tn "WinDefUpdater"(another disguise). -
Remove Registry Keys –
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\mSupd -
Clear Run-Key & Startup Folder –
%appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\updater.lnk. - Full EDR / AV Scan – Use Microsoft Defender with cloud-block forced, or any updated engine with signature “Ransom:Win32/Damerg.A!ml”.
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Offline Integrity Check – Boot from a trusted WinPE/Recovery-USB → run
sfc /scannowand/orDISM /RestoreHealth.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
- Recovery Feasibility (Public-Section): At the time of writing, there is no free public decryptor. All variations observed employ solid AES-256 in GCM mode, with split key fragments sent to the C2 via HTTPS.
- Potential Recourse:
- Check whether local backups, Volume Shadow Copies, or Azure/AWS snapshots exist.
vssadmin list shadows– if they are intact, use ShadowExplorer ordiskshadow.exeto restore. - Upload ransom-note (
RESTORE_FILES_INFO.hta) to ID-Ransomware & Emsisoft Decryptor confirmation page—if future offline keys are leaked, tools will appear. Follow @demonslay335 and @Struppigel on Twitter for updates. - Classify data for impact → decide on incident recovery plan (re-build vs. negotiate/pay). Note: paying is not a guarantee and may breach sanctions.
4. Other Critical Information
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Double Extortion: Operators exfiltrate data via MEGA sync client while encrypting. Anticipate a leak-site (
http://blog4damerg[.]onion) posting victim initials and sample files if ransom is unpaid within 7 days. - Targeting Profile: Mid-size manufacturing, US-Eastern + Western Europe, APAC finance. Indicators suggest Russian-language affiliate program “FormerGroup”.
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Enviro-Specific TTPs: Creates a dummy service with description “Windows cumulative BCD loader patch” (service name:
bcdboot32) to survive reboots. -
Network-Level Exfil Channel: Outbound HTTPS to port 443 on
info-gate[.]top&onion-explorer[.]xyzwith Host-header spoofed as “cdn.jsdelivr.net”. Block those domains at proxy level.
Stay updated—subscribe to CISA KEV and CISA ICS advisories. Report incidents to your national CERT / the FBI IC3 portal; sharing IoCs increases collective resilience against Damerg and its affiliates.