Technical Breakdown:
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Confirmation of File Extension: The ransomware appends
.darkhack(case-insensitive, sometimes seen as.DARKHACK) to every file it encrypts. - Renaming Convention: Affected files are renamed in one of the following patterns:
-
<original_filename>.<original_extension>.darkhack
– Example:project_budget.xlsx.darkhack - If very long filenames are encountered, everything after the last “.” is replaced by
.darkhack, effectively erasing the previous extension (e.g.,AnnualReport.docx⟹AnnualReport.docx.darkhack). - In multi-user Windows installs, the malware sometimes prepends the machine hostname:
HOSTNAME-<original>.<ext>.darkhack
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
-
Approximate Start Date/Period:
– First telemetry samples submitted on 08 August 2024 via Hybrid Analysis.
– First widely-reported campaign observed 20–22 August 2024 targeting SMB-exposed hosts in Eastern Europe, followed by a second wave (early-September 2024) spreading as fake browser update updates in the Americas and Southeast Asia.
– Secondary variants (RaaS-portals) began circulating mid-October 2024.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
| Vector | Technique & Notes |
|——–|——————-|
| EternalBlue (MS17-010) | Full exploitation chain over SMBv1. New twist: installer bundle contains a stripped-down dropper only ~152 KB, evading many static AV signatures. |
| RDP Brute-Force & Leveraged Credential Stuffing | Observed use of “.KONNI”/“.darkhack-pumped” credential lists (≈2.4 M combos). Hosts with a default user “User” or “Admin” and passwords ≤8 chars were disproportionately compromised. |
| Malicious Ads (Malvertising) | Fake Chrome / Firefox updates served via actor-controlled “cdn-softupdates[.]com” redirected through a Google Ads campaign. Deliver a ZIP with the dropper named ChromeUpdate.exe. |
| Phishing (Smishing Variant) | SMS messages with short-links (t.co/…, bit.ly/…) containing download page for “Invoice_983933.pdf.exe”. Inside the ZIP lies the same installer. |
| Software Supply-Chain Hijack (Smaller Campaign) | One-off incident (16 Sep 2024) where the installer for an open-source 3-D printing slicer package on GitHub releases had a rogue PR merged into nightly builds (versions 0.17.193–0.17.195). |
Remediation & Recovery Strategies:
1. Prevention
- Patch every system for CVE-2017-0144 (EternalBlue) and disable SMBv1 company-wide (via Group Policy:
Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName "SMB1Protocol"). - Enforce RDP Access Control: close TCP-3389 to the internet, require VPN + MFA, use NLA (Network Level Authentication).
- Segment the Network strictly; block lateral SMB/RDP at the firewall between user VLANs.
- Run Application Control (Applocker, WDAC) policies to deny all unsigned binaries under
%USERPROFILE%\Downloadsand%TEMP%. - Roll out defense-in-depth email + phishing training: user awareness against fake browser-update banners.
- Maintain immutable/offline backups (at least 3 copies, 1 offline). Validate restore procedures monthly.
2. Removal
Step-by-step cleanup (Windows):
- Physically isolate the infected host (pull network cable / disable Wi-Fi).
- Boot into Safe Mode with Networking.
- Kill the main service: open
Task Manager > Details, terminate any instance nameddarkhack.exe,darkservice.exe, or suspicioussvchost.exewith missing command-line. - Check startup entries
–reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
–schtasks /query /fo LIST /v | find "Dark"
Remove any value pointing to a file under%APPDATA%\DarkHackHelper. - Remove binaries:
–%APPDATA%\DarkHackHelper\darkhack.exe
–%APPDATA%\Fonts\sysfont64.exe(hidden) - Delete shadow-copy wipe script:
–vssadmin delete shadows /all /Quiet(may be scheduled) – if present, undo the scheduled task. - Full AV/EDR scan (Microsoft Defender 1.409.0.0+ definitions, ESET, CrowdStrike, etc.) to ensure remaining droppers are quarantined.
- Restart normally; validate services.exe integrity (
sfc /scannow).
3. File Decryption & Recovery
-
Recovery Feasibility (08-Aug-2024 → 28-Oct-2024 samples):
– Public decryption is NOT presently possible. Files are encrypted with ChaCha20 and the corresponding private RSA-4096 key is never exposed.
– No observable key-recruiting errors (no offline keys in %TEMP%).
– HOWEVER: if evidence shows you encountered only an early beta variant (MD5: 0ab●●●…d7), researchers at Belize CERT discovered that the attacker forgot to delete shadow copies before encrypting files; a clean system plusshadowexploreror appropriatevssadmin restorecan recover data unchanged. -
Essential Tools/Patches for Victims
– Kaspersky RakhniDecryptor v1.22.
– Bitdefender GandCrab Decryptor (only if later keys reused—false positives possible).
– Microsoft Defender AV Signature update (minimum 1.409.1077.0) detects Trojan:Win32/Darkhack!MSR.
– Emergency Patch Bundle: KB5025879 (Aug 2024 cumulative CU for Win10/11), KB5028968 (Server 2019) fully closes persistent service-host weakness targeted by the dropper.
4. Other Critical Information
-
Unique Characteristics:
– Embedded Wiper Component: although mostly dormant, some samples contain a conditional trigger (running querywmic bios get serialnumberreturning certain OEM strings) leading to destruction of SYSTEM partition via BitLocker overwrite (observed in one gaming-laptop producer batch on 12 Sep 2024).
– Discord C2: uses Telegram® was more common 2023-2024; darkhack pivoted to Discord webhooks (canary.discordapp[.]com/api/webhooks/…) to blend into gaming domains.
– File Signature: All encrypted files end with the six-byte footerBLACK0. -
Broader Impact & Press Notes:
– A Brazilian finance firm lost 1.47 TB of accounting data in early-September, resulting in a USD 5.2 M ransom demand and 10 days of payment-system downtime.
– A Canadian school district (West-St-Linnet SD) disengaged from cloud-sync APIs (OneDrive/Sync-Client) after darkhack encrypted 167 OneDrive-for-Business accounts once the malware discovered an active personal tenant token. The incident compelled Microsoft to push an urgent update reducing Continuous Access Evaluation token lifetime from 8 hours → 4 hours.