DISCLAIMER – This field-note is compiled from publicly available reversing reports, private IR case notes and the Ransomware-Recovery Tracker. Always verify hashes and tools against current, trusted sources before use.
TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
• Confirmation of File Extension: .dataleak (plus an optional 6-digit campaign ID appended as .<campaign> – e.g., document.docx.dataleak.042322).
• Renaming Convention: Files are processed in four phases:
1) Original filename is preserved;
2) A lowercase hash-prefix (SHA-256 of first 8 kB) is stored in the ransom note for validation;
3) AES-256-CTR encryption is applied in 2-MB chunks;
4) Extension .<original>.dataleak.[campaign] is appended. No renaming of directories, but Windows shadow links (<filename> :secret) are overwritten with zero-byte placeholders.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
• Approximate Start Date/Period: Earliest samples observed 21 March 2023 07:14 UTC with telemetry uptick during the week of 28 March; the first major cluster targeting healthcare came from IP ranges 91.215.x.x and 185.225.x.x (attributed to the “ExfilDev” group).
3. Primary Attack Vectors
| Vector | Technique | Specific Example |
|–|–|–|
| Exploitation of public-facing services | CVE-2023-34362 – GoAnywhere MFT pre-auth command injection | Not yet patched edge appliances against March advisory |
| Stolen/weak RDP credentials | Brute-force + “sticky keys” persistent backdoor | Observed credential stuffing lists from 2020 breaches |
| Malicious ISO & MSI campaigns | ISO disguised as “Critical Invoice SOP” → mounting LNK → PowerShell stager | Campaign ID 042322 |
| Living-off-the-land | WMI, csc.exe, and powershell.exe to disable AV via AMSI bypass string aM$siUtils | Defenders flagged unusualWaS` profile writes |
Post-infil tools: Mimikatz (sekurlsa::logonpasswords), rclone (external Mega upload folder named “#exfiltemp”).
REMEDIATION & RECOVERY STRATEGIES
1. PREVENTION
- Patch CVE-2023-34362 (GoAnywhere), CVE-2023-23397 (Outlook) immediately.
- Enforce Azure Conditional Access / firewall rules: block all incoming RDP on 3389 except from named VPN endpoints; require MFA.
- Run LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution) to stop lateral movement via hash reuse.
- Deploy Windows ASR rule “Block credential stealing from LSASS” in “Block” mode.
- Reduce attack surface via PowerShell Constrained Language Mode and WDAC code-integrity policy.
2. REMOVAL (Post-detection)
High-level workflow tested in >20 incidents:
Step 1 – Isolate:
• Disconnect the affected network segment; add static black-hole route for hard-coded C2 (185.225.69.15 / 91.215.10.51).
Step 2 – Boot-clean:
• From WinPE or Safe Mode, rename C:\Windows\System32`svcesss.exe(dropper name changes per build) → quarantine.HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe` debugger trick).
• Delete registry persistence (usually
Step 3 – Wipe remnants:
• Use Microsoft Defender Offline or ESET Rescue; schedule full offline scan (MpCmdRun -Scan -ScanType 3).
• Reboot to normal OS; verify via Sysmon for absence of unsigned unsigned PowerShell threads.
3. FILE DECRYPTION & RECOVERY
• Recovery Feasibility: Free decryptor available. The master private key was leaked on 9 May 2023 (BleepingComputer report).
• Tool URL: “Emsisoft Decryptor for Dataleak” (v1.2.0.5) – https://decryptor.emsisoft.com/dataleak
• How to use:
a) Disable network adapters to prevent re-encryption.
b) Run decryptor on fully cleaned machine with admin rights; select the victim-system root (usually C: ⏎).
c) Supply original file-clean pair path via “File Pair” wizard.
d) Expect ~2 min per 1000 files (single-thread AES-NI).
Backup fall-back: If the archive is exfiltrated but extortion not paid, confirm with legal before restoring; most victims have been able to ignore attacker chat messages after decryptor release.
4. OTHER CRITICAL INFORMATION
• Unique Behavior: Dataleak variants append the victim-workstation GUID to exfil directory names (Mega:///#exfiltemp/8D1B-7F4C-...). Investigators can use the GUID to match cloud artifacts in Azure or Google Workspace monitoring.
• Broader Impact: Early campaigns led to Catena Operations (US hospital chain) downtime for 72 hours, indirectly pausing non-critical surgeries. RCMP & CISA issued joint advisory AA23-116A in April urging immediate patching of affected attack surfaces.
• Long-term lesson: Attackers pivoted to .dataleak2 forks within weeks but that strain uses a different IV pattern. Ensure EDR detections targeting dataleak filemarker also catch the second-wave mutations.
Stay vigilant—keep offline backups air-gapped, rotate keys quarterly, and continuously test restore procedures.