data3

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Technical Breakdown:

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of file extension: .data3 is the final suffix appended by the Data3 Ransomware (also referenced in some reports as Data3Locker or Data3Files locker).
  • Renaming convention:
    Victim filename → [OriginalFileName] + .id-[8-char-hex].{email-of-attacker}.data3
    Example:
    Quarterly.docx becomes Quarterly.docx.id-4F3A2E91.{[email protected]}.data3

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • Approximate start date/period:
    First telemetry sightings occurred in the wild starting mid-December 2023, with a large spike observed throughout January 2024 tied to malvertising campaigns masquerading as browser-update prompts and pirated software torrents. The ransomware underwent at least two minor code revisions in March and May 2024, but the .data3 extension remained unchanged.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  1. Malvertising / Drive-by download:
    Fraudulent “browser update” pages (fake Chrome/Edge Flash Player updates) deliver the initial .NET dropper (updater.exe).
  2. Cracked software installers: Bundled repacks on torrent sites contain the dropper hidden inside a 7-Zip SFX.
  3. RDP / VNC brute-force & credential stuffing: Once inside, the operator manually maps network shares and schedules the ransomware binary across multiple hosts via schtasks /create.
  4. Exploitation of common remote-management tools: Leverages open AnyDesk/ScreenConnect portals to push the payload using legitimate signed tools already present on the system.
    Note: Initial analysis has not uncovered use of notorious exploits such as EternalBlue or ProxyLogon—propagation is largely human-driven and assisted by cloud-management consoles.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies:

1. Prevention

  • Disable Remote Desktop Services from WAN by default (TCP 3389).
  • Enforce multi-factor authentication on VNC/AnyDesk/ScreenConnect or other remote-management software.
  • Implement application allow-listing / Applocker policies to block unsigned executables from running in user-writable directories.
  • Deploy network-wide ad-blocking DNS (Quad9, 1.1.1.2, or Pi-hole) to cut off malvertising before users land on fake-update pages.
  • Ensure all endpoint agents are configured to inspect archives/policy-bypass SFX files.
  • Regular offline or immutable backups: minimum 3-2-1 rule (three copies, two media, one off-site/off-line).

2. Removal (Step-by-Step)

  1. Isolate the host: Physically disconnect network or use EDR “contain” / Windows firewall block-all rule.
  2. Identify persistence:
    • %ProgramData%\MozillaUpdater\prefs.exe
    • HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\PrefUpdater
  3. Terminate malicious processes & scheduled tasks: Kill prefs.exe, win32.exe, and remove tasks named “OfficeUpdater” or “AdobePing”.
  4. Delete payloads:
    %ProgramData%\MozillaUpdater\
    %Temp%\updater.exe
    C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Temp\log4j-*.bat
  5. Scan with reputable security tool (Kaspersky, Trend, SentinelOne) to remove residual artifacts.
  6. Boot into Safe-Mode w/ Networking and run a second full scan to confirm no hidden DropperService DLL is loaded.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Decryption feasibility as of June 2024: PARTIALLY POSSIBLE.
    Kaspersky’s NoMoreRansom project hosts a free decryptor for Data3 v1.0-1.2 (LZMA-compressed AES-192 key left in victim’s temp folder). v1.3 and later fixed the key-leak bug.
    If you do NOT find a file named READMEFORDECRYPT.txt_ and your ransom note ID is 16 digits or longer (AES-256), you need backups—decryptor does not work.
  • Tool / patch:
    – Download Data3Decryptor.exe from https://www.nomoreransom.org (v2024-05-15, SHA-256: …)
    – Requires an unencrypted version of at least one file to brute-force the AES key—Tool gives clear on-screen instructions.
  • General recovery strategy: Leverage Windows Volume Shadow Copy (vssadmin list shadows) and Microsoft Veeam / Commvault snapshots—the ransomware DOES NOT consistently delete VSS or clear recycle-bin copies in earlier versions.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Unique characteristics:
    – Drops “README-TO-RESTORE-data3.txt” in every impacted directory, but the SHA-256 of this note changes daily to defeat simple hash-block lists.
    – Extensive use of Living-of-the-Land binaries (LoLBins): Bitsadmin, certutil, esentutl are abused to stage payloads and clear logs.
    – Self-terminates if it detects an active Windows Defender real-time scan to reduce early-notice alerts—then resumes once the scan cycle ends.
  • Broader Impact:
    – Indiscriminate targeting: hits both SOHO users (via cracked Adobe software) and mid-size healthcare networks (via RDP).
    – Data exfiltration element: An embedded Cobalt Strike beacon (revision 1.3+) steals spooled PDFs and SQL backups before encryption, raising breach-reporting obligations under HIPAA/GDPR.
    – Campaigns have co-opted legitimate MSI certificates (revoked only after the fact), defeating basic driver-signature checks—highlighting the need for code-integrity policies and hash-based whitelisting.

Treat all systems suspected of hosting .data3 as breached until proven otherwise. Check your IR playbooks, rotate credentials, and scan vault/Veeam snapshots in offline sandboxes before full production restore.